Densho Digital Archive - Jim Tsujimura Interview (denshovh-tjim

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MR: How was the education, how did the commission educate the people? What were the avenues it used?

JT: Primarily by having hearings in several different cities. We started in Washington, D.C., went out to the California coast, Los Angeles, San Francisco. One was held in Seattle. And all were on television, televised nationally, and I believe that was the best way to get the education out.

MR: What sort of public interest was there in the hearings?

JT: We received more letters, more comments. After the commission had come around, the chapter, of course, every opportunity we had, we would talk to groups, sole groups, civic groups. But the commission, I believe, had more influence on the public, the American public and what had really, how it had gone wrong. There were powerful people like Hearst, Randolph Hearst of the newspaper. I think it was the State General Attorney Warren before he became to Supreme Court, he was for getting us out, Winchell, Walter Winchell. So they had powerful people wanting the Japanese out of the West Coast for good. They didn't want us to come back. President Roosevelt sent a special agent from the State Department, name of Munson, to study the issue. The Naval Intelligence had sent a representative, Lieutenant Commander Ringle or something like that. The FBI with J. Edgar Hoover said that no, all of them agreed that it was not necessary to move us out, and yet they did. Therefore, the commission came out with their findings of hysteria of the time, lack of government leadership.

MR: During the time Japanese were being interned, you mentioned that the press, Walter Winchell and William Randolph Hearst were pushing for internment. During the time of the commission, what was the attitude of the press and --

JT: They had changed. Long before the commission was involved or selected, Warren became, was one of the members of the Supreme Court and became the chief. He had changed his mind 180 degrees. In fact, he never did, I believe, did not write down. But he did state to one of our members that he had made two great mistakes in his lifetime, and one was the evacuation. So they had changed their mind by then. In the meantime, they knew that there was not one incident of espionage, sabotage by us who were living on the West Coast. Now, there were even many more Japanese and Japanese Americans living in Hawaii several thousand miles closer to Japan. They didn't evacuate them, only a few. And there were two separate sets of camps set up; one run by the Justice Department, one by the War Relocation Authority which we were under, and there were ten camps. The average population when full was to hold about ten thousand apiece. The Justice Department, as soon as Pearl Harbor was bombed, they went around to pick up the Japanese leaders including the Japanese Buddhist priests. So there were two different types of camps. They were in longer than we were.

MR: As you got older and listened to these reasons, wartime hysteria, lack of government leadership, did you look at the situation in Hawaii where the Japanese were a necessary part of the labor force versus the West Coast and wonder if there were other motivations?

JT: I can't think of any since they were closer to Japan. But it's also interesting that in the United States, Italian Americans, German Americans were not incarcerated or evacuated. Now there were some first-generation Germans and Italians that were but not the majority of the race. It was, ours, we thought, was strictly based on race.

MR: Thinking about the conflict between Seattle and the national chapter and considering that traditionally Japanese American culture likes unity and avoids discord, how did the conflict affect those involved?

JT: Well, it really was not a conflict. They were also going to, trying to introduce a bill to Congress, so we were working towards the same goal except in two different ways. After a while, they must have known that education was a large factor, I think, one of the largest factors, because we received so much support from the American people, but we did not have a conflict. We worked together as much as we could.

MR: And what happened to you personally at that meeting, after that meeting? Did you suffer any personal consequences?

JT: No, except from my friends that walked out. They didn't speak to me for a long time. Other than that, I just felt that that was the only way. And if we only had one chance, I just couldn't vote any other way. So it was a sudden change to the commission instead of the direct introduction of a bill.