CONFIDENTIAL
A WAR-TIME PROBLEM
THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII
AN ANALYSIS
FOREWORD
The Navy has a vital and paramount interest in maintaining the internal security of these Islands. This interest arises from the fact that, from a military point of view, the sole function of the Islands is to afford the United States an advanced Naval base.
Our interest is heightened by the certain knowledge that any internal dissension which might occur would inevitably threaten the security of our Naval base from the rear. It is also a fact that the morale of the men and officers attached to units of the fleet cannot be maintained while their families ashore are subject to attacks from disloyal elements in the population.
These are the reasons this study has been made.
Information has been collected from a wide variety of sources, and every attempt has been made to obtain a true and accurate estimate of the situation which prevails at present. Many of the facts presented here have been collected by a considerable expenditure of time and effort.
In spite of the controversial nature of the subject, a conscientious and constant effort has been made to approach the problem from an unbiased and highly objective viewpoint.
For obvious reasons, special consideration has been given to the situation as it exists on the island of Oahu.
This analysis must be considered only as a brief outline. Detailed discussion of the various steps indicated would require several hundred pages of memoranda.
THE FACTS
1. The United States is at war with Japan, Germany and Italy.
2. The Hawaiian Islands, a vital outpost and Naval base, are thickly populated by enemy aliens and their Island-born offspring.
3. A large percentage of these enemy nationals are engaged in economic pursuits essential to normal life in the Islands.
4. A number of the sons of enemy aliens have been and will be inducted into the armed forces defending the Islands.
1. To what extent do these enemy nationals threaten the security of the Islands and Naval base, and what is to be done about it?
ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS
ANALYSIS OF FACT ONE:
("The United States is at war with Japan, Germany and Italy")
This first fact has an important bearing on the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands, as follows:
(a) The alien citizens of all three countries are potentially dangerous.
(b) Japan is known to be directed and advised by German strategists. This is particularly true of the Japanese espionage system which has worked in close collaboration with the German system for several years. It must therefore be recognized that the Japanese in these islands may plan fifth column activities similar to those used by the Germans in France, Holland and Norway.
ANALYSIS OF FACT TWO:
("The Hawaiian Islands, a vital outpost and Naval base, are thickly populated by enemy nationals and their Island-born offspring.")
TABLE ONE
Name of Island / Total Population / Number of Alien Japanese / Number of
Citizen Japanese
Oahu / 285,694 / 18,000 / 65,385
Hawaii / 70,975 / 6,970 / 27,892
Maui / 45,080 / 4,330 / 17,325
Kauai / 34,718 / 3,090 / 12,371
Lanai / 3,720 / 262 / 1,048
Molokai / 5,340 / 243 / 974
(Based on U.S. Census)
This table is self-explanatory. It reflects the large number of people which would be involved in any wholesale evacuation plan, particularly on the most important island, Oahu.
ANALYSIS OF FACT THREE:
("A large percentage of these enemy nationals are engaged in economic pursuits essential to normal life in the Islands.")
TABLE TWO
Occupation / Total Workers / Total Japanese Workers / Percentage Japanese
Workers
Agriculture / 67,992 / 16,064 / 23.8%
Transportation and Commerce / 10,562 / 3,110 / 29.5%
Domestic and Personal Service / 14,377 / 8,054 / 56%
Clerical / 6,549 / 1,508 / 23.2%
Professions / 9,053 / 2,077 / 23%
Trades / 11,629 / 4,889 / 42.1%
Forestry - Fishing / 1,952 / 1,038 / 53%
Mfg. and Industry / 25,319 / 11,107 / 43.9%
Minerals / 195 / 77 / 40%
Public Service / 22,057 / 272 / 1.2%
Total / 169,688 / 48,198 / 28.4%
(Based on U.S. Census)
On the island of Oahu alone, investigation shows 91 percent of the truck farms to be operated by the Japanese. Similarly, approximately 60 percent of the retail druggists, 58 percent of the retail grocery employees, 54 percent of the workers in retail liquor establishments, 80 percent of the dairy employees, and more than 75 percent of the food handlers
ANALYSIS OF FACT FOUR:
("A number of the sons of enemy aliens have been and will be inducted into the armed forces defending the Islands.")
To date, approximately 1900 citizens of Japanese descent have been inducted into the regular Army. It is expected that an equal number remain to be inducted. It is reported that men who have already begun their service are under training and are armed, except for the last (February, 1942) group of inductees, which has been assigned to labor battalions.
THE QUESTION
("To what extent do these enemy nationals threaten the security of the Islands and Naval base, and what is to be done about it?")
This question can only be answered by analyzing, step by step, the manner in which enemy nationals can threaten our security.
THE THREAT ANALYZED
This threat consists of only three factors:
(A) Number of individuals in the islands who may be disposed to aid the
enemy.
(B) The means which they have for doing so.
(C) The opportunity which is given them to do so.
All three of these factors must exist simultaneously in order to endanger our security. Any threat, like a three-legged stool, must be based upon these three elements.
Theoretically, when any of these three factors is reduced to zero, the threat disappears. In other words, if we have -
(A) No one disposed to aid the enemy, or -
(B) If there is no means by which the enemy can be aided, or -
(C) If no opportunity is given to aid the enemy,
our security is assured.
At first glance it would appear, therefore, that the easiest way to insure security would be to reduce one of these three factors to zero. Many individuals have been strongly tempted to solve the problem in this simple manner. This is the reasoning which leads certain individuals to recommend wholesale concentration of all enemy nationals as the panacea for our troubles. This type of thinking is superficial and short-sighted, in that the practical difficulties and the possible consequences of such a program are invariably disregarded. The impracticability of such a step may be easily demonstrated.
What is the possibility of reducing Factor (A) to zero? If all the people who might conceivably aid the enemy (we must include all first and second generation Japanese, Germans and Italians) were removed from the Islands' commercial, economic and defense activities, more than 30 percent of the Islands' population would be involved. The economic life of the Islands would come to a stand-still (See Table Two). The problem of feeding, housing, guarding and providing medical care for such a number would be far beyond the power and facilities of the local authorities.
Insuperable difficulties would arise, either by attempting to concentrate these civilians on a mountain-top, or upon an outlying island, or by transporting them to the Mainland. The resentment which would be aroused by such wholesale and indiscriminate treatment would case other and perhaps more serious difficulties - the estrangement and alienation of large sections of the local population.
This has happened in the wholesale evacuation of the West Coast, following which order, many enemy aliens and nationals are reported to have plowed under and destroyed their valuable vegetable crops.
It must, therefore, be concluded that Factor (A) cannot be reduced to zero.
FACTOR (B)
It may appear that this factor can easily be reduced to zero and offers the best solution to our problem. Careful study, however, will show that this is not the case. Local authorities have already called upon all enemy nationals to voluntarily surrender their guns, pistols and swords. There are some who feel that this move insures our security. Before reaching such a conclusion, we should examine the great variety of means which may
(1) Deadly weapons: Including swords, knives, rifles, revolvers, pistols, shotguns, etc. (Many of these have been surrendered, but no careful and wide-spread ground-search has been made to determine whether still larger numbers of these weapons remain in the hands of unknown local inhabitants.
(2) Demolition materials: Such as dynamite, black powder. These may exist in quantities throughout the Territory.
(3) Incendiaries: Used either for destruction, to create panic and confusion, or to guide the enemy in an air attack; embrace gasoline, oil and bonfires of any inflammable substance. (To guarantee against the lighting of fires, every match would have to be confiscated.)
(4) Signalling the enemy: By means of rockets, fire-works, Very pistols, magnesium flares, searchlights, photo-flash bulbs and radio transmitters.
(5) Destructive tools: Axes, crowbars, heavy wrenches, pliers, machetes, or even automobiles and trucks.
(6) Propaganda aiding the enemy: Spread by means of mimeograph machines, printing presses, loud speakers, or by word of mouth.
(7) Contamination of food and water: By poison or bacteria. These means may be employed by hand
These are the means by which the enemy could be aided. It is perfectly obvious that the local inhabitants can not be deprived of most of these weapons, and it is therefore concluded that Factor (B) can not be reduced to zero.
FACTOR (C)
What is the possibility of reducing Factor (C) to zero, i.e., removing all opportunity to threaten our security? These opportunities are many, far too many to be listed here, but the most important rest upon proximity to vital areas and access to vital areas.
At present there are hundreds of enemy nationals living and working a few hundred feet from military and naval establishments. Thousands of enemy nationals live and work in close proximity to vital power, communications and public utilities installations.
Several hundred of the Japanese race daily gain access as workers to military and naval projects of the highest importance. To remove all opportunity for attack against these points, it would be necessary to:
(1) Create restricted zones about all points of military importance, including each of the above-mentioned objectives.
(2) Deny all enemy nationals employment in, and access to, all places of military importance.
(3) Guard each vital point so heavily as to
While restricted zones may be and should be established around certain vital areas, it would be extremely difficult to exclude all of the Japanese race from employment on defense projects, it would not be possible to guard each point so heavily as to the resist attack by any combination of disloyal forces.
In a situation of this kind the disloyal elements would have the choice of points of attack, and therefore might bring to bear upon any given point an overwhelming superiority of numbers and arms. To avert this threat simply by strengthening guards about each strategic objective would require such a large part of the Hawaiian Department as to cripple our defenses against an invading force. It seems clear that we can not hope, to solve our problem simply by depriving potential fifth columnists of all opportunity to do harm.
Therefore, it is concluded that Factor (C) can not be reduced to zero.
CONCLUSION
We must, therefore, conclude that this problem can not be solved either by arbitrary and wholesale attempts to sequestrate all potential enemies, or by depriving them of all means to do harm, or by denying them the opportunity to attack points of strategic importance.
This conclusion should be no cause for discouragement. To discover what measures are not possible or practicable is a step forward towards the final solution of the problem, as we shall attempt to demonstrate.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The threat remains the same as before. It still must be removed. Only one method remains which holds a promise of success. It is to attack all three factors simultaneously in such a way as to obtain a maximum protection for military and naval establishments with a minimum economic dislocation.
This method demands an entirely different approach. It requires that we abandon all thought of wholesale and indiscriminate measures. It calls for intelligent differentiation between the various groups of the local Japanese. It demands that we distinguish between real dangers and nebulous fears. It requires an accurate evaluation of the relative vulnerability of defense establishments.
In short, it substitutes knowledge for guesswork.
This can be accomplished. The plan entails:
(a) The custodial detention of all those known or strongly suspected to be dangerous.
(b) The discovery and confiscation of the most harmful of the weapons which might be used against us.
(c) The establishment of narrow restricted zones and reasonable strengthening of the guard about vital and strategic points.
It is firmly believed that this combined method may be carried out in such a way as to achieve almost 100 percent security without serious disruption of the internal structure of the Islands.
HOW CAN IT BE DONE?
Let us first consider Factor (A). It is entirely possible, even probable, that the dangerous pro-Japanese may be reduced more than 90 percent by the custodial detention of approximately 1 percent of the population. To achieve this result it is only necessary to know which among the local population are ovilly disposed.
There are many who regard the loyalty of the local Japanese as a mysterious, unfathomable, unknown quantity. Nothing could be further from the truth. Patriotism is not a theory. It is a condition which may be determined by investigation and study. It is only ignorance which has forced us, in the past, to speculate endlessly upon the loyalty of our own citizens.
At present, thanks to the work done by Intelligence, this ignorance has been largely dispelled. We are now able to state, with some degree of certainty, that a majority of the local Japanese are loyal. And we are further able to indicate which of the local Japanese may be disposed to aid the enemy.
More than six hundred persons have already been placed in custodial detention. This does not, however, represent all, or even a majority, of those who endanger our internal security. It is estimated that an additional 1500 must be placed in detention before Factor (A) has been reduced to innocuous proportions. Once this has been done, our potential enemies in the Islands will have been deprived of their leadership and can be controlled by conservative measures.
These measures apply particularly to the older aliens. Of these, the aged and infirm may be restricted to their places of abode. The agricultural workers may be restricted to the plantations and rural areas where they work (with plantation managers jointly responsible for enforcing these restrictions), without curtailing their productive capacity.
Special provisions for the disposition of active aliens in business and Kibei must be made. The Kibei are those born in
As a final insurance against disloyal and subversive activity, Japanese undercover agents must be distributed widely among the local population to give prompt warning of any attempt at organization by disaffected elements.
The above suggestions apply particularly to Oahu. It is acknowledged that the population of the other Islands contains a much higher percentage of pro-Japanese. They do not, however, threaten the security of Pearl Harbor, and their insular isolation greatly restricts their opportunity to aid the enemy. The obvious answer to this threat is heavily strengthening the guard about the few points of strategic importance (such as Maui Air Base) on outlying islands, and strengthening their inshore patrols to prevent direct communication with the enemy.
FACTOR (B)
We have already shown that we cannot hope to deprive the local population of all possible means of aiding the enemy. But we can, by careful organization and hard work, greatly reduce the number of most dangerous weapons now in their possession.
The most dangerous weapon of all is the secret radio transmitter. One of these may very well cost us one or more ships; a convoy attacked; or guide another air attack against Oahu. Can the Army, Navy, FBI, or FCC give the Commander-in-Chief positive assurance that no such station is now being operated from these Islands?
Our next objective should be caches of arms and ammunition. We dare not be satisfied by the ordered surrender of such
In addition to the above, vigorous searches should be made for high explosives and quantities of poisonous substances (several tons of arsenicals are known to be stored in the Islands where they are used as insecticides).
FACTOR (C)
We have seen that all opportunity to threaten our internal security cannot be removed.
Nevertheless, we can greatly reduce the opportunity to do harm by measures which will not seriously cripple our own economic life. These measures are as follows:
1. The total evacuation of certain areas.
As an example we may cite the all-important Northern shore of East Loch, extending from Aiea to Pearl City. This areas is unguarded. It is inhabited by Japanese families, and offers an unequalled view and access to Pearl Harbor proper, which serves as anchorage for units afloat. This area includes the Waiau power plant, which contributes power for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. Approximately 40 Japanese families live within 200 yards of the plant. This entire area should be evacuated as far as the Kamehameha Highway.
2. The establishment of narrow restricted zones about points of military importance.
These zones would greatly increase the security of vulnerable points by providing greater distance to be traversed by an attacking force and greater opportunity for defensive gun-fire. In thinly populated areas such as surround Kaneche, the zone could be a half-mile wide. In congested areas, such as the industrial water-front, the zone could be extended to half the width of the street.
3. The increased employment of mechanical barriers (barricades and barbed wire.)
These measures are already employed, to some extent. They can very profitably be extended to cover many additional points. Certain installations, such as large electric transformers, which are vulnerable to rifle fire, should be enclosed in sand-bag walls.
4. Strengthening of guards at vital points.
It is suggested that the apportionment and disposition of our present guards be carefully reviewed. Some relatively unimportant points appear to be heavily guarded, while other, more vital, places are virtually unguarded. A case in point is the very vulnerable gasoline and oil supply lines in and about the industrial water-front (Pier 30). At present it is entirely possible for saboteurs to set a large portion of this waterfront on fire.
It is felt that the increase, by 50
AMERICAN CITIZENS OF JAPANESE DESCENT IN THE ARMED FORCES
These citizens represent an important part of the local Japanese problem. As a potential threat to internal security they are part of Factor (A), Factor (B), and Factor (C). That is to say, some of them may be pro-Japanese - many of them have weapons - and most of them will have opportunity to do harm.
The entire group should, therefore, be removed as threats to security.
Not, however, by a process of demobilization! That has been tried with the Hawaii Territorial Guard, and it is believed to have proven a serious mistake!
SOLUTION
There appears to be only one practical and feasible solution for both the former members of the H.T.G. and for those American-Japanese now inducted into the regular Army. It is not a new solution, but one as old as the Roman Empire. It is the solution which has been effectively adopted by nearly every nation in Europe with respect to their minority populations.
It is to enlist these people as regular troops, to express perfect confidence in their loyalty, deal with them honestly and frankly, and transport them to other theatres of war, where their physical characteristics will not serve to confuse our own troops and endanger their personal safety.
What will we gain from this program? To begin with, we will be following the American plan which forbids racial discrimination. Secondly - we will restore to several thousand young American citizens their self-respect and the right to defend their country. Thirdly - by sending these men to war with all honors and colors flying, we will ensure the wholehearted support of their families and friends who are left behind. It is the writer's opinion, and this opinion is shared by those who know the Japanese psychology best, that no alien in this Territory, whose son or grandson is fighting for the United States, will lift his hand against that nation.
The cost and difficulty of transporting these troops to the Mainland, and thence to Ireland, Africa or France will be insignificant in comparison with the advantages gained.
The Germans used Lorrainers against Russia, not against France; The Austrians used Czech soldiers against Italy, not against Russia; the Hungarians used Transylvanians against Italians, rather than against Roumanians - and we may profit by their example and use our own Japanese citizens against Germany, rather than against Japan.
If this proposal were followed, it is predicted that a wave of relief and enthusiasm would immediately manifest itself among the local population. A good rule to follow with the Japanese is, "Always give him a chance to save his face."
DUAL CITIZENSHIP
Much has been said about the dual-citizenship of many of our own citizens. The uninformed feel that this duality of citizenship denotes divided loyalty. This is not true. Dual citizenship is merely a legal technicality forced upon our own citizens by Japanese laws - and its effect upon their fidelity to the United States is negligible.
PREREQUISITES FOR SOLUTION OF JAPANESE PROBLEM
No matter what effort is made to solve this problem there are certain fundamental requirements which must be met. They are as follows:
1. Honest and straightforward dealing with Japanese-American citizens.
No pretext, tricks or deception must be allowed to destroy the faith which these citizens have in the United States Government. Rightly or wrongly, the young men who were sent home from the Hawaii Territorial Guard to mumble shame-faced explanations to their parents and friends feel keenly that they are the victims of deception and discriminatory treatment. We have enough enemies here now; let us not make more.
2. A positive program of Americanization should be directed at the local population.
There are only three kinds of people. They are either for us, against us, or on the fence. We should do something more to bring the latter over to our side. No public, intelligent, vigorous or sustained effort to enlist the sympathy and support of the Japanese in these Islands has yet been made. The enemy has not been so neglectful - every night his radio propaganda pours into Hawaii to reach the ears of hundreds of Japanese who, hungry for their own language, defy the Army edict and huddle about illicit receiving sets.
Can we any longer afford to neglect a weapon which the enemy has found to be effective?
A well-administered program of Americanization, utilizing the English and Japanese newspapers, Japanese language broadcasts, public speeches, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, local radio, music and dramatic talent
3. Clearly defined and well-understood division of responsibility between the several departments of government.
In the past the confusion arising from poorly delimited spheres of authority has been a handicap to the solution of the Japanese problem. There has stretched between the various services veritable no-man's lands in which nothing was done. These twilight zones of debatable jurisdiction have obscured some of the most important internal security problems on the Island, among which may be mentioned - the Japanese families living on ground immediately adjacent to Pearl Harbor, the protection of the very vulnerable and valuable water-front facilities, the detection and suppression of all illegal radio transmitting stations, and the adoption of constructive Americanization programs.
4. The responsibility for solving the Japanese problem in Hawaii should only be given to those who understand the psychology of the Japanese and their local environment.
In the wrong hands, the problem may easily become aggravated rather than solved.
C.H. COGGINS
Lieutenant Commander (MC) U.S.N.