WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 Market Street
San Francisco, California
Telephone Klondike 2-2611

November 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen
SUBJECT: Hawaiian-Japanese evacuation program.

1. Based upon conferences with various officers of the Hawaiian Department, and personal observations while in the Territory of Hawaii, the undersigned has the following comments to make regarding the evacuation of Japanese from Hawaii:

a. Under existing conditions no mass evacuation of Japanese is contemplated or anticipated. However, a radical change in the military situation might make the evacuation of a large number of Japanese necessary.

b. Approximately one-third of the population of the Hawaiian Islands is of Japanese ancestry. The evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry would cripple the internal economy of the Islands, and would seriously impair the war effort. Any evacuation must, of necessity, be adjusted to the military and economic situation. Since the Japanese furnish a large percentage of labor in the Islands, most of the interests, both military and civilian, would not favor large-scale evacuation at this time.

c. The present Hawaiian-Japanese evacuation plan is not thoroughly crystallized. The present plan provides for the evacuation of the following classes of Japanese:

(1) Families of individuals now interned on the Mainland;
(2) Individuals and families on relief;
(3) Individuals, together with their families, who are considered as undesirable as residents of Hawaii during wartime;
(4) Individuals and families who have expressed a desire for repatriation to Japan;
(5) Individuals and families who have requested relocation on the Mainland;
(6) Kibeis and their families.

d. Long-range planning for evacuation is extremely difficult due to the uncertainty of the availability of boat transportation.

e. Under present plans, the probable number to be evacuated is approximately 3,000. This evacuation will be spread over a considerable period, possibly several months.

f. Each contemplated evacuation case is considered individually and, after approval, an individual exclusion notice is issued.

g. The present evacuation is largely a token evacuation to satisfy certain interests which have strongly advocated movement of Japanese from the Hawaiian Islands.

h. The entire evacuation program may include only a few Transfer Units, and may be suspended entirely after the individuals listed in paragraph 1-c-(1) above, have been evacuated.

2. The official figure for the number of Japanese to be evacuated from the Hawaiian Islands is 15,000, as authorized by the War Department, but the estimate of 3,000, as given above, appears to be the maximum in view of the present situation. As of November 17, 1942, 315 Japanese had been notified that they were to be evacuated, 50 from the Island of Oahu, and the balance from the Island of Hawaii. These are in addition to 107 in Transfer Unit No. 1.

3. The current action toward evacuation of certain selected Japanese is not a sudden development, and does not indicate that the Hawaiian Department considers the present situation as dangerous. The evacuation now contemplated is primarily for the purpose of removing non-productive and undesirable Japanese and their families from the Islands.

David J. McFadden
Captain, Infantry