REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS
REGARDING JAPANESE QUESTION
ON THE COAST
Los Angeles, Calif.
December 20, 1941
(C.B. Munson)

This report should be read in conjunction with your observer's pre-war report on the "Japanese on the West Coast," and his report entitled "Report on Hawaiian Islands." Our report on "Hawaiian Islands" should be attached to and become part of our report on "Japanese on the West Coast." We did not repeat many basic statements originally embodied in the first report ("Japanese on the West Coast") in the later report ("Report on the Hawaiian Islands") as these statements had already been made and held good in both cases.

We desire respectfully to call attention to a statement of the Secretary of the Navy evidently made to some reporter on his return to Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack as printed in the Los Angeles Times of December 15th and the Los Angeles Herald and Express of December 16th, (marked in red, clipping enclosed.) This release was a J.P. and A.P. release.

We quote, "I think the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway," Secretary of the Navy Knox said. We suggest that this paragraph creates the wrong impression in that it uses the term "Fifth Column." This term is loose and has been widely abused. Should not the term "complete physical espionage" have been used instead? "Physical espionage" is supplied unwittingly the gabble of Navy wives, by the gabble of loyal second generation Japanese, by the gabble of the postman and the milkman and classified by definite agents of a foreign government. To this may be added years of photographing, sounding and "look seeing" by disloyal and paid agents of this same foreign government due to the abject lexity of the

American people for the last twenty years. Fifth Column activities, such as in Norway, impugnes the loyalty of a certain large proportion of a population. Your observer still doubts that this was the case in Honolulu. He doubts, for instance, that outside of sabotage, organized and paid for by the Imperial Japanese Government beforehand (i.e. professional work), that there was any large disloyal element of the Japanese population which went into action as a Fifth Column, running around and intentionally disrupting things on their own hook. We draw attention to the remark in the Secretary's report that people of Japanese ancestry employed at Pearl Harbor burnt their hands on machine gun barrels firing at Japanese planes.

What makes this physical espionage so effective and dangerous on the West Coast and in Honolulu, as we printed in our first report, is simply that there are a lot of Japanese in these districts and have been for years. For instance, we are given to understand that the best maps on the Aleutian Islands were and still are Japanese.

Some reaction of an undesirable nature is already apparent on the West Coast due to this statement of the Secretary's. In Honolulu your observer noted that the seagoing Navy was inclined to consider everybody with slants eyes bad. This thought stems from two sources; self-interest, largely in the economic field, and in the Navy usually from pure lack of knowledge and the good old "eat 'em up alive" school. It is not the measured judgment of 98% of the intelligence services or the knowing citizenry either on the mainland or in Honolulu. An observer can only report what he observes. Your observer must note without fear or favor that 99% of the most intelligent views on the Japanese, by military, official and civil contacts in Honolulu and the mainland, was best crystalized by two Intelligence men before the outbreak of the war. These two men are Lieutenant Commander K.D. Ringle of the 11th Naval District in Los Angeles and Mr. Shivers in Honolul of the F.B.I. Mr.

Shivers in Honolulu, since the attack on Pearl Harbor, should know whether he was right or wrong, and we believe he is big and loyal enough to be only interested in finding out in what regards he was wrong and immediately notifying his superiors. In our first report we quoted Alice in Wonderland,

"If seven maids with seven 'mops
Swept it for half a year,
Do you suppose, the Walrus said,
That they could get it clear?"

The best measured judgment on the local Japanese may be wrong. Mr. Shivers in Honolulu holds the key. An attack is the proof of the pudding. His hindsight should be of inestimable value in shaping policy toward these people on the mainland where an attack has not yet occurred. Your observer guesses by mental telepathy that Mr. Shivers has not changed his point of view. Your observer suspects that Secretary Knox's comparison to the Fifth Column in Norway stems from either of two things: First, a very busy man being caught by the coattails by a reporter; and second, from the unknowing "eat 'em up alive" element amongst whom of necessity he was largely exposed in his hurried visit to determine responsibility.

Your reporter, fully believing that his original reports are still good after the attack, makes the following observations anent handling the Japanese "problem" on the West Coast.

If Shivers says he was wrong, your observer is wrong too, and this report should be thrown in the ashcan and something much tougher substituted.

SUGGESTIONS

A. The loyal Japanese citizens should be encouraged by a statement from high government authority and public attitude toward them outlined.

B. Their offers of assistance should be accepted through such agencies as:

1. Civilian Defense

2. Red Cross

3. U.S.O., etc., etc.

C. An alien property custodian should be appointed to supervise Issei (first generation-alien) businesses, but encouraging Nisei (second generation-American citizen) to take over.

D. Accept investigated Nisei as workers in defense industries such as shipbuilding plants, aircraft plants, etc.

E. Put responsibility for behavior of Issei and Nisei on the leaders of Nisei groups such as the Japanese American Citizens League.

F. Put the responsibility for production of food (vegetables, fish, etc.) on Nisei leaders.

Enlargement of Foregoing Suggestions

A. "High Government Authority," i.e. President or Vice-President, or at least almost as high.

C. Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production and Distribution Situation in the Los Angeles Area following December 7, 1941

The immediate results at the revocation of all licenses authorizing Japanese Nationals to engage in business was a sharp curtailment of the movement of vegetable produce into the Los Angeles market. This was due to the closing of a number of houses in the local produce market owned or controlled by Japanese Nationals and to a fear on the part of the Japanese Nationals on the farms that their produce would not be received or handled if they brought it in; also due to the immediate blocking of all bank accounts of Japanese Nationals.

It was at once obvious that some provisions must quickly be made to relieve the stoppage of food production and distribution. Under the assumption that they would be asked for advice for a plan of reopening the several closed Issei produce houses under Federal control, a plan was discussed and tentatively

drawn up by a group of local produce dealers.

In anticipation of a lessening of these restrictions a press release was issued on December 11th calling upon Japanese farmers to bring their products to market as evidence of their loyalty to the United States and assuring them that these products would be received by American firms for marketing. Issuance of the General License No. 77 under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940 as amended and Regulations issued pursuant thereto relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc. issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 11, 1941, granted a general license under strict banking control for certain Japanese Nationals to engage in the production, marketing and distribution of food products in Continental United States.

As a result of the press release and the issuance of General License above referred to, the local produce market which on December 11th had a total volume of only 30 per cent of normal, received 75 per cent of normal on December 12th and was virtually normal on December 13th. In spite of the apparent severity of the banking controls set up by this General License, it was generally accepted by all concerned as a necessary thing and discussions were immediately undertaken as to the most effective means of operating under its terms without severe dislocation of the food production program.

Since the new license No. 77 immediately allowed the Issei produce houses to open under their former management in a manner more lenient than had been expected, it was still believed that these houses would be promptly taken over directly or indirectly by the Federal Government so as to transfer their operations to the control of American citizens. This was particularly expected because of the belief that operation of

these houses had been strongly influenced and directed previously by the Japanese Government.

"As discussions were proceeding looking to the setting up of a successful program for gradually taking over these essential businesses by American citizens and as clarification of a few points in the General License above mentioned were being requested, these discussions running over into Monday, December 15th, we were suddenly surprised to receive copies of General License No. 66a under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940, as amended and regulations issued pursuant thereto, relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 15, 1941. We assume that this order may have been issued as a result of the wave of query and protest that may have arisen immediately following the realization of the total freezing situation which occurred immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. At any rate, the effect of General License No. 68a which appears to open wide the doors so far as Continental transactions are concerned, and puts a great number of Japanese Nationals back in control, rather than the loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage, many of whom we had expected would be put in control of these essential businesses.

"It has been and is our belief that the objectionable features of the old control system have operated by virtue of control over consignments of merchandise and credits exercised by the Issei produce houses against the Japanese on the farms. Of prime necessity then is the complete elimination of Japanese National control of the produce houses. How far into the farms the

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