CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

October 9, 1942

SUBJECT: Separation of Kibei from Nisei

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

1. With reference to my letters, dated August 23, 1942, and September 8, 1942, both subject as above, and letter dated October 2, 1942, subject, "Retention of Japanese Evacuees in War Relocation Projects," there is inclosed herewith a report of the Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles, California, dated September 13, 1942, pertaining to certain Japanese at the Manzanar Relocation Project.

2. The attached report is comprehensive. Unquestionably, the rumors attributed to the speakers, if true, are seditious. It discloses that the meeting was one of protest against the social-economic-political position of the evacuees as well as a criticism of the management. The Japanese who made the remarks undoubtedly have been seditious at heart for an extended period, and the meeting furnished an opportunity for the more articulate and less timorous to vent their thoughts.

3. Reports from qualified observers state that the Japanese morale at the Relocation Projects is rapidly deteriorating. The situation, if true, appears to be briefly as follows:

a. The younger Nisei have exhausted their personal funds and are rapidly becoming dependent upon their elders for monetary allowances. The older Issei are attaining a greater family control over their children than was their control prior to evacuation. They are taking advantage of this situation to argue to their children that as Americans they have no rights and must look to Japan for relief from their present situation. The Nisei are said to be despairing of their future.

b. In the meantime, the Kibei claim to be occupying a very superior position. They assert that if the United States wins the war, they, the Kibei, who alone know Japan, its language and customs, must be at least the minor officials or key personnel in a military government of Japan by the United States. If Japan should win, the Kibei will be the

governing officials in this country. According to this theory, the Kibei cannot possibly lose. They need only bide their time. Their attitude is said to be galling to the Nisei.

4. The foregoing facts, if true, indicate the necessity for early action in the segregation of the presumptively good Japanese from the essentially bad Japanese. To leave them together much longer is bound to atrophy what loyalty some of the Japanese (number unknown) may have had to this country, and perhaps to make them perpetually pro-Japanese. The recommendations contained in my letters of August 23, 1942, September 8, 1942, and October 2, 1942, above referred to, are reiterated.

J.L. DeWITT
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding