9 September 1981

Rita Takahashi Cates
_______________
Cheney, Washington 99004

Ms. Joan Z. Bernstein, Chairperson
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
726 Jackson Place, N.W. Suite 2020
Washington, D.C. 20506

Subject: Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians

I, RITA TAKAHASHI CATES, submit the following written testimony to the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians:

I. Personal Identification:

I am Rita Takahashi Cates, an assistant professor at Eastern Washington University's School of Social Work and Human Services and the Graduate School of Public Administration.

For approximately three years, I have been involved in researching and writing related to evacuation and internment of persons of Japanese ancestry. In 1978 and 1979, I resided in Washington, D.C., for the purpose of researching historical documents deposited at the National Archives and Records Service. As a result of this research, I completed my Ph.D. dissertation, "Comparative Administration and Management of Five War Relocation Authority Camps: America's Incarceration of Persons of Japanese Descent During World War II" (September, 1980, University of Pittsburgh). Prior to completion of this dissertation, I finished a master's thesis and Ph.D. competency paper, "'Military Necessity': An Effective Rhetorical Tool for Policy Implementation and Social Change. The Plight of Japanese in America During World War II" (Spring, 1978, University of Pittsburgh).

In addition to these academic documents, I have written several papers about the relocation and evacuation policies and programs. Several have been presented at professional conferences in the last two years.

II. Introduction:

This testimony deals with two major areas: government negligence and exploitation. Throughout the evacuation, relocation, and internment processes, government officials were negligent in protecting evacuee property rights, and in ensuring the security of in individual rights. Furthermore, government officials exploited evacuees by milking them for labor resources and policy/program gains.

After discussion of issues related to negligence and exploitation, this testimony concludes with recommendations for the Commission's consideration and action.

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III. Discussion of Issues:

A. Government Negligence: Property Rights:

Local, state and federal government officials were negligent in protecting evacuees' property rights. On local and state levels, limited efforts were expended to protect the interests of evacuated persons of Japanese ancestry. Because little protection was offered by local and state authorities, field days were declared for thieves and vandals. Poston's senior reports officer, Allan Markley, reported that

It is in the property officer's records that one will find some of the most pathetic stories. Often the savings of a lifetime have been erased by conditions over which these people have had very little control.

Many times personal property was left in the custody of people in whom the evacuee had faith, and later was to learn that it was next to impossible to recover their possessions. Numerous cases of theft and vandalism have been reported from the places where treasured possessions were stored.(1)

Despite multiple cases of property infringements, insufficient efforts were expended by local and state officials to eliminate and prevent further property abuses. According to T. I. Reynolds, the War Relocation Authority (WRA) Evacuee Property Division representative from Gila River,

...trespassers and tort feasers were not a little aided and abetted by the laissez-faire attitude of state law enforcement agencies which, more often than not, found it convenient to be elsewhere while the bull was being gored.(2)

Allan Markley explained the problem and issue in further detail:

The saddest commentary on the whole situation not only in this small California town but in others where similar cases have been investigated by the Evacuee Property Officer from Poston, is that local authorities apparently do very little to restrain the vandals. The attitude has been, in too many cases, that if it belonged to an evacuee family, no one cared what happened to it. One police official in a southern California town is reported to have openly stated that he was not intending to protect property left by the evacuees.(3)

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Pointing a finger at the government, Reynolds specified some of the results of government negligence:

By far the greatest hurdle was thievery, conversion, vandalism and cannibalization. The blame for this must rest with the government for its failure to secure property rights simultaneously with human rights. Evacuees lost many thousands of dollars and great deal of property as a result of this oversight. Farm equipment was impossible to buy on the retail market, and consequently this apparently abandoned and uprooted property was an easy mark for anyone badly in need of equipment. The rental value of farm implements misappropriated would total a small furtune.(4)

In Reynold's assessment, government could and should have provided greater protection of evacuee property. In his words,

...it should have been no more difficult to place [evacuee] property under lock and key than it was to place the individual in a Relocation Center. If the law was stretched that far it could have been pulled out a little farther.(5)

Evacuees faced additional problems by inadequate representation from private attorneys and representatives and by public officials. Gila's project attorney, for example, uncovered "numerous" cases where evacuees "...were not being adequately served or protected by their representatives" and where public property offices were rendered ineffective.(6) Gila River's project attorney, Hendrick Terry, analyzed the problem:

...it was evident that the Property Division on the Coast was reluctant to take incisive action, such as demand prosecution, in cases involving criminal activities against evacuees, such as thefts, frauds and wanton destruction of property. Numerous reasons for failure to act in such cases were advanced by various officials of the Property Division, and many of such reasons were not without. justification. Nevertheless the fact remains that the Authority [WRA] did not even see fit to make a complete and adequate record by calling each such case to the attention of the appropriate prosecuting official or officials and the appropriate police or other investigating authority, in writing, every time such case arose.(7)

While local and state officials neglected evacuee interests by not protecting against property losses, federal officials also failed

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by not immediately responding to evacuee needs. During the initial stages of evacuation and relocation, legal services, advice and consultations were imperative. Government, however, was tardy and negligent in providing these services. Attorneys and property officers arrived late in most WRA centers, and failed to provide needed representation during the critical period. At Gila River, for example, there was no property officer for the first nine (9) months of operation. Furthermore, there was no project attorney during the first four (4) months. "Consequently, according to Gila's Property Division representative, "the tardy opening of an evacuee property program had the same effect as closing the barn door and going to look for the horses." (8)

In T. I. Reynold's final assessment, government's failure to protect evacuee property and property interests from the beginning, "...caused irreparable damage to the evacuees both from a morale and financial standpoint."(9) In addition, he indicated that

The lapse of time, or perhaps lapse of thinking, was not without its consequences... their rights and interests were being violated and abused without mercy, and without fear of discovery or penalty. Yet there was not a single person on the Center, until the Project Attorney arrived in November, 1942, who was qualified and authorized to assist evacuees in these matters.(10)

Emphasizing that there was a tremendous need for legal services, particularly as they related to property and property interests, Gila's project attorney reported that a "large number" of requests for legal assistance were made after his appointment.(11) Because of the backlog of cases, and due to shortage of staff time, immediate services could not be rendered.

By the time Gila's property office was opened, "...the bird was pretty well picked."(12) Furthermore, only one person was assigned to provide services to the large community. Exasperated, the property officer submitted that:

A little more vision, or perhaps a deeper analysis of the problem, would have shown that one man was totally inadequate effectively to attend the needs of 14,000 evacuees making up 4,000 to 5,000 family units. They all had property problems, and certainly no other group had ever succeeded in becoming invovled in the multiplicity of complex and complicated entanglements that they did.(13)

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B. Government Negligence: Individual Rights:

After losing their individual liberty, evacuees were subjected to deplorable living conditions. In most instances, government officials were aware of health and safety hazards; nevertheless, many deficiencies were not attended to. Sanitation, for example, was a problem in most camps.

At Gila River, for example, there were times when untreated, raw sewage remained in pools less than 200 feet from living quarters. According to William J. Furuta, Chief Sanitation Officer and Supervisor of Gila's Hospital Laboratory, there was "...about a quarter of an acre of untreated sewage exposed to flies," which created "a definite nuisance and health hazard."(14)

Not only did exposed sewage provide a breeding ground for mosquito larvae, but also other pools of stagnant water posed a health hazard.(15) Making matters worse, "...very little provision was made for the collection of barrack refuse. As a result, rubbish of all kinds"(16) were heaped -around shower rooms at Gila River.(17)

Gila's sanitation problems also extended to the drinking water and milk. First, there was a shortage of milk, then the bacteriologic counts were excessively high.(18) In 1942-1943, the U.S. Public Health bacteria standards were set at 10,000 per cubic centimeter. Milk counts in excess of 50,000 were to be condemned.(19) Bacteriologic levels at Gila oftentimes far exceeded the condemnation point, especially during 1943. An examination on June 16, 1943, for example, pointed out a count of 750,000 per cubit centimeter. Samples taken a month later still pointed out high levels. On July 22, 1943, the count was 552,000.(21) An "alarming" count of 2,500,000 was recorded in September, 1943.(22) Essentially, evacuees consumed contaminated milk for months, despite government's knowledge of high bacteriologic counts.(23)

Other camps experienced similar health hazardous conditions. Although government was on notice, improvements were not made with all deliberate speed.

Housing inadequacies are well-documented in various publications, as well as in deposited archive records. Many evacuees were crowded into small living spaces, before construction was com­pleted. To compound evacuees' sorry plight, some camp administrators placed higher priorities on their own staff housing. This factor, plus the shortage of lumber and materials, limited construction efforts during the first half of 1943. Therefore, most work was limited to repair work, remodelling, building housing for WRA Caucasian personnel, and miscellaneous other buildings such as hog pens, root cellars and packing sheds.(24) Government, therefore, did not expend energy or resources to relieve severely-crowded evacuee living quarters.

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One WRA document revealed the degree of housing shortage. Although a barrack building measured 24 by 100 feet, the one-story, rectangular buildings were divided into three or four apartments. The following table outlines the average number of persons per apartment, the number of apartments originally constructed, and the number of cases where the apartment was shared.

WRA EVACUEE HOUSING(25)

WRA Projects; Apts. Originally Built; Persons Per Apartment; No. of Cases where Apt. was Shared
Colorado River; 4,320; 4.51; 691
Gila River; 3,024; 4.65; 581
Heart Mountain: 2,818; 3.83; 342
Manzanar; 1,872; 4.85; 928
Tule Lake; 4,247; 3.79; 389

The hastily-constructed housing material included green wood, which eventually dried in the heat. Large cracks -- and oftentimes large holes (due to knots falling out) -- were created after shrinkage. These large crevices and holes allowed bugs, insects, dust, etc. to enter living quarters.

Evacuees were typically plagued by severe dust problems, due to lack of vegetation. Although officials were aware that dust posed a health hazard (e.g. Valley Fever), effective remedial efforts were not vigorously pursued. Consequently, evacuees had little relief from the dust, even within their own homes, since dust entered through large wood gaps and holes.

Other evidence of government negligence is extensively documented in this writer's Ph.D. dissertation, in government documents and in various government and private publications.

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B. Government Exploitation:

Before and during evacuation, relocation and internment processes, government officials assessed the advantages to be reaped from evacuee resources. In many instances, government officials took advantage of the "captive" population, and deliberately used their services to achieve governmental objectives.

On February 18, 1942 -- one day before Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 -- George P. Clements, a Counselor from Agriculture and Conservation, wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Services, John Collier, saying:

It seems to me that the temporary internement (sic) of the Japanese on the Reservation would enable the Indian Department to put the ground in shape for agricultural occupation by the Indian on removal of the Japanese, possibly

without any expense for that preparation. Give that a thought. It seems to be the most rational program so far presented.(26)

Collier favored the possibility of having evacuees settle on reservation land, since evacuees could be used for clearing the land and preparing it for agricultural production. A teletype message from H. A. Van Norman, Chief Engineer and General Manager, under Commissioner Collier, to S. B. Robinson in Washington, D.C., identified advantages of relocating the Japanese to Colorado River: "...The Japanese could be employed to clear, level and put into production the additional acreage needed which would result in permanent improvement that could be settled by return soldiers at the expiration of the war..."(27)

Commissioner Collier also identified other areas where evacuees could be put to good use. He made it clear that evacuees on open range land "...would be expected to contribute work in the building of check-dams, stock-water tanks, in shelter-belt planting, etc."(28)

Ultimately, two of the ten War Relocation Authority camps were situated on Indian reservations. Commissioner Collier entered into agreements with WRA, which confirmed that the Indian Affairs' interests would be served. For example, at Colorado River, 20,000 acres were to have been subjugated and planted.(29) According to Collier,

In resettling these Japanese, public and Indian­owned lands were placed at the disposal of the War Relocation Authority. The justification for this action was based on the announced policy of the Authority, that (a) raw land would be improved, and (b) that surplus foods would be raised to meet the war-

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time food needs of the Nation.(30)

Gila River, also located on reservation land, was selected because of its potential for continuous vegetable production throughout the year.(31) It was anticipated that evacuee farmers, with years of experience and skill related to vegetable production, could be tapped for production at Gila. Because approximately half of Gila's 16,000 acres were "undeveloped" land, evacuees were expected to clear and prepare the land. A conference, including officials from WRA, the Office of Indian Affairs, and the Superintendent of the Pima Indian Agency, resulted in an understanding that:

...The land was never used for farming, and WRA had to build the irrigation structure.

All lands were new and in their native condition. Eighty per cent of the land area selected for cultivation was covered with native sagebrush. This sagebrush had to be cut loose from the ground, piled, and burned before seed-beds could be prepared. (32)

As was true of Colorado River and Gila River residents, evacuees at Heart Mountain were expected to clear, develop and farm virgin public lands.

Evacuees were expected to provide similar labor services at other centers. At Tule Lake, for example, portions of the 26,000 acres were undeveloped. The landowner, the Federal Bureau of Reclamation, expected that the Reclamation lands would "...be developed by the evacuees for irrigation in line with the plans of the Reclamation Service."(33)

Evacuees were paid a maximum salary of $19 per month. Professionals and highly skilled laborers received this salary, while others received $12 or $16 per month. In many instances -- particularly

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when evacuees were under the jurisdiction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) -- evacuees received tardy payments (and in some cases, no payment).

Government officials also used evacuees to implement policies and programs --especially unpopular, controversial ones. Camp officials attempted to use "leaders" to push policies and programs. This was especially true when WRA officials pushed registration, community government and community enterprises programs. In many instances, persons associated with unpopular programs became "live bait" for personal attacks and abuses.

In other instances, government officials encouraged and promoted informant activities, which only led to greater camp unrest and long-term evacuee resentments. Furthermore, it led to multiple splits in the communities -- splits that continue to have an impact upon persons of Japanese ancestry.

IV. Summary and Recommendations:

During World War II, local, state and federal governments neglected the evacuee property rights and individual rights. In this testimony, examples have been given, based upon documentation at the National Archives and Records Service in Washington, D.C. It has been shown that although government officials were on notice, they continued to neglect the needs of the evacuee population. In some instances, such neglect led to extensive property losses; in other cases, the neglect led to health hazards and health problems.

Simultaneous to the multiple areas of government neglect, government officials exploited evacuees by taking advantage of their "captive" status and putting them to work for very low salaries. It was government's deliberate and planned policy to use evacuee labor to clear, to prepare and to farm what was previously virgin, undeveloped land. Evacuees, who had limited choices under the circumstances, were the ultimate losers to such a game plan.

In light of these -- as well as other fully-documented evidence of government abuses, exploits and neglect, this writer recommends the following:

1. Monetary awards to all persons who were incarcerated by the government, on the basis of ancestral heritage.

2. Lifetime health benefits which cover preventive and restorative medical services.

3. Special funds for grants to support further research into issues related to wartime incarceration, relocation, and in internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War

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Potential research issues include policy formulation, initiation, implementation and post implementation processes, dynamics and impacts. Such research will have wide-ranged implications for other groups, in that such research findings have relevance to phenomena associated with other total institutions.

Research is imperative to get at pressing questions related to WCCA and WRA policies and programs. In the area of policy formulation, multiple issues and questions have been posed about inter-group (e.g. various pressure groups, including Veterans of Foreign Wars, Native Sons of the Golden West, etc.) and intra-group (e.g. the Japanese American Citizens League) inputs and involvements in decision-making processes. Additional policy-related issues include impacts these inputs have upon actual policy initiation and implementation, and incorporate long-term ramifications.

Currently, there is an educational gap in knowledge about this phase in history. In filling educational and historical gaps, diverse policies must be analyzed, with the benefit of a whole range of information, garnered from extensive research.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Allan Markley, Senior Reports Officer, "Special Report: Many Evacuees Have Suffered Property Loss," August 14, 1943, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 4, Box 26, Exhibit 5 of Final Report --Evacuee Property Section, Colorado River Relocation Center, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1943, p. 1.

2. T. I. Reynolds, Evacuee Property Division Officer, "Final Report: Evacuee Property Division," n.d., Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 4, Box 35, File: Gila River Final Report, Evacuee Property by T. I. Reynolds, Gila River Relocation Center, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., n.d., p. 6.

3. Allan Markley, p. 3.

4. T. I. Reynold, pp. 26-27.

5. Ibid., p. 53.

6. James Hendrick Taylor, "Final report of Gila Project Attorney," October 26, 1945, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 4, Box 35, file: Gila River -- Final Report, Project Attorney, by James Terry, Gila River Relocation Center, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1945, p. 46.

7. Ibid., p. 47.

8. T. I. Reyno1ds, p. 6.

9. Ibid., p. 52.

10. Ibid., p. 5.

11. James Hendrick Taylor, p. 11.

12. T. I. Reynolds, p. 7.

13. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

14. William J. Furuta, Chief Sanitation Officer, Supervisor of Hospital Laboratory, Memorandum to Douglas R. Collier, M. D., Acting Chief Medical Officer, August 28, 1943, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 48, Box 16, File: 561: Sewer, Gila River, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1943.

15. William J. Furuta, Sanitation Corps, Memorandum to Jack Sleath, Medical Chief, September 2, 1942, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 48, Box 14, File: 549: health (General, Plans), Gila River, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1942.

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16. Jack C. Sleath, Medical Chief, Report to E. R. Smith, August 6, 1942, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 48, Box 15, file: 549: Reports, Gila River, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. , 1942, p. 1.

17. Ibid.

18. William J. Furuta, "Bacteriologic Counts of Milk Examined at Laboratory, Rivers Community Hospital," August 11, 1943, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 48, Box 14, File: 450: Health (General, Plans), Gila River, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1943.

19. Douglas R. Collier, Acting Chief Medical Officer, Memorandum to Mr. Harold Keadle, Chief Steward, August 11, 1943, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 48, Box 14, File: 540: Health (General, Plans), Gila River, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1943, pp. 1-2.

20. William J. Furuta, "Bacteriologic Counts of Milk Examined at Laboratory, Rivers Community Hospital," August 11, 1943.

21. Ibid.

22. Douglas R. Collier, Acting Chief Medical Officer, Memorandum to Mr. Harold Keadle, Chief Project Steward, September 2, 1943, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 48, Box 14, File: 540: Health (General, Plans), Gila River, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C., 1943.

23. Documentation and report are fully addressed in Rita Takahashi Cates, "Comparative Administration and Management of Five War Relocation Authority Camps: America's Incarceration of Persons of Japanese Descent During World War II," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh School of Social Work, September, 1980, pp. 180-181.

Sections of this testimony are taken from this dissertation.

24. United States War Relocation Authority, Semi-Annual Report: January 1 to June 30, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: War Relocation Authoirty, 1943), p. 28.

25. War Relocation Authority, Community Management Division, "Evacuee Housing," Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 2, Box 128, File: Welfare and Housing, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, D.C., n.d.

26. George P. Clements, M.D. Counselor, Agriculture and Conservation, Letter to John Collier, February 18, 1942, Interior Branch, Collier Collection, Record Group 75, Box 17, T-W, File: "Internment of Japs on Indian Lands," National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1942.

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27. H. A. Van Norman, Chief Engineer and General Manager, Telegram

to S. B. Robinson, March 3,1942, Interior Branch, Record Group 75, Box 17,

T-W, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1942.

28. John Collier, Letter to Secretary Harold Ickes, March 4, 1942,

Interior Branch, Record Group 75, Box 17, T-W, File: "Internment of Japs

on Indian Land," National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.,

1942.

29. John Collier, Memorandum (not specified to whom), "Unrealized Food Production Capacities at Japanese Relocation Centers," January 7,1943, Interior Branch, Record Group 75, Collier Collection, Box 17, T-W, File: "Part 2, Internment of Japs from Indian Land," National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1943, p. 2.

30. Ibid., p. 1.

31. Conference of A. E. Robinson, Superintendent of Pima Indian Agency,

A. L. Walker, Office of Indian Affairs, P. J. Webster and C. E. Zimmer, WRA, April 8, 1942, Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 48, Box 1, File: 005: Cooperation, Gila River, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., 1942.

32. Glenn T. Hartman, Chief of Agriculture, Final Report of Agriculture Section, [1945,] Social and Industrial Branch, Record Group 210, Entry 4, Box 56, File: Agriculture, Heart Mountain, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C., [1945,] p. 7.

33. War Relocation Authority, First Quarterly Report: March 18 to

June 30, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: WRA, 1942, p. 9.