Record No. 13 - 14
Colonel Bendetsen - Mr. Braun
January 22, 1943 Time: 4:45 p.m.
Evelyn M. Rudy

SUBJECT:

B: Go ahead.

Br: First, for my information, and it may be useful, I tried to boil down the plan into a basic statement; "That all American citizens of Japanese ancestry are to be examined by a joint Board. (a) males of draft age to be certified as to loyalty to the Selective Service and same will be drafted for full combat service. (b) The balance to be certified to War Relocation Authority for release for employment in warplants, etc. and in effect be given complete freedom of action. (c) Certification to be based upon (1) questionnaire (2) record, if any, with ONI, G-2 and FBI (3) Western Defense Command check of those which are doubtful. The basic factor in the plan is the premise that it is now possible to determine the loyalty of disloyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry and that the Board in effect guarantee and accept wholly the responsibility for the future action of those which it certifies as loyal. (Paragraph)

At the time of evacuation, many elements in our population charged that it was unnecessary and based on hysteria and/or pressure from selfish West Coast interests desiring to rid the West Coast area of Japanese. The Army answered this by positively stating that a Military necessity existed. Critics then questioned the necessity for mass total evacuation and asked why it was not confined to aliens or others known to be disloyal. There was considerable public discussion at the time as to why loyalty boards were not used. These critics were answered by statements, direct and indirect from authorities, that it was substantially impossible to determine the loyalty of Japanese. Cited, were ties of race, religion, customs, positions, and the fact that the group had largely been unassimilated. (Paragraph)

On the other hand, a majority of the public was not critical of the evacuation, but on the contrary whole-heartedly indorsed the mass evacuation and in my opinion still views all Japanese with suspicion. (Paragraph)

Thus in viewing the public relations of the proposed plan, there are 2 definite problems created. (1) Those elements originally

critical of mass evaluation will ask: Why was not loyalty determined during the Assembly Center phase if it can be done now? (2) Those major elements in the population that view Japanese with suspicion may or may not now accept them in view of the proposed certification by the Board. It is doubtful if they will be accepted unless a very substantial and logical selling job is done. And so far as the substantial and logical selling job is done. And so far as the Western states are concerned, it is probably that this area will remain recalcitrant in spite of such a selling job." That's it.

B: Oh, very good. A darn good statement. Thanks very much.

Br: Well I tried to make it temporate.

B: Well I think you succeeded very well in doing that.

Br: And at the same time to point out the two major things, you see. Of those who were critical and those who were favorable.

B: I think also that the latter paragraph might be expanded a bit by showing that notwithstanding the selling effect of a certificate, that there will be families which must be considered as a unit and there'll be no certificate on the remainder.

Br: That's right.

B: Which would tend to weaken the case, and probably not soften the communities.

Br: Yes. Hub also raises a further point, which I have no basis for judgement on this one, but he raises the point that there are not now in existence sufficient records either in G-2, ONI or FBI upon which to base a determination of loyalty or disloyalty.

B: Well that's of course... I think Hub is probably right about that, but I don't know that the Commanding General would have any warrant for saying that. He may not have enough records but does he know that they do not exist elsewhere?

Br: That's right.

B: I believe Hub is probably right. If he wasn't right, then why would they want to refer it out here for investigation? Well, very good. I'm a little ... I'd like to throw this one at you. In thinking this one over today somewhat, I'd like you to talk it over if you have any time, give it a little thought tonight, maybe you've already thought it thru - I haven't. Looking at

the evacuation not with hind sight, but viewed in the time, it was a time and space affair. It wasn't entirely that we flatfootedly announced that it was impossible to determine loyalty, it was a location ... a space and time affair. We couldn't afford to take the chance - their location was such that they were deployed along very strategic areas of the frontier and great concentrations.

Br: Karl I had thought about that one, which is why I most deliberately phrased one of the questions which I phrased, namely, - Why was not loyalty determined during the Assembly Center phases? You have there solved both your time and space factor.

B: Perhaps you have.

Br: The fact that it was not done at that point, is the chief hook in this whole business, in my opinion.

B: That goes on to answer the incidental question "Why spend the additional 80 million to build relocation centers?

Br: You had them under control but you had not yet moved them inland -- you had not yet spent any 80 million dollars -- you had accomplished the main thing as to time and space. And at that point, if you could determine loyalty, it should then have been done.

B: And that will have to be answered.

Br: I've just been talking that over with Hub and I said "If you fellows were to say to me tomorrow, - that is the big rub, what were we going to do about it? - because we're going thru with this anyway," the best thing I had thought of up to this moment was for us to be completely honest and say "well maybe we could, though we didn't think so at the time.

B: Right. We still don't think so out here.

Br: No but I'm talking now about suppose we were told "you gotta' do it" and "how are we going to do it?" That's the only answer I could think of that would make any sense.

B: Didn't think so then but we do now. Maybe our ideas on the Oriental have been all cock-eyed.

Br: We've got more information now than we had ... and that we thought

we could get.

B: That's right. Maybe he isn't inscrutable. All right thank you, hope you're having a good time.

Br: But there's the big rub -

B: Right. That's the thesis. Not that you couldn't do it. We don't know. Maybe you can. But why didn't you then?

Br: Yes.

B: All right, thank you.