<Begin Segment 10>

FC: Do you have any opinion or information about rumors involved with the JACL were the big, that there were finking activities, informing activities created the leadership vacuum?

CU: Say, what do you mean by a leadership vacuum when?

FA: JACL claimed that after the bombing of '41, Pearl Harbor, that there were no leaders at all, and that they had to step in to, were forced to step into the void, the leadership void.

CU: Well, you know, JACL was the only Japanese American national organization present. So therefore, whoever was the JACL national leaders had that leadership position already.

FC: Was the, it was the Nikkeijinkai, the community had leaders.

CU: Oh, yeah.

FC: And the JACL fingered, all rounded up...

CU: You know, one of the thing that surprised me was I did read some statement by, especially in southern California, JACL leaders who had said, "We have now become informers." That statement is written down in handwriting, saying that, "Now we have become informers," and saying that, "We have been informing the government of all people that we thought should be investigated." And many, and also I think I read somewhere about the memorandum that was issued by the national to the chapters asking them to turn in names of any Issei or KibeiNisei to the government. To me, why didn't the JACL protest such a request? Without requests, without any protest they passed on information to the, their chapters, which to me seems like they were really a government agent, that's all they were. They were not really protecting or looking after the welfare of the Japanese Americans.

[Interruption]

CU: Information to the chapters to turn in the names of the Kibei Niseis and some Isseis to the government for arrest or pick-up or questioning. That is really becoming part of the government, not the, doing anything for the community itself. Your own people are really in a very terrible bind, and yet they were very ruthless in their advice to their own people, meaning that they did act more like an agent to the government, saying to do this and do that. If there was a leader, say, among the kenjinkai especially, but the kenjinkais in those days were not, Nisei were not leaders, they were, it was still run by the Issei. Nisei were still too young to be leaders of the kenjinkai.

FC: So my impression is that they removed and created and encouraged this prejudice against the Issei leadership and the Kibei instead of... for whatever reason leadership was going. Instead of saying, "Don't worry, there's a continuity of leadership, we are stepping into the breach," they began to threaten the community rather than organize it more or reassure them.

CU: Well, to me, the most tragic thing about the whole leadership is that leaders of the JACL at that time strongly felt and believed that they were doing the right thing, and yet they were doing the wrong thing. I think this is the most tragic thing. And no one wants to say that, "You did it out of malice," no, they did not. I think they were thinking about the Japanese Americans' welfare, but their thinking was completely wrong. They felt that, "Any type of protest was not good for the United States. We want to just be just nice guys." I think that's why from today's perspective it's very difficult to accept that.

<End Segment 10> - Copyright © 1998, 2005 Frank Abe and Densho. All Rights Reserved.