

JACL NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR REDRESS
Minutes of Meeting, Sept. 9-10, 1978

September 9, 1978
10:30 A.M.

Present: Redress Committee members: John Tateishi (Chairperson), Henry Miyatake, Raymond Okamura, Phil Shigekuni, Minoru Yasui; Subcommittee chairpersons: Ellen Endo (Media), Ron Mamiya (Legislation); Dr. Clifford Uyeda, National President; Dr. Jim Tsujimura, National Vice President; Frank Chin (at the invitation of the Chair); Paula Mitsunaga (recording secretary); also present: Ben Takeshita (NCWNDC Reparations Committee Chairperson)

Comments from the Chair: Ground rules for the meeting as follows: strict adherence to parliamentary procedures will not be enforced except in matters requiring an official vote of the committee, in which case only Redress Committee members and Subcommittee Chairpersons will be allowed to vote. Others attending will be permitted to participate in all discussions.

The purpose of the meeting is to plan strategy for the redress campaign and to go over specific problem areas of the proposal accepted by the National Council at Salt Lake City. At the prerogative of the Chair, the five members of the central Redress Committee are given the responsibility of making major decisions when the committee members and subcommittee chairpersons are unable to meet as a whole.

The first area of discussion was focused on the feasibility of pursuing a judicial review of Hirabayashi, Yasui and Korematsu based on the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Economou vs. The U.S. Tateishi suggested that this is one avenue we should consider as a concomitant approach to the legislative redress campaign. He indicated that Frank Iwama, National Legal Counsel, was studying the case and would be attending the meeting sometime during the two days to explain the relevance of the Economou decision vis-a-vis redress.

Yasui expressed the view that there's no point in having a two-pronged approach for redress, a view supported by Okamura in an opinion that a judicial approach may deter from legislative action and vice-versa.

Motion: The committee pursue a legislative campaign as its first priority, not precluding the possibility of a judicial review of Korematsu, et. al. (moved by Yasui, seconded by Mamiya, carried unanimously).

Tateishi introduced an alternative approach to legislative action: Ron Ikejiri, JACL Washington Representative, has stated that Inouye won't sponsor our proposed legislation with a \$25,000 price tag on it. He did, however, suggest that we pursue the idea of presenting a bill in Congress to establish a study commission to investigate the redress issue, in much the same manner of the Native Hawaiian Claims Act. Ikejiri also reported that Mineta supports this approach. The distinct advantage of the commission approach is that it

would give us free publicity since Congressional hearings would be held in various parts of the country, and a Congressional committee would add credibility to the issue. Further, we could submit such a bill in January 1979 when the new Congress convenes. The distinct disadvantage is that it would take perhaps a year to constitute the commission plus an additional year before a recommendation from the commission to Congress would be submitted. Open to discussion.

Okamura began by stating that the Preamble to the Hawaiian Claims Act resolution is extremely effective and that we should adopt or incorporate something similar when we put our legislation together. However, he objected to the investigative commission approach on the grounds that a great deal of energy would be expended and time wasted, both of which could be better spent in directing ourselves to the appropriations bill; he favors a direct approach and sees no reason why we can't submit an appropriations bill with the new Congress in January.

There was a great deal of reluctance on the part of the entire committee to delay the redress campaign for two years until a Congressional commission would submit its recommendation. Miyatake added further that the Native Alaskan Claims Act hearings lasted for three years.

Tateishi indicated again that Inouye didn't feel he could sponsor our bill with the \$25,000 amount but was generally in favor of redress, and since the commission idea was his recommendation, we should perhaps give it some thought. On info from Ikejiri, Mineta has agreed to sponsor our bill in the House, provided that we put together a workable proposal. Sparky hadn't yet been contacted about this specific issue (i.e., an appropriations bill asking for \$25,000), but Ikejiri felt that we could probably count on his support; the \$25,000, however, was the big question.

Miyatake stated that perhaps Magnuson could be used to influence Inouye since Magnuson is sympathetic to our cause and was at one time Inouye's mentor in the Senate. No direction given to this idea, although it was agreed that it will be important that Nikkei Congressmen support us. Miyatake added that Magnuson could sponsor the bill and probably would be able to get it through the Ways and Means Committee by politicking. Okamura felt that the bill should be sponsored by a Japanese American senator, preferably Inouye since he has seniority and has more power and influence in the Senate. Okamura cautioned that before submitting the bill, we must determine the thrust of the bill and the route through committees it will take so that we can make our contacts and lay the groundwork before we get to Congress.

In returning to the Commission idea, Tateishi suggested that one strategy would be to stack the hearings with informed, pro-redress people. Okamura felt that the hearings couldn't be controlled by us and could be potentially dangerous to the cause. Miyatake explained that the standard procedure for Congressional hearings of the type considered is to allow 50-50 representation of pro and con points of view, with each person allowed something like two minutes to address the commission. Uyeda felt that this would

work to our disadvantage; Endo expressed the view that public hearings arouse opposition and in this case, we should expect strong opposition from Japanese Americans, which would be the most detrimental to the redress campaign. This is the sort of thing that often gets the most publicity (witness Hayakawa).

To the point that hearings by a Congressional commission would give credibility to the issue of redress, Yasui reiterated Endo's caution that public hearings generate a lot of opposition, and Miyatake felt that the hearings would give us only minimal publicity.

Mamiya questioned whether the committee wasn't premature in attempting to decide whether we should go with the commission idea or something else. He felt that we should sit down with supportive Congressmen. Yasui added that Mike Masaoka should definitely be consulted.

In order to get a consensus of the committee, the Chair asked for a straw vote on the two routes: none were in favor of the Congressional commission idea, five were in favor of a direct appropriations bill with the possibility of submitting it early in 1979; two abstentions, Mamiya and Yasui, both of whom felt that we needed further guidance from Congressional people in Washington before making a decision.

Okamura suggested that Tateishi and Mamiya go to Washington as soon as possible to confer, along with Ikejiri and Mike Masaoka, with Japanese American Congressmen. The committee as a whole concurred with this. Tateishi to contact Ikejiri to make arrangements.

Break for lunch.

Announcement from the Chair: Tateishi announced that he had authorized the expenditure of \$300-\$400 from the redress budget to duplicate and retain a copy of the film of the Japanese Canadian incarceration. Uyeda pointed out that this expenditure could be recovered by asking donations whenever the film is loaned out.

The afternoon's discussion focused on the specifics of the media strategy/public education campaign. Tateishi asked Yasui to explain his strategy diagram. Yasui gave a brief explanation of the strategy as he saw it, also explaining that these were general and "rough" ideas which he based largely on the naturalization campaign of the late 1940's.

Tateishi expressed the view that he felt it would be necessary and important for us to establish goals and time-tables in our public education campaign, primarily because we need to take the offensive rather than to have to react all the time. He asked Endo, as chair of public education/media strategy, to give her views on how we should handle the campaign.

Endo began by explaining that it was important for us to keep on top of the media, that we should attempt to exercise control of the type of news

that is released to any of the media. As for the public education campaign, she felt that this could be handled at the local levels by chapters and organizations in the Japanese American community. This would involve putting together some kind of educational kit with relevant materials, possibly including audio-visual materials. Shigekuni suggested using the unsolicited comments from redress questionnaires; they have a tremendous emotional impact.

Miyatake warned that we must first educate people in our own chapters before we attempt to educate people in our communities. Many Japanese Americans, he explained, are not aware of the real significance of the evacuation. Each chapter should have the education kit to educate themselves and to educate congresspersons in their areas.

Endo felt that once the education campaign was under way, we should use our contacts to get on major network shows. "60 Minutes," for example, would allow us an effective educational vehicle.

Referring to Yasui's strategy diagram, Okamura stated that we should not solicit resolutions from city councils, state legislatures, etc. until we've established the thrust of our campaign and can assess the public's reaction. The defeat of resolutions by state and local governments would be very detrimental. He also felt that we should withhold contacting local congresspersons. Endo's comment was that in our campaign strategy, we should first attempt to educate the public about the Japanese American experience so that they understand why we were interned, and then focus the thrust of the campaign on redress.

Okamura suggested that we encourage chapters to send historical articles to local newspapers and try to find spots on talk shows, but Miyatake expressed caution in this, stating that JACL lost redress support from the National Episcopal Church because the individuals who presented the case for redress weren't adequately versed on the issue. We need to make sure that those who present our case know what they're talking about.

Tateishi re-emphasized a point made earlier that we need to coordinate all of our efforts through the committee. Individuals acting on their own may not always be beneficial. He asked Uyeda whether the experience of the Iva Toguri campaign is applicable here. Uyeda's response was that the Iva issue was controversial enough to generate its own interest, which may not necessarily be the case with redress. We need to attract attention to the issue, perhaps by creating a significant date such as February 19 for the signing of EO 9066 - perhaps have something like a rally.

Tateishi stated that such action may depend on our time-table. The question is, where do we hope to be by the 1980 convention? How soon can we prepare an appropriations bill and have it in Congress? Miyatake answered that there was no reason why we couldn't move quickly. David Ushio thought the repeal of EO 9066 was monumental and that it would take five years for the repeal. It took one year.

Okamura suggested that we introduce the bill early in 1979 when the new

Congress convenes; that way they'll have two years to work on it and our campaign can be geared accordingly. He saw no significant difference between submitting our bill before or after we step up our campaign. The important factor, he added, was that we make concrete progress. If we submit the bill in 1979, we would have to select a principal sponsor by the end of this year. Miyatake concurred with Okamura, adding that the bill should be a Nikkei sponsored bill, co-sponsored by every Congressman from the West Coast (viz. California). He agreed that the bill should be in Congress by the next session.

Yasui suggested that we set up the campaign on a broad based national perspective, using Isseis whenever possible. He added that the bill should have lots of sponsors, not necessarily just from the West Coast, and we should attempt to secure the support of the Carter Administration. This would be very helpful, keeping in mind that almost twenty-five states have no JACL chapters.

Mamiya questioned whether we should first set the platform for acceptance by assessing the feedback from Washington. He expressed hesitancy in introducing the bill into the next session of Congress on the basis that it may jeopardize our chances by premature action.

Miyatake stated that doing something is better than doing nothing at all, which has been one of the problems of the redress campaign for the past eight years. Yasui, however, expressed a concern similar to Mamiya's, to which Uyeda stated that waiting another year won't establish any greater groundwork for the campaign. Besides, we take a serious risk that Japanese Americans might lose interest in the issue if we wait too long.

Tateishi asked for a straw vote on whether we should submit a bill when Congress convenes in 1979. Endo, Miyatake, Okamura and Tateishi are in favor of introducing the bill if the three Congressmen will support us. Yasui is opposed. Mamiya and Shigekuni abstain, preferring further investigation before we act.

Shigekuni raised the issue of the 501C(4) arm since JACL would have to enact the political arm once the redress fund raising campaign exceeded 20% of the national budget. Tateishi stated that the redress campaign, if it's run as a high-level campaign, could possibly cost close to \$1 million. Shigekuni's point was that it might be advisable for JACL to begin the paperwork to establish the 501C(4) arm and that the redress campaign should switch over immediately. Yasui feels that it might be more beneficial to run the redress campaign under an independent organization set up by 501C(4). Mamiya concurred, stating that perhaps redress is tainted by the JACL label. If redress were placed under the guise of a different name other than JACL, it might gain more supporters since there are a lot of people in the Japanese American community who don't look upon JACL favorably.

There was a question of how quickly 501C(4) could be set up and what the expense would be. The question was deferred to Frank Iwama, who, Tateishi explained, would be present at the meeting sometime on Saturday or Sunday.

Shigekuni stated that if there are complications and/or delays in setting up 501C(4), perhaps we could operate under E09066, a political arm set up by PSWDC under the same IRS category.

In establishing the education campaign, Tsujimura pointed out, it will be important to set up some type of network for reaching out to all chapters in all districts and to feed them concrete information. The chapters have to be kept informed generally, but they also have to ^{be} given direction. Miyatake suggested that we make use of audio-visual materials since these are effective tools for educating chapter members. He stated that the Seattle committee has tape cassettes for different educational levels which Endo could have. Okamura suggested too that Endo should review all materials for a packet which could be sent to all chapters and be used by them to present information to their congressional representatives.

Tateishi stated that when he discussed the basic structure for the redress committees with Tsujimura at the Sayonara Banquet, Tsujimura had indicated the necessity to establish some method of keeping close and direct contact with chapters. They had discussed the idea of a chain network, with representatives appointed from districts and chapters. Miyatake felt that it would be much more effective to get volunteers rather than appointed individuals; seek out those people who are committed and interested in redress to work on the campaign across the country. Uyeda added that there are strong supporters from e.g. the midwest, such as Mike Yasutake, Chiye Tomihiro, Bill Doi. Yasui stated that the experience of the naturalization campaign demonstrated the effectiveness of finding local people in various places throughout the country to help make contacts with local congressional representatives. Congressmen will listen to their constituents but not to outsiders.

Tateishi asked Endo what we should be doing as far as the newspapers are concerned. Should we start sending out press releases in an attempt to take the offensive? Endo felt that we should first start with our own communities by sending out releases to vernaculars about such things as this meeting, the appointment of members to the committee, etc.

Tateishi asked Chin if he, as a reporter, had any suggestions for our publicity campaign. Chin suggested a full page ad in the Washington Post and New York Times as effective methods of getting publicity. Such ads, which may run anywhere from \$3,000-\$5,000 would undoubtedly be picked up nationally. One such ad would be worth three days of network news. Also, try to make contacts with journalists who you know to be sympathetic to our cause. Miyatake added that McDowell of the New York Times wrote favorable articles on the Iva Toguri campaign and is very sympathetic to our causes in general.

Tateishi asked Uyeda how the Iva committee was able to get such widespread coverage in the major press. Uyeda replied that people such as McDowell, who was then with the Wall Street Journal, were instrumental in bringing the issue to the public attention. Once the Journal ran the articles on Iva, other publications picked it up. What the Iva committee did was to send booklets

to all newspapers with circulations over 200,000 and to weekly magazines. Tateishi added that a similar mailing had been done with the redress booklet one week prior to the Salt Lake City convention.

Chin suggested that we locate Japanese American and Asian American journalists. Bill Hosokawa has compiled such a list and can help us out. We should also think about such things as reprinting the first issues of some of the camp newspapers which really show that the Japanese Americans didn't lay down and accept what was happening to them. There's a lot of anger in some of those articles and a lot of frustration and bewilderment. They tell the real story of the internment, the real human interest stories for all of America to read. Go from a full page ad, which will be picked up nationally, and then go to local stories and deal with the human interest side of it. But you need something that will catch the nation's attention, some gimmick-- a full page ad, a march, a re-creation of one of the camps.

Yasui and Endo both felt that the timing of such a strategy would be very important, that the full page ad idea should wait until we are rolling on the campaign.

Okamura suggested that all chapters should plan an event for February 19th, such as a talk show, a demonstration, benefit, etc., and that Endo should make preliminary contacts with "60 Minutes" and "20/20" to film it. Chin added that we could use familiar, non-threatening faces and voices such as Pat Morita, Pat Suzuki, George Takei, James Shigeta, all of whom would be effective in a benefit type of program. He further suggested that we combine entertainment with a lightweight message. We could also invite other celebrities. Endo stated that a benefit of the type discussed here would take about a year of planning.

Endo felt that if we target for February 19th to publicize our campaign, the date should commemorate Ford's signing the proclamation to rescind EO 9066, not Roosevelt's enactment of the Executive Order.

Uyeda felt that we have to take measures to confront the negative press in the major publications. Chin suggested Harry Honda writing a think piece for Atlantic and Harpers, and Shigekuni stated that the negative letters in the PC should be answered.

Tateishi stated that it will be important that anti-redress articles are answered. He and Uyeda had written replies to some of the editorials published as a result of Hayakawa, but individuals in local areas must also respond. Uyeda added that local answers and letters against redress should be sent to Tateishi so that a file can be maintained.

Uyeda commented further that many Nisei will come out and agree with Hayakawa, and that we must be prepared to answer. Chin stated that these Nisei are afraid of jeopardizing their hard won status and acceptance by whites. Tateishi felt that if seeking redress puts our status and acceptance in jeopardy, then we haven't really been accepted and are still very much second-class citizens. Further, he felt that one of the major points of the redress issue is that Japanese Americans will have to face this fact and will

have to take a hard look at themselves.

Shigekuni's objection to the anti-redress attitude of some of the Nisei who speak publicly to the issue is that they may deny money to the Issei who exist in poverty today. Yasui felt that we should avoid the poverty level discussion and concentrate on the issue as a means of deterring the government from ever doing it again. Uyeda added that aside from being morally wrong, if the government decides to do it again, it would be expensive.

Tateishi closed the discussion, indicating that the committee's task for the Sunday meeting would be to put together a position paper and to go over some of the problem areas of the redress proposal. He announced that the budget for this year is \$12,500. Pledges from the convention come to \$2,200, with an additional \$200 donated from the Contra Costa chapter (NCWNDC). Thus far, \$600 has been received.

Meeting adjourned at 5:00 P.M.

September 10, 1978
9:30 A.M.

Present: Tateishi, Endo, Mamiya, Miyatake, Okamura, Shigekuni,
Yasui; Tsujimura, Uyeda, Mitsunaga; Chin.
Also present: Frank Iwama (JACL Legal Counsel)

Tateishi began the session by stating that the committee should establish a cohesive and coherent position on redress which can be used as part of the responses or mailings to publications. Also that Ron Ikejiri needs hard facts and the basic rationale for our position to present to Congressional representatives once we begin the campaign. Tateishi asks that the committee attempt to develop a position paper which would state the justification for redress.

The following are some of the essential ideas evolved from the discussion: Don't overstate "race and race alone" or "denial of Constitutional rights"; stick to basic human and moral rights (Yasui). State clearly the abrogation of the basic guarantees of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution (Shigekuni). Ask for legislative, not judicial remedy (Yasui). State that the evacuation and incarceration were unconscionable acts (Mamiya). State unequivocally that the government avoided the issue of due process (Okamura).

It was agreed that a draft should be written and distributed to all committee members for revision, and that the position paper should be somewhat short (approximately 1-2 pages). Endo, Mamiya, Miyatake, Shigekuni and Tateishi assigned to develop drafts, to be sent to Tateishi.

The next item of business was the legislative proposal. Yasui, who had expressed specific concerns, was given the floor to go over the proposal. He explained that his corrections/criticisms deal with concepts, not specific

wording. His suggestions were, for the most part, incorporated as revisions of the proposal.

The following portions of the minutes vis-a-vis the proposal reflect primarily the areas of discussion.

Under /C/(3), page 2, Yasui questions whose responsibility it is to determine the extent of the search for surviving families. He suggested that we should indicate to Congress the determining mechanism and that a time limit be specified; otherwise, it could conceivably take years before a trust fund is established. Miyatake suggested some type of self-executing five year clause. Yasui concurs with Miyatake that there should be devised a self-executing mechanism for the trust fund. Mamiya, however, felt that there is no major problem with the time element in establishing the trust fund. He suggested that we confer with members of Congress (ie, Inouye, Matsunaga, Mineta) about how we could best establish the fund.

Yasui disagrees with Mamiya: he feels that timing is crucial in the trust fund disbursement. If some provision isn't made for the establishment of the trust fund and the disbursement of monies, it could be delayed for 10-15 years while the search for heirs is carried out and the mechanism for the fund is being developed.

There was a question whether the appropriations bill should be submitted without the \$25,000 figure included. Mamiya felt that since the \$25,000 is basically an arbitrary amount, we should perhaps omit the figure.

Tateishi stated that it's the figure which has become the issue and that the real issue of redress is being placed as a secondary consideration. However, the \$25,000 figure is in the open now and there's no reason to try to conceal it. He stated that when the National Redress Committee determined the \$25,000 figure in the April meeting, it was considered a negotiable amount. Since, however, the monetary demand is public knowledge, we need to deal with it.

Miyatake stated that we need a device to illustrate to the American public that the \$25,000 figure is a rational amount. He suggested the Seattle Plan, using a per diem basis.

Okamura replied that a per diem argument may go over in Congress, but it would never be accepted by Japanese Americans. It puts at a disadvantage those who left camp early only to face a hostile public in the West Coast, those who left to work in the east, and what do you do about the men who went into the army? As a determining device, it creates too many problems.

Shigekuni suggested that we take the average time of incarceration, based on the Seattle Plan, and come out with a total sum for everyone affected. The total amount would then be distributed equally to all eligible persons. Yasui expressed his concurrence with this idea, and it was generally acceptable with the committee as a whole.

The unresolved question is how we derive at the basic figure. Miyatake stated

that the economic salary losses amounted to \$8 million. Shigekuni suggested using this amount plus a per diem amount of \$10,000. Miyatake suggested further that added to this total should be included such considerations as cultural and psychological damages, community losses, etc. He showed a detailed breakdown of these figures and indicated that based on these, we could well justify the total of \$25,000. Shigekuni suggested that we don't itemize the figures but include in our rationale the loss of earnings plus per diem plus the intangible losses.

Tateishi then deferred the discussion and turned the floor over to Frank Iwama to discuss the possibility of a judicial review of the Supreme Court cases.

Iwama urged the committee not to foreclose completely the possibility of a court case. Economou vs. The US doesn't have direct relevance to our concerns, but we need to take a new look at Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui. He didn't feel that a legislative and legal approach would conflict with each other and that we are in a better position now to garner our forces. There are a substantial number of Asians in the State Bar Association plus 40 Asians in the UC Davis law school who could help us out in the research. Taking a case to the Supreme Court would take thousands of hours of work, but the possibility of a viable suit could pressure Congress into resolving legislation. We should look at our possible resources, such as retired and semi-retired attorneys, law students, etc; a nucleus of people should start researching the legal side to determine if we have a case. If good groundwork is laid, there's a lot of free publicity.

When questioned about 501C(4), Iwama replied that the necessary paper work is being done and that establishing the political arm is a relatively easy process which will take only about one month. He also indicated, in response to Shigekuni's question, that the PC would fall under 501C(4).

Returning to the discussion of the legislative proposal, Mamiya stated that the proposal presupposes that the commission will do everything. It was his understanding from the convention that the responsibility of the commission was to oversee the trust fund. Okamura concurred with this view, stating that the commission would oversee the trust fund and that the federal government, or one of its agencies would oversee the project.

Yasui agreed with this, stating that the government, rather than the commission, should make the individual payments. He and Miyatake both felt that the payments to individuals should come directly from the government.

Mamiya stated that the determination of heirship is still an unresolved problem, and that we need to get more input from our Nikkei Congressmen.

Yasui asked Iwama whether there were any legal basis for determining existing heirs before placing money into a trust fund. Iwama stated that there are legal bases, but that since we are establishing a legislative bill, we should make that determination. As such, we should specify guidelines for the commission regarding the search for heirs. The deter-

mination should be fair but it should also be expeditious.

Regarding the appointments to the Nikkei Commission, Mamiya felt that the proposal places us in the political arena, something which should be avoided if possible. Uyeda pointed out the the nominating committee limits the political vulnerability of the appointments. Yasui also pointed out that in the Hawaiian Claims Act, the governor submits a list of candidates and that the President makes the appointments only from the list. Miyatake pointed out, however, that we should learn a lesson from the Japan-US Friendship Act where a Japanese National was appointed to the Commission; the list submitted by JACL was virtually ignored.

It was decided that this problem could not be resolved at this time and that we should confer with Inouye and Matsunaga specifically about this and other points, and also with Mineta. A copy of the proposal is to be sent to these three Congressmen, and a delegation from the committee would go to Washington to confer with them. Yasui suggested that Uyeda, Tateishi, and Mamiya should be the ones to go. Okamura suggested that the delegation confer with Mike Masaoka also. Tateishi indicated that he would contact Ron Ikejiri to make arrangements.

Tateishi stated that the committee should meet again in January. At this point, everything is contingent upon what happens in Washington. He indicated that committee reports are due in December, April, and August, to be turned in to Tsujimura; subcommittee chairpersons are to turn in reports to the Chairman and these reports would be incorporated in the committee report to Tsujimura. Also, committee members will be assigned to write articles for the PC on specific aspects of the campaign. All articles should go through the Chair for coordination. They should be about 300 words unless sent as a press release. Finally, a small amount of redress stationary will be printed up and distributed to committee members.

In a closing statement, Tateishi indicated that his choice of committee members was a very careful and deliberate one, selecting each of the individuals for their expertise and their knowledge of the redress issue.

Meeting adjourned at 12:45 P.M.

Respectfully submitted,

Paula Mitsunaga

Paula Mitsunaga
Acting recording secretary