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TI: So going to... and you're, by far, the closest person that I know to Ronald Reagan, in terms of his thought process, he never publicly came out before the signing of redress that he was either for or against. It seemed like he kept that very close to his vest in terms of what he was going to do. There was concern that even though if Congress... well, first, in terms of the community, the sense was the Senate would pass redress, the House, we weren't quite sure and that a lot of effort and lobbying would have to happen to have the House pass redress, but then the sense was if we got Congress to pass redress, there was concern that the president might veto it. And so that was kind of the thinking in the Japanese American community. And there was never anything said that we knew this one way or the other. I think part of it is just people are always worrying, like what could happen, what could go wrong? But I'm wondering, in 1985, at the point you're at these Issues Lunches, you're talking to the president, what's your sense about where he was on this issue?

JS: Well, one thing, Ronald Reagan did not telegraph anything. He wasn't that kind of dealmaker where he would let it be known that he was, if they didn't do something, he was going to veto a bill or something like that. And in fact, he rarely made decisions on the spot. He would listen to a group of us talking about something and then he would say, "Well, fellows, I'm going to think about this and I'll let you know what I decide." And he would do that. So it was incumbent to explain things in a way that he would understand them. Because he made up his mind on a lot of stuff that he'd do it himself, and that was both an advantage and a disadvantage. I mean, the thing we'd all try to do is to get him as much information, relevant information, and to explain how it worked into the way he made decisions. And I'm sure that that was the case here. I know there were people who were interested in vetoing that. I was gone, I left, and I knew there was going to be problems in the House, and that's when I went to talk to Bob Matsui. I told him, "He'll sign that bill." I was very confident that he would sign the bill.

TI: And about when did you have that conversation with Bob Matsui? And Bob Matsui, for people, he was the...

JS: Congressman from Sacramento.

TI: Congressman from Sacramento. And so did you know Bob before?

JS: Yes.

TI: Because, that's right, you had that Sacramento connection.

JS: Well, I knew him, he was on the city council out there in Sacramento. I don't know how he did it, but he got named to the Ways and Means Committee when he was a freshman. I mean, that's a very big and powerful committee and he was on the Ways and Means Committee, and so he went through that Social Security thing with me. And I knew that he knew what the issue was and which side of it he was on. And so I went up there on my own initiative -- that was after I left the White House -- just to tell him that I was confident that the president would sign the bill.

TI: Well, so why were you confident? I mean, I'm curious, because how would you have that...

JS: The only reason I can say it is that I knew Ronald Reagan. And I knew how he approached things like that. He wasn't... he never worried about politics, I mean, he always tried to do what was right, and there was no question, in a man with common sense's mind, whether this was right or wrong. So I was very confident that he would.

TI: When you talked about how President Reagan wouldn't telegraph what he was thinking, how would he respond when someone would try to advocate for something? Not staff member, but like a congressman or a governor, and they'd say, "Oh, you need to do this." And when President Reagan had not yet decided, how would he respond to people? Would he kind of let them, just let them know that he's thinking about it, or he'd say, "Oh, I like what you're saying"? What was his general kind of demeanor in those situations?

JS: Well, he would start out with, "Well..." Like I said, he didn't make decisions on the spot. I mean, people would come in and make pitches. I mean, people didn't get in there unless they had something that they wanted to say, unless, of course, they were old friends or something like that. And he would be polite. I mean, he was polite to Tip O'Neill and I never understood that. But he'd be polite and he would listen and he would thank people for their position, but he would never say... I remember a session we had with, well, it was a whole National Security establishment about whether or not we were going to go ahead with the space station, the International Space Station. And everybody in that room -- we were in the Cabinet room -- everybody in that room wanted him to say, "Okay, let's go." He thanked everybody, he said, "I'll let you know later." In fact, that day, there was an admiral there and he had a tie on that said, "Don't give up the ship." And I grabbed him as he was going by me and I said, "Mr. President, do you see this tie?" Just to try to push him a little more towards saying, "Okay, we're going to build the International Space Station," which, of course, is still up there flying around.

TI: Right, right. And so even in your role, sometimes you wanted to try to get a little bit more? Wasn't that kind of dangerous for you as a staff person to push him on these things? I mean, at some point would he get, like, "Jack, you need to back off. Give me the space to think about this"?

JS: No, but he got to the point where he'd say, "Now, Jack, I'm not going to say this, but wouldn't it be funny?"

TI: Oh, so he'd kind of change the subject, you mean? Or what do you mean?

JS: No, no. It stemmed from an incident where I didn't say anything and he did, and it was the wrong thing to say. Then from that point on, I always would tell him, "No, you can't say that." Like when he had cancer, he was going to get asked at a press conference, which poor Joe Biden just found out that you can't show what the questions are going to be beforehand because someone will accuse you of knowing them. But he was going to be asked a question about, "How do you feel?" Because he came back from the hospital, he had the surgery for colon cancer and everything. And he thought about it and he said, "Well, let me say something about that." This was in a practice session. He said, "Let me say something about that. I didn't suffer from cancer, I had an operation, and I'm fine." Unfortunately the Chief of Staff at the time, Don Regan, said, "That's a wonderful answer, Mr. President." I thought, well, here goes, maybe I'll be a civilian tomorrow. I said, "Mr. President, that is not a good answer." And so I had Regan staring daggers at me and I told the president, I said, "Mr. President," I said, "you had cancer." I said, "I know you didn't suffer, and that's what you're talking about is you've suffered from cancer. You didn't, you had an operation and they told you it's all gone, and you recovered from the operation." I said, "But if you use that answer, they're going to get four doctors who are going to say, "That's a typical response of a cancer patient. They'd deny that they have cancer." And I said, "You don't need that." So he agreed, he didn't use that answer. He waited about three weeks until he was being interviewed by the Washington Post, and then he gave that answer.

TI: Where do you think you developed such good political instincts like this?

JS: Well, I don't know that I have good political instincts.

TI: Well, no, this is a good example of that, right? I mean, because I would have agreed. I think anything that, in that position, anything that could be perceived as defensive or avoiding it, I mean, people would just go after that.

JS: Well, they were always after him for being his age and his work habits and things like that. People didn't know what the truth was, I mean, they just see what the Post or the Times or the Chronicle or what they would write, and they'd extrapolate from that. I mean, in the time that he was president, he worked all the time.

TI: Earlier you mentioned that you were not in the administration at the time Reagan signed the redress bill. You left, I think, in 1986, and the bill was actually, he signed the legislation in 1988. But before you left -- and we talked about this meeting in 1985, the Issues Lunch -- in your memoirs, let me see if I can grab this. In your memoirs, you actually talk about... and something you said which was really powerful. Because it was more than just explaining to President Reagan what the issue was. I'm going to read this. That you say that, at the conclusion of your pitch, you said, "I completed my pitch by saying, quote, 'Mr. President, there is little doubt today that the actions taken over forty years ago were unnecessary and unjust. Some of us think that it's time to put forty years of resentment and frustration to rest in the Japanese American community. Perhaps next Veterans Day, President Reagan could say again what Captain Reagan said so long ago.'" That's a very powerful thing to say and to end. It's essentially a strong pitch for him to sign the bill. It feels like a little bit, going beyond just a staff position saying, "Here are the options, here is the issue, here are your options, and here's my recommendation." You really put your heart into this one.

JS: Well, I believed in the issue, and so you fight a little harder when it's something that you understand and you think that he really needs to understand it and needs to do what's right. And I just figured I knew what was right. But that quote, actually, I had that on the back of a 3-by-5 card, my notes for that quote, and that's what I used. I imagine it's down in the library somewhere. [Laughs]

<End Segment 18> - Copyright © 2023 Densho. All Rights Reserved.