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TI: So I want to kind of pivot back a little bit, to earlier we talked about, sort of, inside-outside in terms of getting things done, and in your role of national director and going back to redress, there was all the work in terms of Congress and getting their support, and also the White House. Because there was early indications that the White House might resist, the Reagan Administration would resist this. And I kind of want to go back to something that I just became aware of in terms of some of the inside meetings that were happening with higher up people in the White House about redress. And in particular, there was a meeting, I believe it was in 1984, that the current national president at that point was Frank Sato, and he was also the Inspector General of the VA, and so he had some connections, and arranged for a meeting at the White House about redress. Do you remember that meeting, can you talk about that?

RW: Yeah, I wasn't part of that meeting directly, right? And our role was... and I actually didn't know a whole lot about it even as, until recently, I know more about it now. But the perspective that I would have on that is that when Frank Sato said he was going to run for national president, my interpretation of that was like saying, that's an indication of support. Because everything I learned about is like those guys in D.C. vet everything, even before we started using the word "vetting." Like if Frank was going to run for JACL national president, and JACL has as its main agenda redress, they wouldn't let him run, they would cut that off, because it's prevention of a potentially embarrassing situation for them if they have to cut it off.

TI: So that's interesting. So you have to kind of read the tea leaves, even as national director --

RW: Oh, sure.

TI: -- what was going strategically, where the organization was going?

RW: Yeah. And that meeting takes place before Frank is national president, it's right at the tail end of Floyd's term. And later on, as I get to know Frank better -- I mean, I knew Frank already, but you get to more as national president -- I just found it remarkable because someone like me never gets a view inside the White House. You have no idea what goes on, I have more of a view now out of my work. But I did sort of make the presumption that they would vet this stuff. And Frank, in terms of the stuff that he would ask for support, like he's going to Camp David, "Craig Fuller is going to put this in the briefing book, can you get it together by tomorrow?" and you go, "By tomorrow?" And they put us in a position where we looked for what kind of things that we could preposition. So actually, like in the meeting that you talked about, one of the things that was prepared was the Reagan recognition of Corporal Masuda. So that's... it wasn't just happenstance that we had it, it's good old Carole Hayashino, telling me, "Stillwell stuff is over here, I'm going to go look at it." I said, "Yeah, go." And then she comes back eventually and says, "Hey, you know what? And here's this and here's this." So all of a sudden, briefing book. But at the time, we didn't know that that may play this larger role. It was kind of like this might be useful, and you save it, and it turns out it looks like was very significant.

TI: And so at that point, it's like, I guess you're just doing several things, you're not really quite sure. I mean, sure, you have this overall strategy in terms of what you're doing, but when these opportunities, when these things are available, then you just sort of...

RW: You know, like we had people who were kind of elite people on redress, and it's not me. Like I know I got some pushback from the standpoint, like, you're the national director, you should be leading us, and going, "I don't think so." I think there were people who understand this stuff better than me, my job is to make sure that they can pull it off. So there's times when you carry the ball, and there's times when you block, and I saw my role much more as blocking. Like when I go back, I need to get this budget solid, I need to get stuff prepared that they could use. Like even on the bill introductions, Sparky was making me crazy because he kept changing, he kept moving the goalposts. Said, "We're going to roll out today," you get ready, says, "No, we're going to put it off three days, because I got two more cosponsors." He kept doing that.

TI: Until he got over fifty, right, or something?

RW: He got to it veto-proof.

TI: So it wasn't just the majority, he wanted to get it veto-proof.

RW: Like even he changed his own standards. And when I finally talked to his staffperson, Elma Henderson, I said, "Elma what's up with him? Sparky's driving us crazy. He keeps moving the thing." He says, "He's driving us crazy, too, but," he says, "you know he's dying?"

TI: I didn't know that.

RW: "You know he's dying," like, "he's gone banzai. Anyone that he can talk to about that, this is what he's talking about."

TI: So I didn't realize this. So in the throes of redress, Sparky knew he was dying?

RW: That's what Elma said. And this was -- 'cause he was always the "junior senator," right?

TI: Right.

RW: But I think even Dan recognized, this guy's gone whack. Like how many times do you get a veto-proof introduction in that Congress? I mean, I think that's kind of... I mean, there's a lot of amazing stories in the redress, I mean, Aiko was an amazing story, Michi Weglyn's an amazing story. But Sparky's an amazing story. And he's just kind of remarkable to me, but he doesn't get the play. But for me he does. But anyway, I saw my role as kind of like, I block. And some of the blocking is internally, like we were sort of addressing with other groups. Because different parts of the community would piss on each other, even within the left, you get into, "I'm lefter than thou," and, "My way is right, your way is wrong." And it really wasn't that, but people...

<End Segment 14> - Copyright © 2019 Densho. All Rights Reserved.