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TI: There was a series of key moments in redress, I know one was getting it through Congress. And when it went through Congress or passed Congress, there weren't enough votes to make it veto-proof, I mean, it still had to be signed by President Reagan, who was a Republican President (at the) time, and you think back, there were pressures on our federal budget, not like we had a lot of money. And here was a bill coming forward for 1.5 billion dollars. The early word was that he wasn't going to sign it, and yet there was a process that happened mostly behind the scenes, and he ended up signing it. To the surprise of lots of people... I remember when the JACL convention was in Seattle, when they got word that he was going to sign this, and it surprised many people. How did that happen? So from the point when Congress passed, which was a huge success, people said, "Great, we did this," but yet the many people who were knowledgeable said, "But this is where it's going to stop. It won't go any further." How did it happen that the President signed it? Because you look at it, it wasn't veto-proof, and so if he chose not to sign it, it may have just stopped there. So tell me what you know with what happened.

FS: Well, you know, the interesting thing is, Tom, my job as the inspector general, during the Reagan administration, some of the key people that I was meeting with. I mentioned to you that as the IG, one thing the President did do, he was declaring a war on fraud and waste in government. And that's why he (supported) the Inspector General Act and I ultimately became one of the IGs in the Department of Veteran Affairs. He set up this President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and I became the chair of the audit committee under that group. That President's Council, the first guy that led that for the President was Ed Meese, counselor to the President. And then after that, I think it was Ed Harper, then Jack Svahn, and later on Joe Wright. These are all names (of people) that were working in the White House. Now, these are people that I was meeting with as the IG. So anyway, what happens (is earlier in 1984) I was meeting with my friends in Washington, and Ron Ikejiri one day says to me, "You know, you're meeting with these folks in the White House, can you set up a meeting for Floyd Shimomura as national president in the White House?" I was serving as secretary treasurer then. So I said, "Sure, why not?" So I called the White House, talked with actually Jack Svahn, who I was dealing with the most at the time. And set up this meeting and we got Floyd Shimomura to travel into Washington. And John Tateishi came in and the four of us met with Jack Svahn and his deputy... gosh, I'm losing his name right now, I'll get it in just a minute. But anyway, so we met with him. (Narr. note: His name was Lou Hayes.)

So you ask about redress? Insofar as I'm concerned, Tom, I was very confident that the President would sign the bill. I had no question that he would sign that. In fact, earlier, on one of our board meetings of the JACL, there was some discussion that we ought to put off the redress bill until the next administration because they thought that the Reagan administration and President Reagan would not sign that bill. And I remember telling them right in that board meeting, "You guys are nuts. We got more support for this bill in the White House than you think." And the reason why I said that was people like Jack Svahn and his deputy had told me, "Frank, don't worry about it." (...) And I really felt confident all along. There was no question in my mind, if it got through the Congress, that it would go. So I had a little different view.

TI: Yeah, so interesting, because there are people who were involved in redress who felt, they make it seem like it was a heroic effort to get the President to sign the bill, that it was kind of a, it was from almost like an impossibility to turning him around. You've seen the similar stories about this.

FS: Yeah. And you know, the one thing, Tom, is you learn in Washington, people speculate about what the President may or may not do, (but they don't know). [Interruption] I don't know, I don't know what Jack Svahn said to the President, but I will tell you this, he told me, "Don't worry about it, Frank, I'll take care of it," (whatever that means). And I knew these people well enough that when they told me that, I knew that it was taken care of. And I'm talking about people that I just met with. You know, Tom, I generally don't talk about things like this. But you know, the White House has a bunch of box seats in the Kennedy Center, it was not too much after that meeting that we had, Floyd Shimomura and so forth, that I got a call from Lou Hayes is his name, his deputy. Lou calls me one day and he says, "Frank," he says, "We're gonna host an evening at the Kennedy Center. Would you and June be able to join us?" I only mention this in that these things don't just happen. They don't happen if they don't like you, or they're not supportive of you.

TI: Like if they're going to say "no" to you, they're not going to invite you to the Kennedy Center, is what you're saying.

FS: Yeah. All the circumstances to me were such that I was very confident. There was no... if you could have asked me to place a wager, I'd have placed the wager on the biggest (amount), because I was pretty confident, very confident.

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