<Begin Segment 19>

TK: Someone has written that Personal Justice Denied has had far-reaching implications and effects after it was published. It said, international effects in terms of Canada and their redress campaign, has had affects on the coram nobis cases. What's your take on this? How do you feel about the other kinds of effects besides the particular redress for the Japanese Americans?

AM: Well, I think it did in Canada from what I know, and that struck me as reasonable. I'm not an expert on the Canadian situation, but my impression was it was really pretty analogous to what happened in this country and so, the fact that Canada tended to take this seriously and follow along with it, I, struck me as pretty reasonable. With the coram nobis cases, there's good reason it ought to have some impact. I mean, we certainly concluded that there was no military necessity. And that ultimately is part of what was the heart of the coram nobis cases. Given the fact that (...) you have to bring that kind of case on the basis of some evidence that you discover well after the close of trial for obvious reasons. They turned a good deal on what had been going on internally in the War Department and Justice Department that wasn't publicly known. But the ultimate force of the position that was being pursued was that there was not a military necessity, of course, in a couple of cases for the curfew alone, and in Korematsu's case for the exclusion. And that's certainly where we came in as well.

TK: Just as a final question, it's been many years. You've devoted a lot of time to a very successful campaign. Look into the future. Are there any statements you'd like to make about how you think Personal Justice Denied might be remembered, should be remembered, and how do you feel about it now after it's been published seventeen years later?

AM: (...) Two things that I would address there. One is simply what I hope (that) it helped (...) the Japanese Americans and the rest of the country. I hope that it was a real contributor to a reconciliation (...). This was, these were terrible events, but I think that Congress -- and I hope behind it, the constituents of Congress -- is responsible, it took the apology seriously and meant it, and meant to make it something that was solid and meaningful by paying $20,000 to each person who had been excluded. And on the Japanese American side, I hope that it was accepted that way, that it was recognized that the rest of the country formally and in reality was recognizing the mistakes and the injustice that had occurred and was trying to make it right in so far as you can make those things right. You can't in the end, obviously, but you can make it clear that you want to. And you can try to be reconciled and to move on to something else.

The other thing, of course, is what may lie ahead for us. And there, honestly, I think that the educational part of all of this effort is what's most important, because you know, what happened here shows the frailty of any legal system when emotion runs very high and there is a possible scapegoat who has very little power and ability in reality to defend itself. And that could happen again in some set of circumstances. And you hope that people take away from it all, and away from the report, a sense that if we're tempted by this again, by our baser instincts that we have, we've been through this at least once. We need to try to behave as soberly and fairly as we possibly can. And I think that if people take that from the use of the report in high school classes or colleges or just reading it or (its) seeping into the collective memory, that that's the most important thing. I don't have much doubt, that if you had a case like this today, in today's atmosphere without a lot of high emotion, the courts of the United States would say the government can't do that. But these things don't happen in normal times. They happen when people are very distraught and very upset and when their worst instincts mix with some fear of what may happen to them and they do not act in the way they would if times were quieter.

Which is not to say -- I don't want to end by making this sound as if it was all war hysteria because part of what happened here clearly was that there was a long history on the West Coast and California in particular, of real prejudice against Japanese aliens and people who weren't allowed to become American citizens and Japanese Americans. It was that (...) instinct (...) that came to the fore again. But I don't think it would have happened in that way if there hadn't been at the same time the fear and real emotional pressure and force that came from the war as well. And I think, ultimately, it's whether plain human beings faced with it again will have the courage and the fortitude to do what's right. And that depends, I think, more on education than it does on legal principles, because we've had the legal principles. We had the legal principles then. And that's really, in the end, what the Endo case stands for. I think the fact that the Supreme Court didn't get to it 'til November of 1944 is a demonstration that (only) at that point we were really willing to come back to saying a loyal American citizen cannot be held by the government. But the courts weren't willing to come back to it until they thought the danger had passed.

TK: Thank you, Mr. Macbeth.

AM: Thank you.

<End Segment 19> - Copyright © 1997 Densho. All Rights Reserved.