<Begin Segment 6>

TI: Well, what was it like for them? I mean, they were quite old. And was living in Japan an enjoyable experience for your family?

SK: I think so. I think so. They had the security of living on a U.S. base installation. And yet every chance we got, we would go out and take a sample of the Japanese food, restaurants...

TI: Were you ever concerned...

SK: ...sightseeing.

TI: ...for their safety because of the type of work you did?

SK: No, no, no. About the only time that I was threatened was during this, during the Korean War, when we had this so-called "case of the seven dwarves," when I got a threatening telephone call.

TI: Let's talk about this. So how long were you in Japan before this case came up?

SK: I was there from '49 to 1954. So about, almost five years? Would that be about five years?

TI: Uh-huh.

SK: And then I came back to staff and faculty of -- the Holabird Army Intelligence School for about three-and-a-half years, before I went back to Tokyo for roughly six years. So all together I spent roughly eleven years on civilian status, which means I wore civvies and drew my housing as a GS, instead of a military rank.

TI: And so what year, or what time period did this trial, the "seven dwarves" trial come up?

SK: That happened in 1951. The Japanese intelligence referred to that (case) as a "2-12 Incident" because on second of December, 2-12, 2nd of December, the Japanese intelligence (in Tokyo) arrested seven communist defendants, seated around the table with maps of U.S. bases in Japan in front of them -- caught red-handed. But trouble was that the Japanese intelligence could not break all seven and complete their pre-trial investigation. Therefore, in desperation, they turned the matter over to the Allied Occupation Forces, asked for support and, or whatever. And the Allied Occupation said, "We will take it over. You assign three of your key investigators on a team to work with our team of three investigators that we will assign. And they can work together and complete the investigation." So they did that. And among the Allied occupation, three of us Nisei were appointed. And we worked daily with the Japanese team in investigating the seven communist defendants. And we concluded successfully all seven investigations, and went to the last trial in the U.S. Provost Court in Tokyo before the peace treaty went into effect. And we got convictions on all seven. And the Japanese side were so elated, to think that -- where they had failed, with the entry of the American investigators, they succeeded. And came to the conclusion that at a public -- well, it wasn't exactly public, but at a celebration meeting where (they) toasted the president of the United States and all the commanding officers all the way down, they presented us with a Japanese sake drinking cup with the imperial crest inside of it, which I still treasure. And they gave us a package each of Japanese cigarette. Each of the cigarettes had the imperial crest on it. They just looked real nice, but they didn't taste as good as it looked. [Laughs]

TI: What was it that the American investigators brought to the investigation that the Japanese couldn't do?

SK: Probably the persistence in looking at little, tiny loopholes presented by the answers. And since we knew from the previous investigation the nature of the work that they did, we're able to correlate more closely -- rather than the Japanese side -- what they should have known about it, anyway, in the first place. Because...

TI: Let me make sure I understand this. So you...

SK: ...because most of us...

TI: ...you had more information than the Japanese from your other...?

SK: ...because the three of us selected to form this one-man team -- one team, (possessed) more detailed knowledge about the Japanese communists' daily activities than the Japanese team, because they were selected from the Japanese intelligence -- intelligence side, but not necessarily those who were the most knowledgeable about the communist side. And I think that we had the advantage there because we were more experienced in what they -- what to dig into, rather than the Japanese side. And we succeeded where they failed. But they were so pleased -- the Japanese side were so pleased, that they toasted us. And they wrote up the entire sequence of events of the trial. And they introduced the entire trial, from beginning to end, into their Japanese police academy curriculum, including where they failed, and where the American side had to be asked, and where the American side came in with a team of three investigators. And that, to us -- to me, anyway, is, one of the highest accolades that we could receive.

TI: Well that's impressive. Were you able to -- were you -- did you also question...?

SK: Oh, yes, we questioned. And the Japanese side -- the lawyers for the Japanese communist side questioned us on, on the stand, each one of us. And they even had a cartoonist from the Red Flag, Akahata, Red Flag -- that's the communist journal of the Communist Party. Cartoonist (drew) sketches of us. So I wore the same clothing every day, and parted my hair the wrong way -- I had more hair to part in those day -- but parted my hair the wrong way. And wore my wristwatch on my left hand. And I knew that I was being drawn, being sketched.

TI: Oh, so to make sure -- so you actually did things differently so it would, so that those sketches wouldn't be as valuable...

SK: That's right.

TI: ...later on...

SK: Then later on.

TI: ...in identifying you.

SK: Yeah.

TI: So during the trial you actually had to come out of your sort of undercover, or your sort of anonymous persona. You were there...?

SK: Yeah, right. Right.

TI: ...in a very public setting.

SK: And it was during that period that I received the threatening telephone call at home. And so I reported that, and they authorized me to draw a shoulder holster (weapon) underneath my clothing. Just in case.

TI: Right. Because this...

SK: Yeah.

TI: ...this -- the story you're telling was -- I think I originally, I asked, did you ever feel that your family was threatened there?

SK: Right, right.

TI: So that was the one time.

SK: Yeah.

TI: Now, did this change your relationship or your job, because now people could identify you in Japan. Did this change...?

SK: No, no. Because where I went, I was very careful as to whom I associated with in public. Because I didn't want to draw attention to me or to anybody else who associated with me. So there were certain basic precautionary measures that one would take. And instead of meeting some of my associates or informants in a certain place, I would pick him up on the road.

TI: Now, the Japanese recognized the accomplishment of what you and the two other American investigators...

SK: No, the Japanese intelligence did.

TI: ...American, Japanese intelligence.

SK: They appreciated that -- right.

TI: How 'bout the U.S. side? I mean, obviously...

SK: Well...

TI: ...they assigned you to this, did...

SK: Right. Well, unfortunately, there were some officers who were reluctant, shall I say, to push for the recognition of three Nisei investigators. So in my opinion, even at this late date, I feel that the three investigators should have been properly recognized by the American side. Because certainly the articles that appeared in the Stars and Stripes of that time -- copies of some of which I still have -- would indicate the tremendous accomplishment to thwart the activities of the communists and the efforts of the Allied side to protect South Korea, by sending in troops from Japan into South Korea. So it was a very crucial time. But we, we thwarted their plans for sabotage in Japan through this one sabotage incident.

TI: Why, why do you think the three of you weren't given the accolades that you thought...? You mentioned that...

SK: Well, unfortunately, one of our superiors happened to be of Japanese descent -- was a Nisei. And I think he bent over backwards not (to) give the impression to anybody, anywhere, that he was pushing for the recognition of somebody who happened to be of Japanese descent. And I could appreciate his viewpoint, although I don't agree with it. But I think that's what must have happened, because we never got the recognition that I feel that we should have gotten, considering the reaction on the side of the Japanese. And considering the overall ramifications that followed -- that there were no other subsequent effort by the communist side in Japan to thwart the flow of support from Japan to South Korea -- that I know of.

TI: Well, good.

<End Segment 6> - Copyright © 1999 Densho. All Rights Reserved.