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TI: And then you mentioned, instead of going to Keio, you went to UC Berkeley. And what did you study in terms of when you say graduate school?

CS: Well, they didn't... both at UCLA and Berkeley, there were very few courses on Japan or Japanese or anything. There was nothing, you might say. So I majored as international relations, but my master's thesis was going to be on Japan-American relations. But I had to do the research myself because there was no classes.

TI: What's interesting to me as we're just --

CS: Well, you know, there was Japan-bashing going on in those days. And as I kept researching, hey, there's another side to this story that's not being published. Why don't they say why Japan is doing this and why is Japan doing that, and all the U.S. (is blaming) Japan for doing that. But the whole story wasn't told. That's why, with that information at the museum today, I'm able to tell Japan's side of the story about Japan-bashing. In fact, when I was working at Honda, they gave me all the material I needed to give my anti-Japan-bashing speeches.

TI: But back in these early days at Berkeley, how would you do your research? How would you get the information?

CS: Oh, I would have to go to the library, study the books, study the historians, you know. That's about everything, to see what was going on. Publication from Japan that was written in English. [Laughs]

TI: And when you think about how the, say the media portrayed the U.S.-Japan relationship, and your research, I mean, what were some of the main differences do you think between the two?

CS: Well, they said Japan went into Manchuria, went into China, and they get blamed for it, they're becoming a colony. Well, I tell them the seeds of all this began in 1929 with the big Depression. I won't go into details, but Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Bill that raised the tariff fifty to seventy percent to save the American business from some of the imports that were coming in. So when they passed that law, all the countries couldn't export to the United States, so they all went on their own. So the whole world collapsed, even the League of Nations, the U.S. wasn't in there, so they were helpless. So things, the whole world just collapsed. Well, Japan did these things, went into Manchuria and China, and when the United States criticized 'em, Japan came back, "Hey, you passed this law, why don't you rescind it? Then we could start exporting to you. As long as you're not, we're going to be like England. We're not going to be a colonizee, but we're going to be a colonizer like England." So already, nobody talked about that. They Japan went into China, they're being aggressive. Well, they didn't see the roots of all that (was that) Smoot-Hawley Bill.

TI: And so you had this perspective, this, in some ways, clear sense of this building tension between the two countries, because you could see it fundamentally in terms of trade relations, military, everything building up. I mean, did you have a sense that war was imminent?

CS: That day, on Pearl Harbor day, I was typing, and I was just typing, "U.S. passed the oil embargo." That was one of eight, eight-step plan to provoke Japan into attacking. I won't go into it right now, but when the oil embargo was passed, I was just typing on my thesis, "Japan will have to make a move, and I predict that she'll probably go into Borneo to take over the oil fields of Borneo." And I was living with four hakujin roommates, and one guy came in and said, "Hey, we're being attacked."

TI: And so it was almost like you said, well --

CS: I didn't think they were gonna attack Pearl Harbor, but they'll go to Borneo.

TI: So you knew they had to do something, but you were maybe surprised at the aggressiveness in terms of going after Pearl Harbor.

CS: Yeah.

TI: But did you have a sense that they had to in some ways neutralize or defeat the American forces in the Pacific for them to continue?

CS: Well, now (in looking) back, they had to attack Pearl Harbor if they were going to go to Borneo, which they did, you know. But at that time, I didn't dream they would attack Pearl Harbor.

TI: And this point of view, this research and this thinking, were you seeing this in other places? Were you reading, like in the newspapers and columns that were predicting this also, or other scholarly papers?

CS: Oh, yeah, there was a lot... there were other scholars presenting Japan's point of view, because that was part of my research, too, that many people knew what was coming, what the U.S. was doing was forcing Japan's hand.

TI: Then why do you think the U.S. was so unprepared in Pearl Harbor when the attack happened?

CS: Well, I think, just to give an idea, at UCLA there were two courses, one by Professor Kawai and one political science professor Steiner. He was supposed to be an authority on Japan, so I took it. Just... he was so off base, but he's the authority, you know. Like we talked about his trip to Japan and China, he said, "Gee, I look at these Japanese soldiers and they're all unkempt." I kept in my mind and said, "Hey, who in the front line would be spic and span?" And I think Roosevelt was also advised before Pearl Harbor attack that they looked at the planes Japan was using in China, and they said, "Oh, they're dilapidated." They didn't know they had a fleet of superior planes. They said torpedoes dropped in shallow water will go straight down. Japan had that one that was... lot of things they misjudged, you know. I forgot the question already. [Laughs]

TI: Well, no, it sounds like... I was asking, one, why were they so unprepared, and it sounds like your response is --

CS: Well, I think they thought they could beat Japan with one hand. And they just looked down on Japan as a minor country and not powerful as she turned out to be. So all they wanted to do was have Japan attack, people would get aroused, they could declare war, and his plan worked, but at a huge cost in the Pacific war. But he did save England, that was his main purpose.

TI: So Roosevelt's plan in terms of a way to get into the war --

CS: Well, he couldn't unilaterally declare war. If Japan attacked, then he could declare war against Japan on the Tripartite Treaty, Germany and Italy would automatically come in the war, and Roosevelt knew that. So that's why he provoked Japan in attacking. I won't go into the many ways he did it.

TI: But what's interesting is that you were taking classes from, quote, "U.S.-Japan experts," and in your viewpoint, they totally underestimated what Japan was doing and what they could do.

CS: And all those American students that studied the same major as me, they became expert on Japan, went to Washington, D.C. But me, being a Nisei, automatically declared pro-Japanese. With the same opinion, same side, but because of this face, we're automatically pro-Japanese.

TI: But did your sort of Japanese heritage, did it give you a different understanding about Japan than, say, your other classmates who weren't Japanese? I mean, did you think you had a better insight into...

CS: I think so. Because I was starting off on the positive side to begin with, you know. Then I could hear the Isseis talking, and I could hear their point of view. And so I got exposed more than what the white students would get.

TI: And when you say the Issei point of view, what was the Issei point of view? When you would hear them or maybe talk with them, what were they saying?

CS: Well, the Niseis, I think it was like any American. No one talked much about it, I don't think. We didn't talk about it. Only when I was at Berkeley, it was just that short six-month period where I got that information.

TI: But then when you would overhear Isseis, they were probably more interested in what Japan was doing.

CS: Oh, yeah. The Isseis were all pro-Japanese. I mean, like when my father was (...) pro-Japanese, but he was not anti-American because he loved both countries. Same with me. We loved both countries, and it was like Father and Mother fighting. It was a sad situation.

<End Segment 12> - Copyright © 2009 Densho. All Rights Reserved.