Densho Digital Archive - Lucius Horiuchi Interview II

<Begin Segment 1>

TI: Okay, so let's start the interview. Today is Friday, November 21, 2008, and this is the second interview I'm doing with you. We had an interview, oh, last year in Las Vegas, during the Minidoka reunion. And so this is a follow-up interview. And what, I went back and looked at the transcript, and because we only had two hours, we weren't really able to spend too much time on your career, in particular, your foreign service career. So I wanted to come back and do a little more in depth, starting with your foreign service career, in particular, in Asia. So I'm going to start in 1951. So this is a little bit different, but can you first tell me, again -- and this is a little bit of review from the last interview -- why you decided to join the foreign service?

LH: Well, I think any number of reasons, including the fact that I was a political science major. And ever since being in the camp, I've always felt that service to one's country was really a worthwhile goal. That's why, after high school, I joined the U.S. Army. And when I completed college and got into the foreign service, I made myself available for any duty. And you'll see later as we go through the progression of my career, when I was asked to go to a war zone, and though I had opportunities to serve elsewhere through close friend ambassadors, I refused and went to Vietnam as I was asked to do.

TI: And so I'm curious, when you say it was because of the camp experience, you thought public service was important?

LH: Oh, absolutely.

TI: What was it about being put behind barbed wires that made you want to think about public service?

LH: Well, I think it's as simple as the fact that you're an American, but so many people felt you weren't an American, so you had to prove your loyalty. And the best way to prove your loyalty, at least for the ones a bit older than myself, was to volunteer for service in the U.S. military. And though I was in high school at the time, I was very envious of those that were old enough to go into the army. And that's another reason why I went in in '46 after graduating Franklin High School. An additional reason was the GI Bill, and I think that can be extended to the fact that I wanted to then become a civilian in the U.S. government. I think that was probably my strongest motivation.

TI: Okay, good.

<Begin Segment 2>

TI: So let's get into your career. Your first tour of duty, tell me about that.

LH: Yes, well, I was assigned to the embassy in Japan, and I was a junior political officer. And a lot of people think that the foreign service is exciting. Maybe not quite as exciting as being an intelligence officer, but still, they see movies of diplomats and movies of so-called spies or intelligence officers, and think that every moment of the day is exciting and thrilling. Well, of course, as a diplomat, you deal with, for instance, in Japan, with members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese counterpart of our Department of State. And I'll interrupt, I call it the Department because we are the premier department. And in the line of succession to the presidency, when it moves to the cabinet, the first in line is the Secretary of State. So to me, it's a misnomer when people call it the State Department, because people then think, "You mean like you work for the State Department of California?" No, the Department of State of the federal government. And so you associate with your counterparts in whatever country you're assigned to. But it isn't like being dined every day for lunch and dinner, and oftentimes called the "Striped Pants Brigade" because you're in formal black tie or white tie, euphemistically called a tuxedo. There's an awful lot of humdrum work where you sit and read report after report of not only other government agencies of the U.S., but also translations of all the possible publications of interest to the U.S. into English, that you review, so you have a better picture of that particular country's politics, economics, financial situation, and then search for the right individuals to talk to to gather up information. And that reminds me that I should always explain to people that gathering information through the Department of State is an overt act. There's nothing clandestine, nothing secret about it, even though you don't go around blabbing that you met with Joe Blow or the Deputy Prime Minister or the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for American Affairs. But it's just that that's the job of other agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency to gather information on a covert, secret basis. And maybe to... I won't say maybe, but at least from what I've read and what I've heard, to gain the cooperation maybe beyond what foreign service officers do. Because foreign service officers only exchange ideas with their counterparts.

TI: So let me ask this then. In the foreign service, gaining or collecting this information, increasing your knowledge, how does that translate into a benefit for the United States? What's the benefit of the foreign service doing this?

LH: Well, the foreign service in line with other agencies, whatever information is collected, is collated and then distributed to the primary customers, so to speak, meaning the Department of State, the intelligence agencies, to Commerce and others that may be able to use this information in their private negotiations with Japan, or in our official negotiations with Japan.

<Begin Segment 3>

TI: Okay. So I want to talk about your role as, and how being Japanese American affected that. So let me ask first, were there very many other Japanese Americans in the foreign service at your, the time that you served?

LH: Actually, very few. There were very few non-Ivy League members of the Department of State, especially in the foreign service. Let's say... I'll take a figure off the top of my head, let's say today there are thirty thousand members of the Department of State, but only maybe a select four thousand are foreign service offices, those that we generally call diplomats. And those are the key individuals, and I think we just have to look at it from the standpoint that when I entered the foreign service, most were not only Ivy Leaguers, but most were WASPs (White Anglo Saxon Protestants). Of course, some were Catholic, and a few Jews, and maybe a sprinkling of blacks and other minorities, but very few. And I feel very fortunate that I was able to pass the foreign service exam, and did very well in the orals. I think the orals are the critical aspect of the examination, and I guess you just call that quick on your feet. And others may call it other words, maybe somewhat derogatorily as being, you know, a spin-meister or someone who's able to skirt the fine line of truth and falsehood, but I don't buy that. It's just an individual who can think quickly and express himself correctly.

TI: And so with that kind of origins in terms of when you entered, very few minorities.

LH: Oh, very few.

TI: So very few Japanese Americans, and serving in Tokyo or Japan, how many other Japanese Americans were there?

LH: Well, in the embassy, maybe one other, in any given, one time. Two at most. And there were any number of Nikkei, Japanese Americans, that I also talked to on an official basis within our own government, within the Central Intelligence Agency, the military intelligence groups, and other elements of the U.S. government.

TI: So in general, how did the foreign service view placing someone of the same ethnicity, so a Japanese American, in Japan? Was that viewed as a positive?

LH: I would say it was neutral. It was not... there were more senior foreign service officers that preferred, say, Nikkei, not to serve in Japan. Because the line of thought was that they may be overly sympathetic, overly empathetic towards the Japanese since most of us were, in that period of history, Nisei, children of immigrants. Not that they doubted our loyalty, but may have felt that we may see things in a different color because of our ancestry. And I would say, basically, that's not true. I think only of the positive aspect. That the Nikkei that I knew that were involved in the occupation at that time, and I was there during the latter part of the occupation, that they were able to work more closely with the Japanese because the Japanese looked upon them as someone that could understand their culture, their history, and their motivation. And I knew any number of Nikkei that were involved in the war crimes trials, and involved with Japanese that were being investigated for what they may have been doing during the war. And I know a number of them that became very close friends of the families of those that were put on trial. And I think in that case, and in all the cases that I know of, it wasn't because they showed favoritism towards the Japanese, it was only because they were, had more insight into the Japanese and were able to give them a fairer "trial," so to speak.

TI: So you thought Japanese Americans were able to, to find that line in some ways. That they had further insights, maybe understanding, but yet they realized that they were Americans and their role wasn't to necessarily cross a line by doing favors or anything like that.

LH: That's right. And I think you also have to look at it from the standpoint of even though I was hired as a foreign service officer diplomat, not as an interpreter or translator. And a large number of Nikkei were first involved in Japan in the occupation through the Military Intelligence Service of the U.S. And they were able to speak Japanese to a high degree, and were utilized in positions maybe -- not maybe, somewhat different from my approach to my relationships with Japanese, because I spoke very limited Japanese. I either worked or talked to Japanese who spoke good enough English or a mixture of the two, or in certain negotiations I would use an interpreter. And, of course, that lessens your effectiveness in the sense of building up a closer relationship with Japanese. And that's why I feel so many of the other Nikkei that were there, especially during the war crimes trials, were able to draw themselves very, very close to Japanese nationals, because they had the language.

TI: So what I hear you saying, so you think it's a positive. So if the foreign service were able to, they would have Japanese-speaking diplomats in Japan, who had a good sense of the culture, the country, the people.

LH: Oh, absolutely.

TI: And they would be more effective.

LH: Yes. There have been more and more over the years, not a majority. But I think of people like Dr. Reischauer, Ambassador Reischauer. He was a Japanese expert at Harvard, he was married to Japanese-Japanese of a very high-class Japanese family. And so he goes to Japan speaking Japanese, knowing the Japanese culture and history, married to a Japanese, and yet he was extremely effective. And I can't think of anyone that ever spoke derogatorily of him being overly sympathetic to the Japanese because of his background. And I could relate that, I think, correctly to Nikkei, as well.

<Begin Segment 4>

TI: Okay, so I'm going to now look at it from the other side. I want to look, or have you kind of assess how the Japanese viewed Japanese Americans. Because here, you're an American representing the United States, as did the men from the MIS, Japanese Americans, primarily Niseis. How do you think the Japanese viewed Japanese Americans?

LH: I think I can say, generally speaking, the Japanese approached Nikkei, Nisei, at that time, not with trepidation but with caution. A lot of it was based on the fact, from what I know personally, that Japanese looked upon most Nikkei as nothing but farmers' children. Children of former farmers of Japan, the poor people that went to America to build a better life, or to earn money and return home, like a lot of immigrants did from around the world. So I always made it a rule that the moment that I presented my card, which is both in English and Japanese, that I was an American diplomat, I would immediately say that my father came from such-and-such province, that he was in the silk business, that he'd also run a newspaper, to give them the feel for my position. That I was not one of the farmers' children. I have nothing against farmers. Look at the millionaires that developed the Imperial Valley even though they were screwed out of it during the war, there are a lot of intelligent, rich Nikkei in the farming business. But it's just an occupation that Japanese generally look down on, especially those that came from other countries, representing other countries.

TI: Now, how did you figure this out? Was this something that someone told you, "Lucius, you should do this," or was it something that you figured out over time in terms of how people reacted to you?

LH: I would say over time you just sense it, you just know what to do. Why is it that there's an awkwardness, or there's certain questions that are asked of you. Just like in America, when people asked you a certain question because you don't look like the average American. And you eventually learn how to play it off, to make a joke of it, or throw it back at them. And I'll move forward in my career later because it was the same syndrome where I also utilized my wife's family. Whenever I then presented my foreign service card, I would bring up my father, I would bring up Admiral Cooke, my father-in-law, and his relationship to their country during the war or after the war. And immediately build a high level of bona fides on my part, so that they would look upon me as an American and say, as an equal. And in Japan it's the old business. They really want to know how far to bow, whether they should bow lower than you or not. And the only way they're going to know is through that initial introduction and the exchange of your name card.

TI: So I'm curious, did the other diplomats, the Caucasian foreign service officers, did they start doing the same thing, or did they not feel a necessity to do the same thing?

LH: I think the latter. They probably didn't feel the necessity because they were Caucasian. And the Japanese were, whatever reason, throughout history, if not paid respect for whatever reason, thought the "white man" might have been superior in so many ways. I think -- and I may be wrong, but I don't think I am -- so many Asians, especially Southeast Asians and even north Asians, meaning Japanese, Chinese, Korean, the women especially, they wanted to look as "white" as possible. Now, I don't say that goes all the way back to the powdered geisha, I just say that they avoid the sun, they have parasols, they think that whiteness is cleanliness and superior. And I think that's part and parcel with the fact that when they did meet, my contemporaries, those I worked with who were Caucasian U.S. diplomats, a lot of that interplay wasn't foremost in their minds as it was for me.

<Begin Segment 5>

TI: Well, to the Japanese, did you begin to stand out a little bit more? Because you were a Japanese American, a diplomat, and as you would make your way around, my sense is in getting to know you, Lucius, you're very good at getting to know people. And I'm wondering, did you find yourself at times, perhaps, being more effective because of being Japanese American as you worked with the Japanese?

LH: Oh, I feel that very strongly, more effective. Because they trusted me more because... this is an extremely sensitive area to discuss, because it can be misinterpreted. But a number of Japanese consider Nikkei Japanese. They don't look upon citizenship, they look upon blood. So they initially may approach you or negotiate with you on the basis that we're the same. "Your name is Horiuchi, my name is Tanaka," whatever, "and we have the same blood. So you're one of us." And I had to explain to any number of Japanese, both diplomats and friends and acquaintances that, "Listen. I'm proud of being of Japanese ancestry, my blood is pure Japanese, but I'm an American. I was born and brought up in America, I'm loyal to America, I never gave it a second thought that I could be loyal to any other country." But in their mind, a Japanese with Japanese blood is, and regardless of what country they're from, they are Japanese.

TI: That's good.

LH: But that's a two-edged sword.

TI: Well, the other thing that might have played a factor was your age. I mean, when, your first tour of duty, you were a young man.

LH: Oh, yes, I was twenty-three, and I looked eighteen.

TI: And you're dealing probably with, oftentimes, with men much older.

LH: Oh, much, much older. Oftentimes a generation or two older. And in fact, I don't want to say I exploited, but I utilized that age difference to have them treat me not only as an equal, but more like the feeling between, say, a grandfather and a grandchild. In other words, "Take me under your wing, educate me, tell me what's going on in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tell me more about how I should work with the Japanese." And a lot of them did take me under their wing, I would say, not as a grandson or a son, but as a, they would be my sensei and I would be their deshi, their disciple, to some extent.

TI: And they were trying to help you because they thought that would help, perhaps, your career?

LH: Oh, help my career, help, you know, U.S.-Japan relations. We all have multifarious motivations involved in whatever we do, but I, you're right, I think I'm pretty good at reading people and utilizing that information almost immediately in whatever relationship I develop.

TI: Well, so in the same way, they looked at you perhaps as a, possibly as a son, nephew or grandson. When you dealt with these older Japanese, how did that differ or how was that compared to you dealing with the Isseis that you knew? Like your father, your uncles, the ones who were Issei, who immigrated, was there much difference between the men that you dealt with in Japan and the Issei in the United States?

LH: Excellent question. You may not know that all Nikkei, Nisei, called the Issei "Obasan," "Ojisan," "uncle," "aunt." And everyone was like part of the family, even though we weren't living in the Nikkei community, we were still, in a sense, part of the Nikkei community. But they were not truly relatives, and in my case, when I then went to Japan as a diplomat, they were not my relatives, and even though some were a lot older than me, and we treated each other as equals, as diplomats, but at the same time, because of the age difference, there were some additional considerations, I think, given to me because I was eager and young and willing to work. Again, that's a two-way street, and a double-edged sword, but can be exploited for our purposes.

TI: So at times for you, though, was it hard for you to, oh, be harder on someone who you viewed as, perhaps, a jichan, ojisan or obasan? I mean, how was that for you? Was there that line, that, at times, did you feel like, "Oh, I have to be careful, they remind me so much of my relatives or people I respected back at home"?

LH: Yes, I don't think the latter. But I think along the lines that if they felt too close to me for reasons I just mentioned, I wouldn't withdraw, but I would sort of draw the line. And through various subjects, point out to them as subtly as possible that there is a difference, and we are from two different nations, and we are not, in essence, "blood brothers."

TI: Good. Okay, that was very good.

<Begin Segment 6>

TI: So let's talk about you as a young man in Tokyo. What was it like, Tokyo, for you as a young man? Because I believe this was the first time you had...

LH: The first time I visited Japan or went to Japan, it was 1951, and Japan was still completely devastated. And you knew that the average Japanese would treat you in an elevated fashion because even though they used the word, something like shinchuugun, the advancing army, they never used the words that we would use, that we were the occupation forces. But we were. And they paid due respect to that, but at the same time, I think all of the Japanese, or most Japanese except people like Yamamoto or Nomura and others who had lived in America, thought that we would rape all their women and take advantage of them and kill them and do horrendous things against the Japanese people and the nation. And they quickly learned that the average American, whether they're a diplomat or a soldier or a civilian, was not cruel and mean or evil. We, as a whole, were good people and wanted to help Japan rebuild. And on the rebuilding of Japan, if I may go to that for a moment, because you discussed part of that with Maynard, a lot of that rebuilding occurred during the time that I first arrived. Because the Korean War had started, and we needed a shorter supply line, and we knew that Japan would have the industrial might if they had the raw materials, and we gave them the financial beginnings to start their so-called industrial revolution. And we needed them badly for, as a supply line into Korea. And that, I think, was the major element in the immediate rebuilding of Japan after the war, when the Korean War started in June 1950.

TI: Okay. Well, so you're there at the end of the occupation, that time period, and I'm wondering, when do you know as a country when to withdraw as an occupation force? I mean, what were the signals that led the Americans to say, "Okay, this is the time for us to let the Japanese rule themselves?"

LH: Yes, I would only have to speculate, because I wasn't senior enough to be privy to policymaking of that level. But I can only assume that we felt that it was time for them to be independent again. They wanted to be independent, they were rebuilding their industries because of the Korean War, and you know, there were... I highly respect people like Yoshida Shigeru, 'cause he was not only the longest serving prime minister, but then became the top genrou, elder statesman of Japan. And he had great foresight and understanding of politics, world politics, and of the U.S., and knew that they, the Japanese, got to a point where they could exercise more power and lean on the Americans more and more so that they could become, you know, fully independent again. And I think it was to our advantage that this occur to prove to the world that we were not there on a permanent basis. But again, you have to look at the fact that we held on to Okinawa until, I believe, 1970. So that's, you know, 1952, is when the peace treaty took place, spring, and Japan became a sovereign nation again. So it took another eighteen years before we gave up the islands of Okinawa. But I don't berate ourselves too severely because the Soviets never really went to war against Japan, they were allies. But when they knew, when we dropped two atomic bombs and we were going to win the war, they then broke their treaty with Japan and joined forces with us against the Japanese, and then stripped Manchuria of all their machinery and industrial might. And they still hold Habomai, Shikotan and Etorofu islands just north of Hokkaido. They've never given them up.

TI: That's interesting. And so going back, so yeah, on the major policy side you weren't sure, I mean, you were supposing what happened. But I'm curious, you were in Tokyo on the streets talking to people, and I'm curious how well-prepared people were to have a democracy placed upon them. This was not something that I sensed the people were demanding or understood what a democracy really was. It didn't have the same history in the United States in terms of us struggling and fighting for our democracy. Here was something that was being given to them, I guess, in a sense.

LH: Yes.

TI: How did the people on the street kind of, what were they talking about?

LH: I think it was a slow process, but our information to the Japanese, you may say propaganda as well, because propaganda could be good or bad, that it was the militarists, it was the far right-wing of Japan that created the situation where they then went to war against the U.S. and then lost everything they had conquered in China and Southeast Asia and what islands of ours they had taken. And with the peace treaty in essence forced upon them, even though they realized maybe, at least some of the politicians, that it might be the right road to take after a militarist regime, still, it was a somewhat heavy-handed negotiation if you can call it that, but not highly publicized. A lot of that was hidden, that it was forced upon the Japanese, the new peace treaty, and Article IX of never rearm, never to go to war unless attacked. But the Japanese people realized as a whole that they had gone down the wrong track militarily, and maybe democracy is the right road. We lost our nation to a democracy, and maybe their form of government could be better than ours, or what ours was. And we showed them initially that we meant to foster democracy in Japan by freeing all political prisoners, including all the communists. We had rebuilt the labor unions, we had given the women suffrage, the right to vote, and the constitution was written in a fashion that I think would appeal to any right-thinking human being anywhere around the world, that, "My God, this really looks a lot better than what we used to live under." The Kenpei-tai, the military thought police, the restrictions that were placed upon the average citizen, that, "our emperor was a living god, that he wasn't a human being," I mean, any number of extreme thoughts were impressed upon the Japanese that we relieved them of. And I think slowly but surely, it became part of their nation, and even today, I feel very strongly, they're going to repeal Article IX. Not just the right, far right wing, but any number of Japanese are beginning to feel more and more that, "We shouldn't have a self-defense force, we should have an army, a navy, and air force." Well, basically they do, but their hands are tied with Article IX. We did the right thing. The majority of the Japanese accepted it, and I feel the far majority of the Japanese feel today that they had done the right thing.

<Begin Segment 7>

TI: But you mentioned initially, in that when McArthur opened up the, released political prisoners, including the communists, you mentioned, the socialists. But at some point, the American policy changed a little bit. I mean, they weren't as open to the communists and socialists.

LH: That's true. That's absolutely true. Now, I don't know where you get this insight from, but that's exactly what happened. We released all these communists, and gave the labor unions free rein, but then they became too powerful. The communists... not appealing to me, so it's a little difficult for me to understand, but for a lot of the poor people, a lot of the people that were struggling because it was still a class society in Japan like it is in many countries, but not here in America. And so it's difficult to rise above the station in which you was born, and so communism may appeal to more people there than here. The same with the labor unions. They became more and more tending towards the communist thinking or far left of the socialists' thinking. And the U.S. government felt that, "My God, maybe we've gone too far. That we've left it wide open so that they are, our closest ally in Asia may be lost to us." And the only way to get it back is to then restrict some of the activities, and if that cannot be done legally or through pressure to the Japanese government, then possibly it should be done in other ways. Now, again, it's not, I'm not privy to what exactly occurred, but I've read enough from the press and from books, from reliable writers, that the U.S. government may very well have gone to bed with the liberal Democratic party to help build it up to ensure that Japan did not get into the hands of the extremists again.

TI: Okay. So they tried to put the genie back in bottle in terms of, after realizing that perhaps, I guess, in some ways, the Japanese may go down a path that the U.S. government wasn't as comfortable with. And I guess this makes sense historically when you think of China, mainland China going to the communists. You are in the throes of the Korean police action going on at the same time, that there was this fear of communism.

LH: Oh, the fear of the domino theory was foremost in everyone's mind, I mean, whether that was the President or the National Security Advisor or the Secretary of State. That if South Korea fell, if Vietnam fell, then the domino effect would take over all of Southeast Asia and all of North Asia.

TI: For me, though, one of the ironies is that the LDP, I mean, some of the men that were put back into power in Japan, were the same men who helped start the war against the United States.

LH: That's true. Whether it was the Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, he was the one that was put under the war crimes trial, and he became prime minister, and he worked very closely with the U.S. government. None of these people were traitors to Japan. None of them were, so-called, on the payroll of the Americans, but they realized that the best road for Japan to traverse in the future was an extreme close cooperation with the Americans, and the continuation of the peace treaty and the security treaty. Going, jumping forward to when Maynard and I got married and her parents came to visit us a couple times. One time there were major demonstrations going on right in front of one of the buildings that the U.S. occupied when we were having a large reception for Maynard's father. And that also reminds me of the fact that at that same, 1961, I believe it was, or '60, anyway, President Eisenhower was visiting Asia. And for weeks ahead of time, the Secret Service had come to Japan, and we always worked hand in hand with the Secret Service and the Japanese National Police, and I think it's called the Public Safety Investigation Agency -- they're sort of FBI -- to check out the routes and the people the President will meet, or former President, but in this case, the sitting President, Eisenhower. But when the press secretary, (Haggerty), came to Haneda Airport, and Ambassador McArthur III, the nephew of General McArthur met him there, they were locked into what I called a near riot, the closest thing to a riot I'd ever seen. They barely got out with their lives.

TI: And the riot was, these were Japanese demonstrating against the...

LH: The Security Treaty, and Eisenhower was coming, our president. And the press secretary had landed first, the day before Eisenhower was to come, and our ambassador met him, and they barely got out of Haneda Airport in a helicopter and got to the embassy, and the Eisenhower trip was cancelled. And I think you can just point to any number of incidents like that, or similar to that that obviously the U.S. government was saying, "We've got to bring Japan closer in relationships, not just bilaterally, but within the context of all of Asia because of the domino theory." Now, the domino theory proved itself wrong. In 1975 when we did leave Vietnam, the rest of Southeast Asia did not fall into communist hands.

TI: So let me see if I understand this. So back to the Eisenhower situation, so these people protesting, or this near riot situation was, so they were angry at the Americans. And so what needed to happen, or at least the American thinking was, we need to turn this around somehow. We need to either -- this is not probably a good word -- neutralize or somehow get to a place where people are more willing or wanting to work with the United States.

LH: Yes, I think the majority did, it's just that -- I think you used the right word -- that we wanted to implement a policy or policies that would thwart the efforts and successful efforts of the communists and the far left. And I think that's why the longevity of the Liberal Democratic Party continues to this day. Even though from what little I know, I still have a number of contacts throughout the U.S. government, but we're not "in bed" with the LDP as we might have been in that period.

TI: Okay, that's good. Thank you, that was very useful in terms of my understanding.

<Begin Segment 8>

TI: I'm going to go back, back to that first tour. In my notes I have you saying that you had some temporary duty trips to Korea during this time period?

LH: Correct.

TI: So what would that be about? Why would you be going -- because this is during the Korean War.

LH: Yes. Well, a lot of that, again, had to do with the building up of the Japanese industrial might, which included munitions and armaments, and working with the Korean, South Korean government and the utilization of whatever we were able to provide to ensure it got into the right channels. I want to mention, though it may not be completely germane to what we just discussed, 'cause I traveled to other countries in Asia during this period. And I was a consultant to a joint effort by the U.S. Army, Navy, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Department of State was not a member of that group, I was there only as a consultant. But I throw this out to you because so many people think that civilian of the military or so-called -- we civilians include Department of State, and of the Central Intelligence Agency, are on a free ride overseas, living well, earning lots of money. But I can tell you, as I've told so many people, it isn't just cocktail parties and nuzzling up to other diplomats and having a good time. Because this group was trying to collect intelligence on other foreign countries that they called "denied areas," areas that we didn't have either diplomatic relations with or close diplomatic relations. And two members of that group were actually captured and held prisoner for longer than any other American in the history of our country, for over twenty-one years. And so obviously I knew these two individuals, one quite well, because I was a consultant to this group for a long time, and he was there from the very beginning of this particular operation. And to this day, I'm still in touch with him. And I was sad to see him when he came home -- of course, we were all pleased as punch that he came home. But the first year, we didn't know that, we thought they were both dead. Then a year later, we found out, no, they weren't dead, they were held prisoners. It was over twenty years before they came home again. And they both managed well and did well in life. In fact, one of them came to our son's wedding last January. But I just throw that out to let people know that it isn't all (a bed of) roses and, you know, a good time like so many people think diplomats have.

TI: Right.

<Begin Segment 9>

TI: So I want to follow up with two times during that period. So the time after they were, they were captured, again, you're a young man just starting your career, and you see something like this happen, where someone, a friend of yours, is either killed or captured. How does that affect you in terms of thinking, is this the right kind of line of duty for you? Do you ever think about those things?

LH: Oh, yes, of course. But if anything, I think -- and I'll get into it later -- being single, it just made the job and work that I did more interesting, more exciting, more challenging. And I say, because I was single, later when I went to Vietnam, and I was there during a very horrendous period, '68 to '70 was truly the worst period of all militarily, and I was in danger physically in any number of the provinces, and even in Saigon itself, which was being shelled daily. But because I was married, had a child, I worried so much about them if something happened to me. But being single, no thoughts like that ever occurred to me. If anything, it was an added incentive to do better, to work harder, to accomplish things for the government.

TI: So the second time period, when your friend was released after twenty-one years in captivity, what do you say to a friend after twenty-one years under those circumstances?

LH: You know, a lot of it is, like in some relationships, less said the better. And until they bring up certain subjects, you just don't delve into it. Of course, you ask the obvious questions, especially when they walk by a drinking fountain and they're not even thirsty, but they stop at every drinking fountain to take a drink of water. It's obvious why, because they were limited as to how much drinking water they had. Or how much trouble they had just using the telephone, because they hadn't used one for twenty-one years. It was really... I guess vicariously, one who had worked with these people would understand that what they had gone through was so horrendous that in many ways, everything was so sensitive, you didn't want to bring up anything unless they did. And literally, we've just become closer as the years go by. But I just throw this out because people should know that all the novels and books they read, and all the movies and television programs they may view about U.S. diplomats or members of the intelligence community like the CIA, they're there to do a job for our country. And sometimes it may bring death or permanent damage to them psychologically or physically.

And then again, I know from Iran-Contra, from Watergate, from the Iraq War to Abu Ghraib, we do things that are -- and I say it's an aberration -- that we do things that are so foreign to the central core of our beliefs, that it's very difficult to accept. But yet we know from fact that a lot of it is true. I even read in the New Yorker magazine a month ago, an article about Machiavelli, how he had been, hands tied behind him, and then his arms raised above his head and lifted twenty feet high with a rope holding him, and dropped. And that was called strappato. Strappato. And after six strappatos, he wrote out a confession. And usually it broke arms, dislocated joints. And the same article states that this is now called the "Palestinian Hanging," and one prisoner in Abu Ghraib was killed in that fashion. I find that not only disgusting, but horrible and unbelievable, and I don't want to believe it, but... I'm going to have to read it from other sources as well to accept it, but I find it believable. I find that this respected writer, I've forgotten his name, would not have written such an article, or the New Yorker would have published these so-called facts unless they were true.

TI: And what, when you said that, I thought of all the foreign service officers, the U.S. diplomats, in all these different countries around the world, when as you call it, aberrations happen like this, what's the impact on the people on the ground around the country?

LH: Yes. Well, as a fact, I know that any number of foreign service officers midlevel, and some fairly high up, ambassadorial and below, resigned because they could not accept some of the policies coming out of the White House. And I would say for the average person, whether it was me or whoever, would, you know, not do these things themselves, but accept the fact that probably on rare occasion, something horrible like this may occur. And hopefully it only occurs once and never happens again. But it's like we talk about what we went through during World War II, let's get the information out, let's have the history books show it, let's continue to teach it in schools so that it won't happen again. Well, it might very well happen again. I mentioned that in my last interview with you, with the Muslims and the Arabs here in this country. But we just pray and hope that the checks and balances work between the three powers, meaning, you know, the judiciary, legislative and the executive. And the last several years, the balance hasn't been there. Now, others, like I say, some have quit, others accept it, others may ask for transfers. And you do have people like Vance, who, as Secretary of State, resigned. You have (Secretary of State) Powell, who was buffaloed, meaning given misinformation about what was occurring in Iraq, and went in front of the U.N. claiming that they did have weapons of mass destruction, and then fighting the administration, meaning the President, Vice President and the Secretary of Defense to the degree that he was shut out. He remained in office until the first term was over, and then, as you know, Condoleeza Rice then rose from National Security Advisor to Secretary of State.

TI: Yeah, because this, it's interesting listening to you, because it does give me some insight. Because here you have these very well-educated, bright people going into public service, oftentimes at a huge financial sacrifice. I mean, you don't make a lot of money going into government service, you want to do good. And when all of a sudden your country has a pattern of these, what you called aberrations, I mean, it must be very difficult, very painful to be in that situation. You have to start questioning what you're doing and while you're doing it.

LH: You're absolutely right.

<Begin Segment 10>

TI: Okay, we're now in the second hour of our interview today, Lucius. And where I wanted to go now is the second tour of duty in Japan, in Tokyo, around 1957, '58, when you met your future wife. And so can you set the scene? Because my understanding is that you had heard about this woman even before you met. And why don't we start with that. How did, what had you heard about Maynard Cooke?

LH: Well, Maynard, by that time, was working as a contract employee for the Department of State in Washington, D.C. And the single people in any organization know about other single people. So I had this friend of mine write me saying that, "There's this gal coming out and you ought to meet her." This friend actually was telling Maynard about me as well. I very much looked forward to meeting her. I was dating, as Maynard said, Japanese starlets, one the most famous of all, Yachigusa Kaoru, true name Matsuda Ikuko. Her mother wanted me to marry her, but I didn't speak good Japanese. That's the worst thing to do, is to marry someone you can't have a common language with. Marriage is difficult enough as it is.

TI: So Lucius, I have to ask this question. So if you didn't share a really common language, when you went on dates, what would you guys do? What would you talk about?

LH: If you didn't, you say?

TI: Yeah. So you don't really, aren't really able to communicate that well...

LH: Yeah, well, you're able to communicate well enough to enjoy meals together and talk about movies that she was in, you know, Japanese culture and history and American things that she might be interested in. I then, unfortunately, was transferred to the embassy in Seoul in late '57. And then Maynard actually came out in '58. And I met her once in the spring of '58, but then she told you about that party, an embassy party that was being given that she attended where I was also at and we met and we went out. And after three dates, I went back to Korea, wrote her forty different letters on Japanese washi paper, and...

TI: But explain to me that first time, that first reception there, you met her, and then the two of you talked, and I think you went later to another place to continue the conversation.

LH: Yes.

TI: What were your impressions of her? Because as Maynard discussed, or mentioned, there were other women around you.

LH: Yes. Well, here was this woman that I'd heard so much about, and here was my opportunity to get to know her better. And I had heard and then I knew immediately she was highly intelligent, so she was very intriguing from that standpoint. And she was a lovely woman with, as I said, very voluptuous. [Laughs] And it was all obvious to me she was a very gentle human being. So after that first evening, I dated her a couple more times before I had to go back to Korea. And that's when I started to write her all these letters, exchanging letters, and telling her, "I think this can be serious," and, "I really do think I love you," and, "You ought to really consider it." She really wasn't sure. So when I had to go back to Washington on consultation, I extended my one year there for a second year. But then when I went to Japan, and we dated a couple of times and got engaged, we discussed, well, we don't want to be separated a year before getting married.

<Begin Segment 11>

TI: Well, so tell me, how did you propose to her?

LH: I don't think it's any different than most people. But the letter sort of was the prelude and you had a pretty good idea she was going to say, "Yes." So I asked her, "Will you marry me?" and she said, "Yes." It was as simple as that.

TI: And at what point, from those early dates, the letter writing, when did it become clear in your mind that she was the one?

LH: Well, I had a pretty strong feeling after the three dates. But then after the exchange of letters and seeing more into her heart and soul, and her ability to express herself, I guess it's like some movie called "Love Letters" or something like that, you know. Woman falls in love with a fellow that writes her from the war front, but it's not really him, it's his friend who's writing the letters. [Laughs]

TI: But in this case, it was really, it was really, after those first dates, it was the writing back and forth that you really got a better sense of who she was.

LH: Absolutely.

TI: And you knew that this was...

LH: And then when I got back in November, and seeing her a few more times, and it was obvious, this is the right person. And I was thirty, I was old enough, I'd been around the bend. She was thirty-three, she had been around the bend, we were already adults; we knew what we wanted in life. And so I went back to Washington and got my assignment changed. Canceled that second year in Korea and got myself reassigned to Tokyo. Now, a lot of that is not easy unless you have friends, and friends who know your abilities and know that you're not trying to, you know, get out of a hardship post, which Korea was. I was there for a year, and I'd been in and out of there during the war, and they knew I could do a good job in Tokyo. So there was no real problem there. And as Maynard said, I came back and we got married.

TI: Well, before that, though, you had a trip through Seattle.

LH: Oh, yes, because my parents and siblings were in Seattle.

TI: So at that point, did you tell your, your parents and siblings that you were...

LH: Well, my father had just died the year before, and I told my mother and my brothers. And as Maynard had told you earlier, my sister, whose husband was also with the Department in Tokyo, she initially had trepidations, but not serious ones. She immediately, or soon thereafter, came on board. And John Ishii was on board from the very beginning. And so when I went through Seattle, her brother was getting married, I met him, he liked me, I was his best man.

TI: So before you do that, that strikes me as interesting, that he made you his best man for his wedding.

LH: Yes. Well, because he knew I was gonna marry his sister, and he was up there, he was a naval academy graduate but in the Air Force getting his master's degree at the University of Washington. But obviously didn't have any close friends, family, and he felt that I would be the right one. So I agreed, and the father came up -- the mother was ill -- father came up and the wedding took place. And then he and I flew back down to Sonoma.

TI: So I want to ask, when you first met Maynard's father, how was that for you? Because her father was a prominent man --

LH: Oh, yeah.

TI: -- and were you nervous about that?

LH: Well, yes and no. By that time, I had met enough important men in the world that, like the old poem, "To deal with fools and kings," you know. And certainly you may be a little uneasy because you're meeting the father of the woman you love, the one you're going to marry, plus, he had been a prominent military officer during World War II. But he put me at ease very quickly. He was a matter-of-fact kind of guy, and in his heart of hearts, a very good -- I may not say tender -- but a very... well, I would. A tender man, because I saw that later when I saw him dealing with Maynard's younger sister, who was, had physical problems. And he was the most gentle, sweetest man I'd ever seen in my life, the way he treated his daughter, a cerebral paralytic who was damaged when she was born, in the naval hospital. And so when we flew down here, then I met the mother, and the mother wouldn't introduce me around as Maynard's fiance, and that hurt me a little. But I'd been around enough grande dames and older Caucasian that had prejudice, or some prejudice, and I knew it would work itself out. And it did; eventually I became her favorite son-in-law.

TI: So was it, was there ever any direct discussions about you being Japanese American or was it all... yeah, was that ever discussed?

LH: No, I really don't believe there was. I can't recollect that there was. They accepted me as an American even though they knew, we may have discussed my Japanese ancestry because of my parents. And explaining to them my background, you know, that I'd been in one of the camps during the war and then joined the Army, U.S. Army before I became a diplomat. But it wasn't one of those things where we went into it in great detail and spent three nights talking about.

TI: Well, I'm curious, when your in-laws and Maynard found out about the camps -- or did they know about the camps? How much did they know?

LH: Well, Maynard knew very little if anything. Her older sister did, not the one that lives here, Ann, her half-sister. And the parents knew. Maynard's parents knew about what had happened, and were interested in the fact that I'd been one of them that had been in the camp. But as far as I recollect, they didn't make a big deal out of it, nor did I. I generally underplay it with people anyway.

TI: So you returned to Japan, and then...

LH: Then we got married there.

TI: And tell me about the ceremony, the religious ceremony. What was that like?

LH: Yes. Well, first we got married on January 6, (1959), in the embassy legally, and then registered in the Japanese ward office, legally. And then on January 15th, we had an Episcopalian church ceremony. That was on January 15th. And as I said, my older sister and her husband were living in Tokyo. They held a small reception for us after the wedding.

TI: And what's the reaction at your place of work, at the embassy? Are people pretty excited that you're married, or does this change your career path in any way, going from single to being married?

LH: Yes, I would say, overall, it didn't change my career path. But I was still working many nights, many weekends, no consideration was given just because you got married. Going to have a year of only three or five days a week? None of that kind of stuff. I remember one man, actually, he was a counselor in the embassy, quite high up, and he had been a colonel in the military during the war. And he half-jokingly said to me, "Lucius, what do you call your father-in-law? Sir, Admiral, Dad, or what?" [Laughs]

TI: And what did you call your father-in-law?

LH: Well, a variety of things. It depended on the circumstances. We refer to him as Dad, I may have called him Admiral... I picked up something from, later, from one of the, his other son-in-laws, who called him "Skipper." Whereas Maynard's mother said, "Please call me Mother or Mom, but don't call me Mother Cooke." So I just called her Mother.

<Begin Segment 12>

TI: I'm going to, there was something you mentioned earlier about your public service, and how the reason you did this was to serve the public. And in particular, during the '68-'70 time period, Vietnam, there were probably ways for you to avoid having a tour of duty in Vietnam.

LH: Oh, yes.

TI: But you decided to go forward. Can you tell me a little bit more about that?

LH: Of course. Well, you know, the war dragged on for so long that, for instance, in the military, they just couldn't fill the positions there, so the soldiers were going back for a second or third tour. Well, the same with the Department of State. They not only had the large embassy in Saigon, hundreds of officers, and then generally you might have a consulate generalship or a consulate in two or three other places in a country like that, but no, we had, in essence, a consulate or a consulate generalship in every province of Vietnam. I don't remember the number, thirty-eight, forty-five, I don't know. So they would reach out to everybody and his brother and say, "Oh, you haven't served in Vietnam, you're going to Vietnam." Then, of course, any number of my old friends heard this, and a couple of ambassadors, one in Europe, one in South America, wrote me and said, "If you don't want to go, I can use you here. Just let me know, and I'll pull the right strings." And I'd consult with Maynard, and being a good Navy Junior, she said, "Well, you may not want to go, and I really don't want you to go, but if you're asked to go, you should go." And that's exactly the way I felt. I never volunteered, they were asking for volunteers while I was still in the Philippines, messages going around the world, "We need more diplomats in Vietnam." I didn't volunteer. But once I was asked... I would say that I hated to leave the family, but I wanted to get into the thick of things. Any full-blooded 100% American wants to get involved in where the action is.

TI: And what was it like when you got there?

LH: Oh, it was, there was a lot of action. And though I never fired at the enemy, I was involved in a couple of firefights up in the provinces. And we had machine guns in our cars, we had AK-47s in our home, we always carried a 9-mm pistol. And there were bombs being fired into Saigon every day, so it was a bit scary in that sense. But it was also very exciting, very challenging. I'll throw out something about Maynard's younger brother, Charlie (Cooke). He visited me there, while I was there a couple of times, twice as a presidential envoy of Nixon's, and he fought the ambassador. And I remember actually that, 'cause he told me how he had these meetings with the Chief of Station of the Central Intelligence Agency, and they were all playing the game with Johnson. "How we're winning the war." "We see the light at the end of the tunnel." And people like Charlie and a few others would call it as they saw it, and they rubbed against everybody completely. And he says, "I know it didn't help your career," and it may not have. But I don't think it harmed me in any real way. But he, I think, ended up in his career, somewhat shy of his ambitions, in part because he was accused of leaking the Pentagon Papers, and he hadn't, to Ellsberg. Ellsberg was actually part of the group that created the Pentagon Papers. And it actually ended up -- it's the same old story -- you tell a lie, everybody believes the lie. You feed in a correction or you then rebut it, people only remember the initial lie. And so even President Nixon, we have it in writing that he told Haldeman, (President Nixon's Chief of Staff), "Kill Cooke." Literally, that's what he said. But you know, Nixon said any number of things he didn't really mean, and those around him knew when he meant it.

TI: Going back to Vietnam, over the course of several years, I've interviewed men who served in the MIS who became career military. And by the time the Vietnam War started, these Niseis had advanced to a fairly high rank of colonels and things like that. When you were in Vietnam, did you ever come across other Niseis in the military or other positions like that?

LH: I ran into any number of MIS, former MIS or MIS officers in Japan, one or two in Vietnam. Why, I don't know. I really don't think there were that many there. Most of them were, by then, had either retired or no longer interested in serving in war zones.

TI: Okay. Yeah, I was just curious.

<Begin Segment 13>

TI: So while you were in Vietnam, Maynard and Brian were back in Maryland.

LH: That's correct. But they had an option. Foreign service officers were allowed to have their families in Hong Kong, Manila, four or five Southeast Asian countries, so that you wouldn't be that far away from each other and then you can visit them more frequently, because they weren't allowed in country, in Vietnam. But Maynard and Brian, as she told you, she had a medical hold on her. So did Brian, he had severe nosebleeds and asthma. And so they couldn't move to one of those third countries, so they remained in Maryland, and I visited two or three times during that period.

TI: And so when you would come back to Maryland after being gone for so long, how would you reestablish, what are some examples of you reestablishing a connection with your son?

LH: Well, I would say it was easy for me, but difficult for him because he missed me so much. We were always buddies. I don't know if Maynard said it on camera, but she was never attuned to children. She was good with Brian and loved him deeply, and had a good relationship with him, but as she admitted, the mother instinct in her is, I guess, deeply buried, but showed enough of it to Brian that he had a happy life with it. But he missed me so much because I was not only his father, I was his buddy, and we did everything together. And so when I left and he was five or six, too young to realize how long I would be gone, I said I would be gone for five months before I came back again. So I visited Seattle, and I was staying here with Maynard's older sister's family, and I'd talk to him, "Daddy, when are you coming home?" [Laughs] I said, "Brian, I haven't even left the country yet. But it was very difficult for him to adjust to that, my being away, my visiting for two or three weeks, going back and being gone again for another five months or so. And it just so happened that when I finished Vietnam, they came out to Seattle, and I, from Vietnam, went to Seattle. And I had a big party for my mother's eightieth birthday and Brian's eighth birthday. It almost coincided. And it was soon thereafter that, back in Maryland, he was so interested in writing, he would dictate television scripts to me, and I would type them out, and we would send it. The name was Beasly, I don't know what TV station in Washington, and we would get feedback from him. None of them was ever utilized, but he still has those scripts.

TI: That's a good story, given, especially now that he's a screenwriter.

LH: Screenwriter and director.

TI: And director.

<Begin Segment 14>

TI: So I'm going to now jump -- again, you went back to Japan and served there, and there's a lot we could talk about, but we covered a lot of that, or some of that in the last interview. There was something in the last interview, when you retired, that I wanted to talk about. Because you retired, and in there, you slipped in the fact that you had a lunch at the White House for your retirement.

LH: Right.

TI: Now, is this something that's common for a foreign service officer to have...

LH: Oh, far from it. Far from it. I would say that maybe even all ambassadors don't have a lunch at the White House when they retire. 'Cause a lot of the ambassadors, well, sixty percent or more are political appointees anyway. They come and go after a couple of years. But for the foreign service officer who works himself up to ambassadorship, or at the very, very most, Deputy Secretary as Negroponte is, they usually end up, the highest is one of the four or five Under Secretaries of State. That's probably about the highest a foreign service officer would get to. But I had met former President Bush on several occasions. He thought very, very highly of me, and I liked him. I'm a Democrat, but he was a moderate Republican. He's a very intelligent and kind, good human being, and a reasonable man. Anyway, it was through his connection -- he was still Vice President when I retired -- that I had this lunch, a very small lunch, in the White House. And then after that had the retirement ceremony where Schultz presided over. And people like Schultz do not preside over every foreign service officer retiring. Now, I don't want to pat myself on the back. Was I unique? Was I someone that contributed to the extent that I deserved such honors? If I think about it, I don't think particularly so, that I performed to the degree that I deserved, if I was in the military, the Congressional Medal of Honor or that the President would award me with the highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom, but I guess I had a long enough career, a successful enough career, and developed enough close friends that could facilitate such a retirement.

TI: So although you retired in 1988, I saw a picture of you with President Clinton. And this picture was, this photograph was taken in your house. And so you retired in '88, President Clinton took office...

LH: '91.

TI: '91. What was the connection there? I never --

LH: First of all, you never discuss your relationships with presidents. I mentioned Vice President Bush, I didn't mention when Bush Sr. became president. I didn't mention other presidents that I know except, you know, you've also seen me in pictures with President Ford and (Secretary of State) Kissinger, and (President) Carter, and I don't talk about those either. And especially if you have a close enough relationship where they might visit your home. The reasons why, or exactly when, is best unsaid. You lose your access the moment you open your mouth. I bring you out an example. When John Kennedy Jr. died, even those that were the closest to him, if they talked to the press, Caroline Kennedy shut them out from any future relationship with anybody in the family. And I think I have to leave it at that. I'm sure you understand.

TI: Oh, absolutely. Just your response is very interesting. This is something that I never knew or understood.

LH: Really?

TI: Yeah.

<Begin Segment 15>

TI: The other thing I wanted to talk about is we're November 2008, and so in the United States, we just had a historic election, that Barack Obama is now the President-Elect. So several weeks ago, he was elected to be our next president. You started your career in the early '50s, so before the civil rights movement, where the United States, in the South, things were segregated. And so a lot's happened, and I just wanted to get your thoughts about our country electing an African American president.

LH: I love that question. You know, in 1951, when I joined the Department of State, and even before then, I would visit Washington, D.C. and '49, '50, to see my sister. And blacks were not allowed in restaurants, in movie theaters, it just blew my mind. I just couldn't believe it. You know, this is the nation's capital, and citizens were not allowed into public places because of their color. And Maynard and I just never thought that it would ever happen in our lifetime, that a black, even a non-white, period, minority, would ever become president. And we're thrilled to death. We're both Democrats, we're both liberals, we're both registered Democrats, we'll never change, and of course, voted for Obama and always hoped for the best, and there he is, the President-Elect. But as I just told a black lady who I know fairly well who has worked with Brian on a pro-bono "get out the vote" short documentary called The Declaration, it was not for either side, it was just to get out the vote. And she's a very, very successful producer of ads for television, extremely successful, and she worked with Brian in putting this short out. And I just saw her the other day, and I knew her father had been deeply involved in the civil rights movement. I commiserated with her that, "It's too bad your father wasn't living to see this day," because he probably would be so amazed that it occurred in his lifetime. But I also told her, "Some of us -- and I'm sure you're the same with our discussion -- that he's almost like a Messiah." We expect miracles, but we shouldn't. Because even though Bush didn't respect the three elements of the government, and the Executive just tore the Constitution to shreds -- when I say the government, I mean Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz and Addington (Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney) and any number of those guys. Obama's going to respect the three elements of the government, and he in the White House, and he's going to work closely with the legislature and do what he can to work closely with the Supreme Court, and he's not going to abuse his power. And what I have seen, even though I truly believe he's a man of tremendous integrity and righteousness and goodness, I look upon someone like Bush Jr., who is anything but all of those, and everyone -- I shouldn't say everyone -- he sets the tone. And if you have any inclination of being anything but doing your job correctly, you may fall into the same pattern. 'Cause you know that's what the boss is doing, and there are many advantages in doing it that way from a personal standpoint. But with someone like Obama, I feel our whole government is going to fall back in line where the average citizen might, you and I, can truly respect the government again, and I think we're really on the right track. I expect to see great things in the next eight years.

<Begin Segment 16>

TI: So I think back to the interview that we just conducted as well as the previous one, and Lucius, you've lived an extraordinary life and have had to deal with lots of challenges. And I'm curious, you're a Nisei, your parents immigrated to the United States, and I'm curious, were there any values that come to mind in terms of what you learned from that first generation that helped you in your life?

LH: Any number. There's something called nintai. And I think nintai really means "endurance," which I have always interpreted to mean, "Accept what comes your way and make the best of it," and I think that's been the basic philosophy of my life. I've always been an optimist, and regardless of what difficulties, challenges and tragedies that may occur in my life, you get over them as soon as you can. There are always elements within those tragedies that can help you move forward. And whether it's in your career and not making ambassador, but saying, "My God, I did well enough." I mean, for Nisei of my generation and age, I got involved in a profession that was unique, that most people find more than of passing interest, and would gain enough respect and appreciation for my work. But added to the nintai, I think the concept of the Japanese, of girininjo, of always paying due respect and thankfulness to the powers to be, and your parents and your family and your friends, has always been a principle, and basic principle in my life. And I give Maynard a lot of credit, too, because she's very firm in her moral beliefs that I've implemented in my life as well. And somewhat related to all this, I love to gamble, and gamble very heavily. In the '50s, I could win or lose several thousand dollars in a night. But when I met Maynard and we got engaged, and I found out she doesn't like gambling, I quit. I haven't gambled for fifty years. But I give credit to Maynard for that. Now, you know as well as I do that the Issei really felt so strongly about being accepted into the mainstream, and I've always felt that innately. I also feel very strongly that you should help your fellow man, you should, you are a reflection of all Nikkei. And it gives us an added incentive, but it's really a double duty. You want to prove yourself and do right as an American, but you also want to do it because you're a Nikkei. You don't want to bring shame onto the Nikkei community. I think that's one of my several basic principles.

TI: Good, good. So I'm going to ask you another question. I just found out that your son and daughter-in-law, they're expecting, and so this will be your first grandchild. What, how are you feeling about that?

LH: Well, I'm thrilled, as Maynard is, and my son and daughter-in-law are even happier than we are. And I always used to tell Brian, "Whether you get married or not, whether you have children or not, that's all up to you. But if you are going to have a child or more, have it before I'm so old I can't pick it up off the floor." [Laughs] And it's like his career and his education, we left it up to him. We never demanded that he do this, do that, join the Department of State, go to Harvard or Yale. He ended up at Berkeley, he ended up in history as a major, he was Phi Beta Kappa, he was an honors student. And from that point on, it was obvious to me that he was a great writer, even though earlier he was so interested in writing. And never pushed him into a career path. It became quite obvious to us in his adulthood that he was really not cut out for an eight to five job, or eight to five, seven days a week, whatever. He has a brilliant mind, like Maynard. I have an average mind, but I work hard. I'm a real plodder night and day, seven days a week, and a positive attitude. And through his plotting -- or I should say through his intellectual capabilities and his ambition, he's become a member of the Writers Guild of America, so he has a minimum floor for whatever script he writes. He's already been a co-producer and co-writer in a movie that's already been released, he's directed a short film, he's now in the process of -- well, he just selected, had auditions for any number of actors and actresses, and one, now that Twilight is coming out, is Robert Pattinson, was interviewed and selected for this major role in Brian's film. And Robert is already advertised it to the world. He just can't wait to get started in this movie that Brian Horiuchi wrote and is going to direct, and is a "lovely, ethereal piece" that will, in essence, help his career a great deal.

I love children, I always have. I learned magic to show children magic. To this day, I still show magic. I showed that black lady I just mentioned in Hollywood, very successful producer, her young daughter, magic just the other night. 'Cause parents enjoy the fact that someone will pay attention to their children. But they don't want you give them money, candy. So the other one is magic. Children want money or candy or magic. So I was known as the "Magic Man." "Oh, Mama, when is the Magic Man coming back?" Or if they couldn't pronounce Uncle Lucius, "When is Uncle 'Looshoo' coming back?" [Laughs] But I love children, I'm extremely happy, and we just can't wait for the child to be born in May. That's still a few months to go.

I do want to mention one more time, or go into it more thoroughly, how fortunate I feel that I was given the opportunity to serve in the U.S. government for as long as I did. And a lot of people say, "Well, you were lucky." Well, you make your own luck, is my retort. And people may help you open doors, as I mentioned in my first interview, but you've got to be able to prove yourself even though someone helped you open that door. And was there a "glass ceiling" because I didn't become ambassador? I don't know. I was well-qualified, what I had done, what I accomplished. Ambassador, say, to a major country is an extremely far-reaching, difficult job. And if you do it right, as Mr. Kissinger used to say to me quite often, you have to be an expert in linkage. With every problem that you deal with in Japan or Vietnam or Korea or wherever, you have to see how it affects, geopolitically, the whole world. And I will admit I'm somewhat limited in that particular area. It would take people like Maynard and Brian to fill such a position.

TI: Oh, I think you're being much too modest, Lucius. You know, Lucius, I'm afraid we're out of time. We have to run off to the airport, but this was just a wonderful day talking to you. So thank you so much, again, for doing another interview.

LH: Well, Tom, thank you for coming up here, and thank you also to Dana Hoshide, your right arm. I remember her so well from the first interview a year ago, so it's been exactly a year ago, so we now have my first one and my second one, and Maynard's long one yesterday and today, and we look forward to seeing the finished product.

TI: Very good.

LH: Thank you very much, Tom.