<Begin Segment 7>

TI: But you mentioned initially, in that when McArthur opened up the, released political prisoners, including the communists, you mentioned, the socialists. But at some point, the American policy changed a little bit. I mean, they weren't as open to the communists and socialists.

LH: That's true. That's absolutely true. Now, I don't know where you get this insight from, but that's exactly what happened. We released all these communists, and gave the labor unions free rein, but then they became too powerful. The communists... not appealing to me, so it's a little difficult for me to understand, but for a lot of the poor people, a lot of the people that were struggling because it was still a class society in Japan like it is in many countries, but not here in America. And so it's difficult to rise above the station in which you was born, and so communism may appeal to more people there than here. The same with the labor unions. They became more and more tending towards the communist thinking or far left of the socialists' thinking. And the U.S. government felt that, "My God, maybe we've gone too far. That we've left it wide open so that they are, our closest ally in Asia may be lost to us." And the only way to get it back is to then restrict some of the activities, and if that cannot be done legally or through pressure to the Japanese government, then possibly it should be done in other ways. Now, again, it's not, I'm not privy to what exactly occurred, but I've read enough from the press and from books, from reliable writers, that the U.S. government may very well have gone to bed with the liberal Democratic party to help build it up to ensure that Japan did not get into the hands of the extremists again.

TI: Okay. So they tried to put the genie back in bottle in terms of, after realizing that perhaps, I guess, in some ways, the Japanese may go down a path that the U.S. government wasn't as comfortable with. And I guess this makes sense historically when you think of China, mainland China going to the communists. You are in the throes of the Korean police action going on at the same time, that there was this fear of communism.

LH: Oh, the fear of the domino theory was foremost in everyone's mind, I mean, whether that was the President or the National Security Advisor or the Secretary of State. That if South Korea fell, if Vietnam fell, then the domino effect would take over all of Southeast Asia and all of North Asia.

TI: For me, though, one of the ironies is that the LDP, I mean, some of the men that were put back into power in Japan, were the same men who helped start the war against the United States.

LH: That's true. Whether it was the Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, he was the one that was put under the war crimes trial, and he became prime minister, and he worked very closely with the U.S. government. None of these people were traitors to Japan. None of them were, so-called, on the payroll of the Americans, but they realized that the best road for Japan to traverse in the future was an extreme close cooperation with the Americans, and the continuation of the peace treaty and the security treaty. Going, jumping forward to when Maynard and I got married and her parents came to visit us a couple times. One time there were major demonstrations going on right in front of one of the buildings that the U.S. occupied when we were having a large reception for Maynard's father. And that also reminds me of the fact that at that same, 1961, I believe it was, or '60, anyway, President Eisenhower was visiting Asia. And for weeks ahead of time, the Secret Service had come to Japan, and we always worked hand in hand with the Secret Service and the Japanese National Police, and I think it's called the Public Safety Investigation Agency -- they're sort of FBI -- to check out the routes and the people the President will meet, or former President, but in this case, the sitting President, Eisenhower. But when the press secretary, (Haggerty), came to Haneda Airport, and Ambassador McArthur III, the nephew of General McArthur met him there, they were locked into what I called a near riot, the closest thing to a riot I'd ever seen. They barely got out with their lives.

TI: And the riot was, these were Japanese demonstrating against the...

LH: The Security Treaty, and Eisenhower was coming, our president. And the press secretary had landed first, the day before Eisenhower was to come, and our ambassador met him, and they barely got out of Haneda Airport in a helicopter and got to the embassy, and the Eisenhower trip was cancelled. And I think you can just point to any number of incidents like that, or similar to that that obviously the U.S. government was saying, "We've got to bring Japan closer in relationships, not just bilaterally, but within the context of all of Asia because of the domino theory." Now, the domino theory proved itself wrong. In 1975 when we did leave Vietnam, the rest of Southeast Asia did not fall into communist hands.

TI: So let me see if I understand this. So back to the Eisenhower situation, so these people protesting, or this near riot situation was, so they were angry at the Americans. And so what needed to happen, or at least the American thinking was, we need to turn this around somehow. We need to either -- this is not probably a good word -- neutralize or somehow get to a place where people are more willing or wanting to work with the United States.

LH: Yes, I think the majority did, it's just that -- I think you used the right word -- that we wanted to implement a policy or policies that would thwart the efforts and successful efforts of the communists and the far left. And I think that's why the longevity of the Liberal Democratic Party continues to this day. Even though from what little I know, I still have a number of contacts throughout the U.S. government, but we're not "in bed" with the LDP as we might have been in that period.

TI: Okay, that's good. Thank you, that was very useful in terms of my understanding.

<End Segment 7> - Copyright © 2008 Densho. All Rights Reserved.