<Begin Segment 6>

TI: So let's talk about you as a young man in Tokyo. What was it like, Tokyo, for you as a young man? Because I believe this was the first time you had...

LH: The first time I visited Japan or went to Japan, it was 1951, and Japan was still completely devastated. And you knew that the average Japanese would treat you in an elevated fashion because even though they used the word, something like shinchuugun, the advancing army, they never used the words that we would use, that we were the occupation forces. But we were. And they paid due respect to that, but at the same time, I think all of the Japanese, or most Japanese except people like Yamamoto or Nomura and others who had lived in America, thought that we would rape all their women and take advantage of them and kill them and do horrendous things against the Japanese people and the nation. And they quickly learned that the average American, whether they're a diplomat or a soldier or a civilian, was not cruel and mean or evil. We, as a whole, were good people and wanted to help Japan rebuild. And on the rebuilding of Japan, if I may go to that for a moment, because you discussed part of that with Maynard, a lot of that rebuilding occurred during the time that I first arrived. Because the Korean War had started, and we needed a shorter supply line, and we knew that Japan would have the industrial might if they had the raw materials, and we gave them the financial beginnings to start their so-called industrial revolution. And we needed them badly for, as a supply line into Korea. And that, I think, was the major element in the immediate rebuilding of Japan after the war, when the Korean War started in June 1950.

TI: Okay. Well, so you're there at the end of the occupation, that time period, and I'm wondering, when do you know as a country when to withdraw as an occupation force? I mean, what were the signals that led the Americans to say, "Okay, this is the time for us to let the Japanese rule themselves?"

LH: Yes, I would only have to speculate, because I wasn't senior enough to be privy to policymaking of that level. But I can only assume that we felt that it was time for them to be independent again. They wanted to be independent, they were rebuilding their industries because of the Korean War, and you know, there were... I highly respect people like Yoshida Shigeru, 'cause he was not only the longest serving prime minister, but then became the top genrou, elder statesman of Japan. And he had great foresight and understanding of politics, world politics, and of the U.S., and knew that they, the Japanese, got to a point where they could exercise more power and lean on the Americans more and more so that they could become, you know, fully independent again. And I think it was to our advantage that this occur to prove to the world that we were not there on a permanent basis. But again, you have to look at the fact that we held on to Okinawa until, I believe, 1970. So that's, you know, 1952, is when the peace treaty took place, spring, and Japan became a sovereign nation again. So it took another eighteen years before we gave up the islands of Okinawa. But I don't berate ourselves too severely because the Soviets never really went to war against Japan, they were allies. But when they knew, when we dropped two atomic bombs and we were going to win the war, they then broke their treaty with Japan and joined forces with us against the Japanese, and then stripped Manchuria of all their machinery and industrial might. And they still hold Habomai, Shikotan and Etorofu islands just north of Hokkaido. They've never given them up.

TI: That's interesting. And so going back, so yeah, on the major policy side you weren't sure, I mean, you were supposing what happened. But I'm curious, you were in Tokyo on the streets talking to people, and I'm curious how well-prepared people were to have a democracy placed upon them. This was not something that I sensed the people were demanding or understood what a democracy really was. It didn't have the same history in the United States in terms of us struggling and fighting for our democracy. Here was something that was being given to them, I guess, in a sense.

LH: Yes.

TI: How did the people on the street kind of, what were they talking about?

LH: I think it was a slow process, but our information to the Japanese, you may say propaganda as well, because propaganda could be good or bad, that it was the militarists, it was the far right-wing of Japan that created the situation where they then went to war against the U.S. and then lost everything they had conquered in China and Southeast Asia and what islands of ours they had taken. And with the peace treaty in essence forced upon them, even though they realized maybe, at least some of the politicians, that it might be the right road to take after a militarist regime, still, it was a somewhat heavy-handed negotiation if you can call it that, but not highly publicized. A lot of that was hidden, that it was forced upon the Japanese, the new peace treaty, and Article IX of never rearm, never to go to war unless attacked. But the Japanese people realized as a whole that they had gone down the wrong track militarily, and maybe democracy is the right road. We lost our nation to a democracy, and maybe their form of government could be better than ours, or what ours was. And we showed them initially that we meant to foster democracy in Japan by freeing all political prisoners, including all the communists. We had rebuilt the labor unions, we had given the women suffrage, the right to vote, and the constitution was written in a fashion that I think would appeal to any right-thinking human being anywhere around the world, that, "My God, this really looks a lot better than what we used to live under." The Kenpei-tai, the military thought police, the restrictions that were placed upon the average citizen, that, "our emperor was a living god, that he wasn't a human being," I mean, any number of extreme thoughts were impressed upon the Japanese that we relieved them of. And I think slowly but surely, it became part of their nation, and even today, I feel very strongly, they're going to repeal Article IX. Not just the right, far right wing, but any number of Japanese are beginning to feel more and more that, "We shouldn't have a self-defense force, we should have an army, a navy, and air force." Well, basically they do, but their hands are tied with Article IX. We did the right thing. The majority of the Japanese accepted it, and I feel the far majority of the Japanese feel today that they had done the right thing.

<End Segment 6> - Copyright © 2008 Densho. All Rights Reserved.