<Begin Segment 16>

AI: Well, now, at this -- through this period, the vast majority of the people of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast were removed and went cooperatively.

BH: Yes.

AI: There were a few people, notable ones, who decided not to cooperate. And they were in the news. In fact, of course, Gordon Hirabayashi was here at the University of Washington when he decided not to comply with the exclusion order.

BH: Yes.

AI: And I'm wondering, as you followed the news and, and his actions, what were your thoughts? What was your opinion about that?

BH: Well, I knew Gordon slightly, not well. I knew Min Yasui in Portland. And I admired their courage, but I felt that they were tilting at windmills. I felt that whatever they hoped to gain would not be gained for a long time, and I was, I think I was too busy trying to help the others who were in need of help.

AI: I understand that there were some in the Japanese American community who actually had a negative reaction to the, Hirabayashi's and Yasui's and Korematsu's actions, that they -- a negative reaction in that they felt it reflected very badly on the rest of the Japanese Americans.

BH: Yes, there was that kind of feeling. It's true that those three are lumped together, but I feel that that's not right. Two of them resisted the evacuation orders as a matter of principle, and the third just went into hiding, and there's a big difference.

AI: And you felt that those that, that were standing on the principle, while that was laudable, in your mind, it was not likely to have any practical effect...

BH: Yes.

AI: ...or impact.

BH: I admired their courage, but I felt that there was -- it wouldn't gain us anything.

AI: And of course, as it turned out, their courts -- as they went through the courts, the Supreme Court did eventually decide against them.

BH: Yes. And that brings up something else now. JACL and Masaoka have been criticized for not supporting them. And Mike's explanation is that anything that would go through the courts would take years, and it was more important to address more immediate matters. And he thought that these two, to begin with, would cause more trouble. And he was trying to get the government to be cooperative by showing cooperation with the government. But yeah, they, they caused a lot of trouble. And I think it was a good thing they did.

AI: In what way?

BH: Well, I think it rallied the Japanese Americans to the idea that we were entitled to legal protection. I think we admired their courage, even if it seemed foolhardy at the time. And Masaoka's point was that it would take years and years for this to get through the courts, and it did take years.

AI: Right.

BH: We couldn't depend on that to halt the evacuation.

DM: But, but more than sort of a benign nonsupport for the test cases...

BH: Yeah.

DM: ...National JACL take, took an official stance of being opposed to...

BH: Yeah.

DM: ...the test cases. But what was their reasoning for, for actively opposing the test cases?

BH: I don't know. But I would think that they were saying, "Well, these guys are causing us more trouble than we need."

DM: In the sense that it was creating negative public relations or --

BH: Yeah. That and forcing the military and the government to take more stringent, restrictive actions against us. Provoking the government.

AI: So there was some very real concern that as bad as the treatment was, that it could be worse.

BH: Yes. Absolutely. There was talk about deporting all the "Japs." How you can deport a citizen, I don't know, but it was seriously talked about in Congress, and the State Department -- there was a document in the State Department archives in which -- what's his name? I can't remember his name. One of the higher-ups said, "We have been considering deportation of these people, but how can we do that when they have so many of their men in American uniforms, fighting for the country?"

AI: Which came just a little bit later in the camp chronology.

<End Segment 16> - Copyright © 2001 Densho. All Rights Reserved.