

## WHAT ABOUT HUGH KIINO?

BY S. BURTON HEATH

Hugh Kiino is an American citizen of unusually highhrepute. His good character and loyalty, unlike those of most Americans, are not mere presumptions. They have been established by the FBI, which investigated Hugh thoroughly with the idea of using him for undercover work against the Japanese, and turned him d down only because e he had never troubled to learn how to read and write the language of his ancestors.

Hugh Kiino and his wife, Ruth, are typical of seventy thousand and American citizens, victims of one of the most unfortunate episodes in our modern history. They personify a minority problem as vicious, though more limited quantitatively, as that of the Negro.

Hugh was born in Florin, California. He majored in political science at the University of California and remained after graduation for a year's postgraduate study in law. There he met Ruth Dekuzaku, who was majoring in bacteriology. Two years after Hugh left college and joined a brother in the grape and strawberry shipping business in their home town he and Ruth were married. They have one child, a third-generation American.

In February of 1942 Hugh and Ruth were among the one hundred and seven thousand Japanese-Americans who, on very short notice, were forced by the United States Army to leave their homes, desert their businesses, and enter concentration camps. No charge was made against them. There was no suspicion on which to base any charge. But their parentage was Japanese, so they had to move en masse, regardless of their legal rights and of the physical, mental, and economic hardships involved.

Ahigh Federal judge, William Denman of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, himself a Californian sitting in California, has written into the judicial record this appraisal of the evacuation:

"Descended from Eastern Asiatics (these Japanese-Americans) have been imprisoned as the Germans imprisoned the Western-Asiatic Jews."

The analogy is harsh, but it contains considerable elements of justification. We concede that most Japanese-Americans are good, loyal citizens from whom we have nothing to fear; but, we say, among them are a few who cannot be trusted. It would be difficult to ascertain which ones are dangerous, so we just imprison them all and take no chances. That is, in part, what Adolf Hitler did. He did not contend that all Jews were bad, b but he claimed that some of them were, sothe sinstituted a pogrom against all Jews who were unfortunate enough to fall into his power.

The analogy must not be carried too far. We do not propose to discriminate permanently against the Japanese-Americans. There is no blood purge, nor will there be one. Every reasonable effort is being made to avoid even minor personal violence. Our pogrom against the Japanese-Americans is not of the sadistic type that Hitler has inflicted upon the Jews in Europe.

But from a constitutional standpoint Hugh and Ruth Kiino and 70,000 other native-born citizens, plus 30,000 immigrants of exemplary conduct, have been subjected to an intolerable imposition. They have been imprisoned without charge; they are to be relocated in new homes; they are forbidden to return to their old homes and are prevented from protecting their property rights; they are deprived of liberty and the enjoyment of their hard-earned property solely because of their race and color.

They are victims of an official psychology that was put into words by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, who inspired and directed the evacuation:

"A Jap's a Jap and it makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not. I don't want any of them."

But Judge Denman, in the case entitled Gordon Kitoshi Hirabayashi versus The United States of America, expressed a point of view much more in accord with accepted principles of Americanism:

"It is a matter of common knowledge to people of detached thinking in Pacific Coast communities, formerly living among these deported citizens, that their Mongoloid features and yellow skins have among them persons of the same high spirit, intellectual integrity and consciousness of social obligation as have the surrounding Caucasians.

"What is also pertinent is the fact that they have the same contempt for hypocrisy in their treatment by their white neighbors, and the same bitter resentment of a claim of their social inferiority as Americans have of the Nazi claim of Mordic racial supremacy."

## II

Our Japanese-American problem is misunderstood by most Caucasians. This is exemplified by a recent editorial in a magazine of large circulation which grouped Japanese-Americans with prisoners of war, and demanded firmer treatment of inmates of our "alien internment" camps, of which that at Poston, Arizona, was specified by name.

The camp at Poston is not an alien internment institution. It is one of ten concentration camps known euphemistically as relocation centers. Seven out of ten of the inmates of those ten camps are American citizens. None went there because of any misdeed of his own.

To get the picture clear, let us recall what happened early in

1942 while our Pacific Coast was all a jitter with fear that the Japanese might stage an invasion before our battered Navy could recover from Pearl Harbor.

There were more than 100,000 Japanese-Americans in coastal areas. In general they occupied strategic positions. Their farms and homes surrounded vital war installations--factories, aviation fields, Army camps. Many lived near beaches suitable for enemy landings and on hills ideal for transmission of treacherous signals to an enemy approaching from the sea.

Before the war, and in anticipation of its approach, both Army and Navy Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had canvassed these Japanese-Americans carefully to ascertain which were actual or potential spies, saboteurs, or fifth columnists. The moment that news of Pearl Harbor was flashed to Washington, Federal and local officers picked up every person of Japanese ancestry against whom counterespionage had found any cause for suspicion. There were several thousand of these, of whom many were interned and others, after thorough investigation, were released.

None of these was placed in the concentration or "relocation" camps. The relocatees were the 107,000 Japanese-Americans whose lives, so far as keen investigators could discover, had been exemplary. They were not disturbed at first, but in January and February of 1942, when a Japanese invasion seemed quite possible, even a few fifth columnists might have enabled our savage enemies to establish bridgeheads from which it would have been exceedingly difficult to dislodge them.

As a matter of discreet precaution it was decided to evacuate all Japanese-Americans to places where it would be geographically impossible for any fifth columnist who might have escaped detection to give assistance to enemy invaders.

In the case of the majority who are citizens, this evacuation because of race discrimination would appear to have violated the Bill of Rights. But because of the seriousness of the emergency and the known skill of the Japanese at subversion, the evil was accepted not merely by Caucasians but also by most, if not all, of the victims of the evacuation. I have talked with a considerable number of evacuees, including some who now are very angry about what has been done to them, and none questioned the wisdom of the original action at the time when it was taken.

But they assumed, in common with many Caucasians, that the evacuation would be of relatively short duration. It was taken for granted that as soon as all suspicious persons could be combed out and segregated under guard, the remainder would be permitted to go home. And even the pessimists supposed that the Nisei, who are citizens, would return home as soon as danger of invasion had passed.

Such hopes were not fulfilled. All Japanese-Americans were gathered into extemporized assembly centers, and then were moved to ten concentration camps known as relocation centers, situated

all the way from inland California to eastern Arkansas on the banks of the Mississippi. Nothing was done about segregating the goats from the sheep. Any real danger of an invasion passed (as authority for this consult Under Secretary of War Patterson's public utterances) and still the Nisei were forbidden to go home. Former Supreme Court Justice Byrnes, as War Mobilization Director, has placed his imprimatur upon an Army-Navy statement that no change will be made in the evacuation policy for a long time.

### III

There has been loose talk about how the evacuees have been and are being pampered, and about anti-American activities and loose discipline in the camps. I have visited the camp at Jerome, Arkansas, and have checked with competent, objective reporters who have visited other camps in order to determine what truth there might be in lurid tales told before a sub-committee of the Dies Committee on Un-American Activities.

So far as "pampering" is concerned, the situation at Jerome is typical of that at all of the centers. Let me tell you how the evacuees live.

The center consists of frame barracks roofed with tar paper and lined with wall-board. It is located on Arkansas River flat lands which had been abandoned by a rural resettlement project because they were too wet for successful farming.

There are 33 blocks, each consisting of 12 barracks, one mess hall, one recreation hall, and a combination laundry-bath-toilet building. Each barracks has 6 one-room "apartments" with a single overhead electric light in the center of the room. Two apartments, 20 by 16 feet, accommodate three persons each; two more, which are 20 feet square, are assigned to four persons each. The other two, 20 by 24 feet, are for families of from five persons up; one holds twelve Hawaiians who declined the offer of two rooms.

In addition to the bare rooms, the WRA provides a stove for each apartment and a metal army cot, a mattress pad, and two blankets for each person. That is all. Anything else the evacuees need or want--table, chairs, curtains, dresser, wastepaper basket, additional lamps--they themselves must provide or go without.

The mess hall in each block seats 250 persons on backless wooden benches at bare wooden tables. The evacuees are fed at government expense. All rationing rules are observed strictly, even for pork which the residents raise themselves. The WRA allows 45 cents daily to feed each person, which is substantially below the Army allowance; but at Jerome, and at least some other camps, the actual expenditure has never reached 40 cents and hovers

closer to 35 cents. This goes farther than one might imagine, because the Army does the camp's buying, but in these days of high food prices it hardly provides for much gourmandism.

Recreation halls have for equipment only what the evacuees are able to provide. This varies greatly. Some have ping-pong tables, and in most of them there is weight-lifting equipment. Moving pictures from 16-millimeter film (which limits variety and up-to-dateness of the features) are provided by a co-operative. Patrons must bring their own seats if they wish to sit. Entrance costs a dime for adults, a nickel for children, at which prices more than \$1,000 profit has been made after renting projector and film, paying the operator, and meeting incidental expenses.

For the camp as a whole there are a nursery, a grade school, and a high school, all taught by evacuees who are not professionals, because California, the home of most of them, did not approve of Japanese-Americans as schoolteachers. There is an excellent Army-type 175-bed hospital, directed by Caucasians but staffed largely by evacuee doctors, dentists, nurses, etc. The Buddhists and various Protestant sects have resident pastors, and a priest from outside comes in to serve the few Catholics.

No evacuee is required to work for board, lodging, and incidental necessities, nor is employment guaranteed for those who want it. But in fact there have been jobs for all who sought them. At J Jerome half of all residents, regardless of age or sex ranging from \$12 a month for apprentices and common laborers through \$16 for most employees, up to \$19 for doctors, nurses, teachers, translators, and other professional and supervisory workers. When the family head is employed each adult who is dependent upon him receives a monthly clothing allowance of \$3.50 and each child one of \$2. Workers who are not family heads are entitled to clothing allowances only for themselves.

This, in bird's-eye perspective, is what we are doing for those Japanese-Americans who are not even suspected of any wrongdoing, as well as for the relatively few who frankly proclaim their preference for that savage nation against whom we are fighting in the Orient for the survival of civilization. Within the camps there is no discrimination between these two groups.

I doubt whether any reasonable person would consider this to be pampering. On the other hand, it is not oppressive, nor have the hardships and deprivations been imposed deliberately or maliciously. Under such limitations as are imposed upon it by circumstances the WRA is trying to make the evacuees as comfortable as possible. If you feel, as many do, that a great government has no business making unoffending citizens live as these do, then blame should be placed upon those policy-makers who who waited until Pearl Harbor had been bombed before they created the War Relocation Authority and expected it to do the impossible almost overnight.

The Japanese-American problem was permitted to catch us napping. For this there was little excuse. There was nothing in the situation which was unknown or should not have been anticipated. The number of Japanese-Americans, their location, their business and social activities had been matters of record for years. A small but highly vocal group of Japano-phobes in California had imagined and publicized every danger that could possibly arise from the presence of Japanese-Americans there in time of war.

Almost every American realized that we should have to fight Japan soon, and that when we did we should find her a tricky, treacherous, unmoral enemy. It required no imagination to realize that when war came we should have to guard against a fifth-column menace on the Pacific Coast. Likewise, nobody could have doubted that the anti-Japanese element in California--the few who were genuinely worried and the many who were jealous of the Japanese-Americans' industry, frugality, and success as farmers, fishermen, and business men--would take advantage of war to create all possible bad feeling against this minority.

Our investigative agencies, Army, Navy, and FBI, did their jobs and did them well. They were ready when the time came to round up potential enemies. But administrative agencies had made no attempt to prepare for what has become the relocation problem. That was permitted to arise almost overnight, so that it had to be solved extemporaneously without any fundamental plan and almost without any guiding philosophy. It was tossed suddenly into the lap of a brand-new agency pulled out of the executive hat. That agency, the WRA, had simultaneously to feed and house and police the evacuees; to locate sites for relocation camps over the almost hysterical objection of governors, legislators, and other officials; to get the camps built in a period of man power shortage and materials scarcity; and to evolve plans for getting the evacuees back later into circulation without too much disturbance.

Under such circumstances the WRA need not be ashamed of the physical care it is giving to its wards. Nor, if the truth be known, does it need to apologize for the policing of the camps. Much of the evidence heard by the Dies subcommittee was scandalously inaccurate, as certain of the individual members know but never have troubled to inform the public.

There have been a few unfortunate episodes, of which the so-called Poston and Manzanar incidents were the worst. In the former there was a three-day strike without violence; in the latter there was shooting, arising out of a misunderstanding and the apparently deliberate falsification of one evacuee "leader," in which two were killed and ten injured.

Both of these, and lesser disturbances on other places, arose out of the activities of hoodlums who took advantage of the situation to assault unpopular residents suspected of being stool pigeons.

But on the whole, considering the number of inmates and the conditions under which they live, morale has been astonishingly high and even minor personal clashes have been amazingly few.

#### IV

While carrying on creditably its routine duty of providing for the daily needs of its wards, the War Relocation Authority has been far less successful in the longer-range program which is more important.

The essence of the relocation problem was set forth clearly and accurately in the October, 1942, issue of this magazine, by an Intelligence Officer whose official report, with certain elisions, was publicized by permission of his superiors. After pointing out that most of the evacuees are law-abiding, loyal, and trustworthy, and as such are deserving of our intelligent consideration, this trained investigator proposed a specific program for dealing with them. His suggestions may be reduced to four major items:

1. We should offer in good faith to intern for the duration of the war all Japanese-Americans who profess loyalty to Nippon, to treat them decently and kindly while restraining them safely, and when peace returns to deport them to Japan.

2. We should list all Japanese-Americans who subsequent to 1930 and since they were thirteen years old have spent as much as three years in Japan. We should regard them, their wives or husbands, their children, and their parents as persons of questionable loyalty to the United States.

3. Likewise we should list all who have made repeated visits, however brief, to Japan within the past years; and officials of Japanese nationalistic organizations; and alien Japanese who have entered this country since 1933 as traders, students, priests, etc.; and all Japanese-Americans, alien or citizen, against whom the Army, the Navy, or the FBI has ground for suspicion.

4. In each relocation camp we should establish a board of review before which any person on the suspect lists could argue an appeal to be taken off. All who were unable to convince this board of their trustworthiness should be segregated from the remainder of the evacuees.

There is a fundamental duty which was not enumerated in the Intelligence Officer's report because it is inherent in the directive by which the WRA was created. Aside from temporary care, any sensible program for handling the evacuees would seem to include the four items mentioned above plus:

5. After segregation of the untrustworthy all others should be moved with maximum dispatch from the relocation camps into normal civilian activities where they could begin the long job of rehabilitating themselves. In this they should be given a

degree of earnest government assistance predicated upon the fact that, if it were not for the government's interference with their normal lives, they would not have been obliged to start life all over again in strange surroundings without resources.

The eminently sound recommendations reported in this magazine a year ago had been in the hands of the WRA for some months previous to that date. Yet nothing had been done about effectuating them until February, 1943. Then, as an incident to enlisting Japanese-Americans in a combat unit, each evacuee over seventeen years old was asked whether he wanted to stay in this country or be sent to Japan. Throughout the country 6,300 chose deportation ---or had it chosen for them by husbands, parents, or guardians.

As I write, preliminary preparations are being made to utilize the center at Tule Lake, California, for segregation of considered unsafe to be at liberty. There is no reasonable probability that segregation can be achieved before October, which will be a year after the recommendations appeared in the print and some twenty months after evacuation from military areas was begun.

Meanwhile nothing whatever has been done about keeping the most viciously pro-Japanese away from the unquestionably pro-American. The two groups live side by side in the same barracks and eat in the same mess halls; they work side by side in field, kitchen, sawmill, and other community enterprises; they play side by side, and worship, visit, and shop, listen to the radio and read the newspapers. The disloyal are perfectly free to argue, cajole, and even threaten the loyal so long as they refrain from mayhem, and the WRA makes no apparent effort to counteract such subversive activities.

A flagrant illustration is the case of George Kuratomi, born in San Diego, who asked to be expatriated to Japan and who told me that he would like to fight in the Japanese Army. Kuratomi is a smooth, convincing young man who is thoroughly familiar with arguments to show why the future of all Japanese-Americans depends upon Japan because, he points out, they can never again hope to be accepted as Americans.

Kuratomi was described to me before we met as a probable ringleader of the pro-Japanese element at Jerome. He discussed his opinions freely in the presence of a WRA executive. Yet he is executive secretary of one of the four Buddhist congregations at the camp, which among them include about 6,500 of the 8,000 residents. As such, he is provided by the government with an office in which to meet and talk with all comers. The day I talked with him he had two charming young Miso women as assistants, not to mention the largest assortment of newspapers and periodical literature I saw in camp. It is easy to believe that he sees a great many persons every day, under ideal conditions for expounding his views. It is hard to see how the authorities could have done more to give Kuratomi facilities for weakening the faith of his fellows,

The delay about segregating Kuratomi and others like him, so as to protect loyal Japanese-Americans against their blandishments and threats, is due only in small part to inherent difficulties. Until recently no effort had been made because the WRA had not accepted the fact that pro-Japanese should not be permitted to mingle freely with pro-Americans. Even the present decision to institute a program of segregation did not come until an aroused public opinion, along with a recommendation of the Dies subcommittee, forced the Authority's hand. This is one good deed of the subcommittee in partial offset to the great harm it has done by publicizing irresponsible testimony.

Meanwhile relocation has proceeded with painful slowness. Up to the end of July-seventeen months after evacuation-only 10,720 had been released from camps on indefinite leave, with permission to establish homes and seek work anywhere outside the proscribed military zones. At that time such leaves were being granted at a rate ranging from 300 to 500 a week.

At first the machinery of relocation was slow and cumbersome. Each request for permission to leave the camps had to be investigated individually, and each permit signed by the WRA director in Washington. This took about six weeks. By the time the formalities had been satisfied the evacuee had become discouraged, and more often the prospective employer had lost interest and had filled the vacancy.

Last spring the education, experience, and aptitude histories of 73,000 evacuees over 17 years old were recorded, and their names were submitted en masse to the FBI for clearance. By the time this appears all should have passed through the hopper, so that anybody approved-which means all but perhaps 7,000-can leave camp whenever he chooses, go wherever he wishes outside prohibited areas, and seek work. Meanwhile the WRA has set up six regional offices with 50 field branches from which agents are making contact with prospective employers, offering to them the services of their Japanese-American clients.

Thus the machinery has been greased, and the WRA is trying hard to get its wards out of concentration camps and back into the streams of industry, agriculture, and commerce, where their services are needed. And to-day, although there are less than 11,000 out working and approximately 100,000 still in the camps, WRA officials tell me they have more requests for Japanese-American workers than there are candidates to fill them.

But meanwhile the worm has turned. The Issei, the Nisei, and the Kibei would have been glad to stay at home and look after themselves, but Uncle Sam wants them to get out and work, and they have lost interest. How did that happen? Much in the same manner that millions who could not find jobs during the depression in the '30's learned that they could live without working, accustomed themselves to conditions that at first had seemed intolerable, and lost their initiative and self-confidence so

that they feared to reenter economic and social competition.

Before Pearl Harbor our Japanese-Americans were a pretty self-sufficient lot who asked no odds and who looked after themselves. They lived rather well too, by their standards, even though those may have differed from our Caucasian standards, and they accumulated property. But when we evacuated them they had to make some disposition of their homes and businesses; they could not just lock the doors and walk away. So now, even if we were to open up the prohibited areas, they could not return at a moment's notice and reclaim their possessions.

They listen to long-wave radio and read newspapers and magazines. From these, and from their own leading publication, the Japanese-American Citizenship League's Pacific Citizen, they get a hypersensitive impression of how the country feels about them. They read such distortions and exaggerations as those put on record by the Dies subcommittee; they read the bitter diatribes of some Pacific Coast journals and of the Hearst press generally; they see news stories about the Nisei in American Army uniform who was so brazen as to visit a cannery to see how his fruit was being handled, which caused a sitdown strike, following which the soldier was taken into protective custody by the sheriff; about the evacuees who got into an argument with soldiers in Denver and were clouted over the head by military police; about the Des Moines housemaid who fainted when she saw a Nisei at the door, which caused rumors, later disproved, that she had been assaulted.

Why, under such circumstances, should they be enthusiastic about going forth with their bare hands and starting from scratch in some new community where they may face social ostracism, economic barriers, or even physical assault?

When they were first put into the camps they were uncomfortable-crowded, with out privacy or conveniences, with inferior food, little money, and less liberty. Their normal social contacts were disrupted. They were unjappy and they wanted to go home. But now time has passed, and what last year seemed intolerable has this year become preferable to the alternatives which they can see.

They are accustomed now to crowding, lack of privacy, inferior food. They have ceased to feel restrained because they cannot walk down the road without a permit. They have made new friends among the strangers who surround them, have located such old friends as are in the same camps, have developed an acceptable new social organization.

They are getting by with a minimum of responsibility. Perhaps they are better off than if they ventured into a hostile world in wartime to try to lift themselves by their own bootstraps. Who knows? Why take the risk of finding out?

It seems very probable that their reluctance to make the break and their distrust of the reception they would meet among Caucasians have been exaggerated by the arguments of the pro-Japanese

who have been permitted to languish so long, has become a psychological problem more difficult than the mechanical problem it was in the beginning.

We could force them out, but this would be most unjust. We do not ride citizens out of town on tails and let them shiver for themselves even when they have done wrong. These people have done no wrong. They are entitled to a maximum of assistance in the readjustment we have forced on them.

V

We might have done better with this evacuation and relocation if we had not been so occupied with other aspects of the war. But that is a superficial way to look for cheap comfort. The basic problems involving our 130,000 Japanese-Americans, 80,000 of them citizens, arose before the war when we had ample time; and it is our own fault that we did nothing about them then.

In the beginning we encouraged Japanese to migrate here because we thought that they offered a splendid source of cheap, easily controlled common labor. We were disconcerted when we discovered that they were human beings. Fred J. Hart, managing editor of the California Farm Bureau publications, told the House Immigration Committee in 1930:

"The Japanese becomes a menace because the Japanese has a psychology that he is as good or a little better than anybody else, and the Japanese has a great desire to become a landowner."

That, boiled down, is our chief complaint against the Japanese-Americans. They learned too quickly to be Americans--to hold up their heads, work hard, obey the law, save their money, invest it, and get their thirty acres and a mule or its equivalent. So to protect ourselves against the initiative of this "inferior race" we prohibited further immigration, refused naturalization to those who were here, discriminated by law and by custom socially and economically, and refused to assimilate them. Now we penalize them because they are not assimilated.

To those born in this country we cannot deny citizenship without a constitutional amendment that would be too hypocritical for our stomachs. So we educate them as Americans; we teach them our glorious history as the land of freedom and opportunity, the refuge of the oppressed of all nations, the melting pot in which race and creed and color are burned away in the intense heat of militant democracy--up to that moment, in adolescence, when they naively presume upon those teachings.

Then they learn that they must not fall in love with Caucasians, for marriage with an Oriental would be obscene. They cannot inherit land from their parents, though half of them are top-notch

farmers, because their parents, under California law which controls two-thirds of them, cannot own land. They cannot employ their manual dexterity in the better-paid skilled trades because so many trade unions, prating eloquently of democracy, refuse membership to Orientals. Like the Jews in the ghettos of Europe, they cannot live among those of another race.

The ethical outrage that we perpetrated when we evacuated these people is only the current manifestation of the deeper-seated outrage that we have imposed upon them shamefully, and we do not understand how any people can have taken so much abuse without building up an active resentment. So now, under the lash of wartime fear combined with a sense of national guilt, we are extending the prewar discrimination.

The WRA was permitted to establish camps in Arkansas only with the firm understanding that no evacuee would be released to live or work in that State. Governor Homer Adkins signed, if he did not inspire, a probably unconstitutional law prohibiting any person of Japanese descent from owning land or from leasing it for more than one year. Arizona adopted a probably unconstitutional law limiting trade with them. Florida has a law forbidding them to own land there. Nebraska, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have alien land law aimed at them.

California law long has been notoriously discriminatory. The bulk of Japanese-Americans lived in that State, and Caucasian economic groups which found themselves unable to compete with Japanese industry and frugality constantly agitated for extension of anti-Oriental statutes. Perhaps the worst of the offerings which have pockmarked California legislative calendars since Pearl Harbor would prevent any descendant of ancestors born in any nation with which we are at war from owning land in that State.

Evacuation and relocation emphasize what should long have been apparent. We cannot continue indefinitely paying lip tribute to the Bill of Rights while we deprive a minority of their constitutional prerogatives and prevent them from becoming assimilated. It would be better far, more honest and more decent, to deport every Japanese-American than to go on as we have been going.

Gradually most of the 107,000 who were evacuated are going to be relocated, to join some 20,000 who did not live in military areas and so have escaped much attention in this furor. But they are entitled to know whether we are going to accept them as Americans, on the same terms as other good citizens, and add them to the amalgam in our melting pot, or whether we propose to keep them in a state of virtual peonage and treat them as pariahs.

How, for specific example, are you going to treat Hugh Kiino if he comes along asking for a job or a kind word? Hugh and Ruth and their baby were in Michigan the last I knew. They left Jerome a few hours after I talked with Hugh. They were exceedingly fortunate. Ruth found a housekeeping job with a family that

is willing to let Hugh and their child live with her while Hugh finds work.

So you feel that Hugh is entitled to go where he will and mingle as an American with other Americans, in spite of the fact that his parents migrated here from Japan instead of from England, France, Russia, Germany, Greece, or the country whence your own forefathers came? For they too were migrants-unless you are a full-blooded American Indian.

Your answer-our answer, as a people-is important to Hugh and Ruth and their fellow Japanese-Americans, but it is equally vital to us Caucasians. As to that I quote Governor Ralph L. Carr of Colorado:

"If we deny them the protection of the Bill of Rights, if we say that they may be denied the privilege of living in any of the forty-eight States....then we are tearing down the whole American system.

"If these people are not to be accorded all the rights and privileges which the Constitution gives them, then those rights and privileges may be denied to you and me six months from now for just as poor a reason as the one which is now offered against the Japanese."